Methods in world history by Jarrick, Arne et al.
(I.i< II.i) + (I.i< II.i)
(I.i< I
I.i) + 
(I.i< I
I.i)
M
ethods in W
orld H
istory
Nordic
Academic
Press
www.nordicacademicpress.com
Methods in           
World History       
A Critical Approach
Arne Jarrick, Janken Myrdal & 
Maria Wallenberg Bondesson (eds.) 
Cover design: Fugazi form
Nordic Academic Press 
P.O. Box 1206 
SE-221 05 Lund, Sweden 
www.nordicacademicpress.com
M ethods in World History is the first international  volume that systematically addresses a number of methodological problems specific to the field of 
world history. Prompted by a lack of applicable works, the 
authors advocate a considerable sharpening of the tools  
used within the field of study. Theories constructed on  
poor foundations run an obvious risk of reinforcing flawed 
assumptions, and of propping up other, more ideological, 
constructions. The dedicated critical approach outlined in 
this volume helps to mitigate such risks.
Each author addresses a particular issue of method – for 
source criticism, archaeological evidence or estimates of 
economies for example – discussing the problems, giving 
practical examples, and offering solutions and ways of  
overcoming the difficulties involved. The perspectives are 
varied, the criticism focussed, and a common theme of  
coalescence is maintained throughout. This unique anthology 
will be of great use to advanced scholars of world history, and 
to students entering the field for the first time.
Edited by 
Arne Jarrick 
   Stockholm University, Sweden
Janken Myrdal  
   Swedish University of Agricultural    
   Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden
Maria Wallenberg Bondesson
   Stockholm University, Sweden
 
 
Contributors
 
Rodney Edvinsson
   Stockholm University, Sweden
John R. McNeill 
   Georgetown University, USA
Eva Myrdal
   Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, 
   Stockholm, Sweden
Rikard Warlenius 
   Lund University, Sweden
Mats Widgren
   Stockholm University, Sweden
Nordic Academic Press
9 789187 675584
ISBN 978-91-87675-58-4
This volume is an edition from  
Nordic Academic Press Checkpoint –  
a series dedicated to peer-reviewed  
books. It is also published within the 
framework of Kriterium, a quality  
hallmark for Swedish academic  
books. 
   All Kriterium publications undergo 
peer review according to set guidelines,     
and are available as open access 
publications at www.kriterium.se
ISSN 2002–2131
methods in world history
Methods in World History 
A Critical Approach
Edited by 
Arne Jarrick, Janken Myrdal 
& Maria Wallenberg Bondesson
nordic academic press
checkpoint
Methods in World History 
A Critical Approach
Edited by 
Arne Jarrick, Janken Myrdal 
& Maria Wallenberg Bondesson
nordic academic press
checkpoint
Nordic Academic Press
P.O. Box 1206
SE-221 05 Lund 
Sweden
www.nordicacademicpress.com
For enquiries concerning printing/copying this work
for commercial or extended use please contact the publisher.
© Nordic Academic Press and the Authors 2016
Typesetting: Stilbildarna i Mölle, Frederic Täckström
Adaptation of illustrations: Fugazi form
Cover design: Fugazi form
Print: ScandBook AB, Falun 2016
ISBN 978-91-87675-58-4 (print)
ISBN 978-91-88168-48-1 (epdf )
ISSN 2002–2131
This volume is an edition from Nordic Academic Press Checkpoint – a series dedi-
cated to peer-reviewed books. It is also published within the framework of Kriterium, 
a quality hallmark for Swedish academic books. All Kriterium publications undergo 
peer review according to set guidelines, and are available as open access publications at 
www.kriterium.se
Contents
 Globalization and world history  7
 An introduction to studies of methods 
 Arne Jarrick, Janken Myrdal & Maria Wallenberg Bondesson 
1. Historians, superhistory, and climate change 19
 J.R. McNeill 
2. On source criticism in world history 45
 Janken Myrdal 
3. Four myths in global agrarian history 85
 Mats Widgren 
4. Archaeological investigations, interpretations, and theories 107
 The cases of Sri Lanka and Sweden compared 
 Eva Myrdal 
5. What can be understood, compared, and counted as context?  147
 Studying lawmaking in world history 
  Arne Jarrick & Maria Wallenberg Bondesson  
6. Core and periphery in the early modern world system 185
 A time-space appropriation assessment 
 Rikard Warlenius 
7. National accounts in world history 227
 Methodological problems and possible solutions 
 Rodney Edvinsson 
 Index 251
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An introduction to studies of methods
Arne Jarrick, Janken Myrdal & Maria Wallenberg Bondesson
Globalization – a long-term process
Globalization may be considered a process in which the network 
of human interaction gradually widens and takes on new and more 
 complex forms. We would venture to say that each step of these deeper 
and more inclusive interconnections has unique characteristics. For 
instance, during the time of the great empires at the beginning of the 
Common Era (CE), the flow of materials and intellectual influences 
reached a higher level than ever before. Another important step was 
taken in the sixteenth century, involving the merging of the two worlds, 
America and Afro-Eurasia. These steps presented new challenges to 
populations all over the world, in the spiritual sense no less than in 
the material sense. Such challenges permeated the encounters between 
people and peoples who previously never met, and who found one 
another alien and perhaps even less than human. And those people, 
confronted with completely new geophysical circumstances, carried 
with them disease, which would prove yet another fateful challenge.
Globalization can neither be understood as a consciously intended 
process, nor as the irreversible goal or end-point of history. It is not 
the final outcome of some ancient master plan. Likewise, from our 
vantage point we cannot be sure that the worldwide web of human 
encounters will never fall apart, destroyed by, for example, pandemics, 
devastating wars, climate collapse, or something else that we cannot 
even envision. However, the fact that globalization has most often 
evolved as the unintended consequence of intended action has not 
prevented it from having a certain direction as it drives the ever- 
increasing connectedness of people around the world.
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Obviously, globalization has not been the same throughout his-
tory. It has appeared in different guises at different periods in time. 
What are the distinguishing features of our own age of globalization, 
then? Trade? No, the late nineteenth century saw the establishment 
of bulk trade with steamers and railways, a much more pervasive 
change in trade than we see today. Migration? Only if we talk about 
shorter translocations – if we are talking about mass migrations then 
other periods are far more important. But there is one specific fea-
ture that is uniquely contemporary: the immediate and worldwide 
transfer of information. That has never happened before: what does 
it imply for globalization?
Globalization is multifacetted, permeating almost all aspects of 
human life, from the production of material objects to the produc-
tion of ideas, from social conflict to ideational clashes. Ideas have 
spread worldwide, so that similar and fundamental concerns have 
seeped into people’s minds, whether explicitly discussed or not. 
Indeed, today we are witnessing a rapid convergence in what people 
around the world are discussing, not just geographically but also 
temporally, be it a truly worldwide conversation in the global agora 
or a series of local exchanges resembling each other.
Of course, even in our time, there are a wide variety of issues, 
dealt with separately in the different regions and nations of the 
world, but they are increasingly converging into a more limited 
number of core issues of common concern to all humankind. 
Worldwide access to modern Internet media is the technologi-
cal motor of this change, together with computerization, which 
leads to a similarity in intellectual tools and approaches all over 
the world. However, aside from the opportunities provided by 
new and fast-expanding technologies, there is also a societal and 
environmental base for the heated arguments found in almost all 
corners of the world. Democracy, women’s rights, environmental 
problems, and not least comparisons between cultures: for good 
reasons, these issues worry us wherever we happen to live, as they 
are the basis for sustaining our lives and societies, and require 
globally agreed solutions. 
For instance, patriarchs in Central Asia and feminists in New 
York are not only equally preoccupied with gender issues, but also 
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largely familiar with one another’s discourses to which they also 
react, so that advances in women’s rights in one place may trigger a 
conservative, patriarchal reaction in another. Environmental issues 
are linked to questions of power and responsibility not only between 
nations, but between continents, in a continuation of a centuries-long 
trend towards increased rights for previously repressed groups being 
offset by counter-reactions from individuals and groups who see 
their power diminishing.
Self-evidently, this intense global discussion does not necessarily 
mean that we are witnessing an increasingly unified culture. Quite 
the contrary, we are rather experiencing the continued competition 
between world religions and ideologies, and the strengthening of 
some aspects of regional cultures, perhaps in reaction to the pres-
sure applied by globalization. However, those religions, ideologies 
and regional cultures increasingly revolve around common core 
issues. 
It is precisely here that world historians come in. Indeed, the 
growing field of world history research is itself part and parcel of 
that globally converging agenda. And in every discussion that is 
relevant for the future direction of humankind, in every discussion 
with ideological connotations and implications, history plays a role. 
History is the storage chamber from which arguments are fetched, 
whether complete myths or solid facts. Potentially, this gives the 
writing of world history a specific and crucial role as globalization 
unfolds. For this reason it is reassuring that a globalizing trend is 
clearly discernible in current historical research. 
World historians
It is clear that the scientific tide has turned many times before, 
and historical research is no exception. Thus it is no surprise that 
over the last two millennia there have been a number of synthe-
sizing waves, when intellectuals from different schools have made 
attempts at formulating grand, general ideas about the forces and 
destiny of world history. From earlier periods we might mention 
Ssu-Ma-Chien or Ibn Khaldun, from recent history Karl Marx 
and Max Weber (for an overview and a number of presentations 
methods in world history
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of world historians, see Galtung & Inayatullah 1997), and more 
recently Immanuel Wallerstein, Jared Diamond and David  Christian 
(Wallerstein 1974–1989; Diamond 1997; Christian 2004). Today 
we see world history studies evolving into a movement, a genre 
in its own right, with specific journals, international conferences, 
and increasing numbers of scholars leading the way (Collins 1999; 
Bentley 2011). 
On the surface, the current boom in world history studies resemb-
les a similar boom in national history in the nineteenth century. In 
every country, new journals and associations were founded and large 
groups of historians published on national history in mono graphs 
and textbooks. But the similarity goes deeper than that. Generally 
speaking, the peoples of Europe and their politicians in the nineteenth 
century embraced nationalism. Thus, from the nineteenth century 
onwards, professional historians were “drafted” into the nationalist 
project of providing their nation-states with a glorious past. This, 
said in passing, has been repeated in nationalist and sometimes 
anti-colonial historiography in other parts of the world since the 
Second World War. Since nationalism was an all-embracing ideology, 
nationalistic inclinations often harmonized with the attitudes of the 
historians. However, gradually some of them became annoyed by the 
lack of scientific distance to certain of these myths, and took steps to 
professionalize and at the same time improve historical research. As 
professionals they reacted against the role that history was supposed 
to play in the formation of national self-awareness – the forming of 
nations as collective units.
Citizens were taught that they had a shared history, a kind of 
unifying experience. It was normally charged with pride at being 
a citizen of the nation to which they belonged. We are all aware of 
the fact that the development of national self-awareness can have 
disastrous results. After all much of the ideological basis of German 
expansionism was to be found in how history was written. At the 
same time, history as a discipline became more and more profes-
sionalized. History was one of the core subjects at the universities, 
and when the humanities underwent a profound methodological 
transformation – the introduction of detailed and critical descrip-
tion – history was in the front line.
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Source criticism developed into a key method, with certain cri-
teria for how the double-checking of primary sources should be 
implemented. Plain forgery was the first to be weeded out, with the 
help of indicators such as writing style, age of paper and deletions. 
Another criterion was proximity to event and place. The nearer 
in time and space, the greater the credibility of the information 
gained. A most important check was purpose. Every source created 
by human beings embodies an intention. Most often, those who 
produce the source (whether written, painted or created by other 
means) want to portray themselves in a good light (when describing 
a war, for instance), or to gain some advantage (in a conflict over 
property, say). Source criticism could be used as a powerful  weapon 
against exaggerated national self-esteem, with its counterpart in 
today’s sensitivity to Eurocentrism and other self-blind biases. Source 
 criticism certainly does not offer complete protection, however. Thus 
the country where the method was first developed, Germany, was 
also the country where national pride, or even “race pride” based 
on counterfeit historiography, took on horrific proportions, with 
the most disastrous effects. The Nazis had strong popular support, 
largely thanks to historical mythmaking.
This process can be described as bi-directional. Thus profession-
alization, inspired by nation-building, could also provide the tools 
by which the myths and misinterpretations in nation-building his-
toriography could be undermined. Professionalization, in the sense 
that scientific methods are developed, is potentially a self-healing 
process during which facts will be established under increasingly 
intense scrutiny, reviewed by peers, while the individual scholar 
simultaneously exerts self-control when interpreting sources.
Improving methods
What is the lesson to be learnt from this? Historians have a respon-
sibility for their presentation of knowledge of the past, but also for 
trying to avoid undesirable use of their findings. One important 
way to minimize the risk of abuses of historical knowledge is to 
expose the results to stringent tests, as well as to gather and system-
atize knowledge with a mind as “clinically” detached as possible. 
methods in world history
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An essential step is to open up a thorough discussion of what the 
production of historical knowledge can and should imply for us in 
the methodological sense. However, to date such methodological 
issues have seldom been discussed. For example, the just-published 
A Companion to World History (Northrop 2015) has over thirty 
interesting chapters, but almost none of them are occupied with 
critical methodological perspectives (for the one rare exception, see 
Adas in Northrop 2015). The present volume is thus an attempt to 
redress this sort of relative deficiency. 
Today’s world historians need to reflect systematically on the 
 methods they apply in order to improve and develop their craft. We 
are fully aware that this brings to mind a wide variety of issues, of 
which only a small number and specific perspectives will be particu-
larly addressed in this volume. Our take on the matter is as distinc-
tively or narrowly methodological as the overarching questions are 
quite simple. The first question concerns how to gather information; 
the second, how to make sure that the information gathered and 
utilized is reasonably reliable. The questions are operationalized 
into a number of different issues, all aiming at the improvement of 
the craft of world history. They range from an encouragement to 
utilize new, non-textual sources, through calls to improve source 
criticism using systematic examination of secondary sources and the 
different degrees of resolution of data to be compared, to methods 
for improving our ability to understand and compare seemingly 
unintelligible sources divided by wide cultural distances, and, finally, 
to methods for measuring long-term economic relations between 
countries and regions.
For quite a few global historians, the major methodological 
mission is different from ours. It is to find ways to resist ideolog-
ical tendencies and temptations – varieties of Eurocentrism being 
seemingly the most important and pressing one. Quite frequently, 
Western historians have accused other – mainly Western – historians 
of treating Europe as a model for the rest of the world. This criti-
cism appears in two guises: as an accusation of diffusionist bias or 
as what could be called a topical bias. The former type of criticism 
has been frequently repeated since at least the end of the Second 
World War and is well known to all who are familiar with global 
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or world history. Ironically as it might seem, the latter criticism 
has been evoked by attempts to respond constructively to the first 
type of criticism. As a response to charges of naïve diffusionism, 
historians have taken pains to show that certain social, institu-
tional and economic processes, such as advanced trade networks, 
were established in many parts of the world independently, prior 
to corresponding processes in Europe, instead of being spread to 
peripheries from a Western center of origin (for example, Abu-
Lughod 1993; Lieberman 2009). In turn, the critical repercussion 
has been that it is now regarded as Eurocentric to identify essential 
aspects of societal development with processes once thought as 
Western or European, although perceived as evolving independently 
of the West itself. Why focus on phenomena so closely linked to 
the development of Western capitalism, whether developed inde-
pendently or not (Conrad 2013)?
One may wonder if it is possible to imagine any approach that 
would not be viewed as Eurocentric – one way or another. Cer-
tainly, it is always important to cultivate a sensitivity to one’s own 
potential biases. And obviously, historians have had a tendency to 
present their own region as the bearer of specific and perhaps supe-
rior qualities. This is clearly a problem that must be addressed by 
all world historians with an ambition to provide critical and com-
parative analyses. Yet, the rejoinder may be a case of over- sensitivity, 
prompting  anxious scholars to circumvent all kinds of globally 
oriented historical comparisons. 
Equally, it is far-fetched to consider the use of certain concepts and 
theories as Eurocentric simply because they originated in Europe. 
It would be as strange to regard certain concepts as “Afrocentric” 
only because they were invented somewhere in Africa. This is to 
conflate narrow-minded part-blindness with the universal charac-
ter and usefulness of certain analytical tools and theories offered to 
everyone wherever they happen to live. 
Another danger, especially to historians, is politically or commer-
cially driven expectations to present a distorted picture of long-term 
environmental change. This might be disastrous for our chances 
of solving future problems. Similarly, if certain idiosyncrasies con-
cerning women in patriarchal cultures are to decide how women’s 
methods in world history
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contribution to human intellectual and material culture is to be 
described, this could hamper the process of women winning more 
rights, not just for decades but for centuries to come.
This volume
Biases such as these constitute a threat to  societally relevant research. 
Being of profound importance to  science and society, these issues also 
feature large in this volume. This includes a deliberate suspicion of 
one’s own non- scientific idiosyncrasies as much as of other scholars’. 
In other words, to us it is obvious that criticism of ideology-driven 
research in itself has to be as non-ideological as possible in order 
to be, and thus appear, reliable. Indeed, double-directed awareness 
of this kind is evident in much of this volume, especially in Janken 
Myrdal’s plea for better historical source criticism, Mats Widgren’s 
criticism of the myths of agrarian development in the world, Eva 
Myrdal’s discussion of the data asymmetry between Sweden and Sri 
Lanka, and Rikard Warlenius’ diligent attempt to measure value and 
exchange relations in a non-Eurocentric manner.
However, although present in most of the chapters, critique of 
ideology is not at the core of our methodological approach to world 
history. The same applies to theoretical and conceptual issues, despite 
the irrefutable fact that they likewise are relevant to matters of method. 
As said, our overarching ambition is more limited. But even with 
a limited ambition it is beyond our reach to exhaust the issue. A 
great many other questions could have been included. Yet, since we 
see this as a starting point for a new way of approaching methodo-
logical problems in world history, we expect other scholars to join 
in and supply what is missing here.
Historical research has normally been based on textual  sources, 
and it still is, a fact which is reflected in most of the chapters in this 
volume. This is unfortunate. Historians should be ready to approach 
any aspect of the past that could be of potential use for of any kind of 
information that helps in tracing bygone processes leading up to the 
present – be it a text, a physical object or a chemical process. This is 
precisely the issue at stake in John McNeill’s contribution. McNeill 
mentions additional historical sources such as tree rings, ice cores, 
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mineral deposits in caves, fossil pollen, marine corals, et cetera. He 
states that the increasing interest in such sources is due to a “new surge 
of research into climate history”, in its turn reflecting concerns about 
the presently ongoing potentially devastating change in the climatic 
conditions for human life. If historians continue sticking to their age-
old textual tradition, they will gradually become marginalized, miss 
out on crucial debates, and much needed historical knowledge will 
never be produced. Acquiring new methods is, however, not an easy 
task which is why historians, according to McNeill, may wish to col-
laborate with microbiologists, geneticists, chemists, and other experts 
on methods that so far have been rather alien to the historical sciences.
However, despite the coming sea change in the informational 
conditions for historical research – McNeill calls it a revolution 
– historians are still preoccupied with textual  sources. This is also 
why the discussions in this volume mainly address the problems of 
tackling textual remains from the past. Our take on the matter is 
positive as well as negative, welcoming the huge potential of text-
based comparative research, yet also warning against too sanguine 
an attitude to the problems intrinsically tied to it.
In his plea for sharpened source criticism, Janken Myrdal recom-
mends that historians check up on a few indicators that are glob-
ally represented. Such studies could be based on a combination 
of sources, primary, secondary (literature), and tertiary (literature 
referring to other literature). Any such combination may result in 
new and solid knowledge, as long as the study is arranged so as 
to make it sincerely possible to refute its results. With the aid of 
empirical examples from his own research Myrdal then addresses a 
pair of essential methodological problems which he then applies to 
the testing of the so-called axial age theory.
Myrdal touches upon the problem that world history to a substan-
tial degree has to be based on secondary or even tertiary sources. But 
he leaves a closer treatment of the issue to Mats Widgren. Widgren 
is presently engaged in a project to summarize and assess existing 
knowledge of global agrarian systems in the last millennium. In 
this project, the researchers have had to rely heavily on secondary 
sources. Here, they have been struck by how often scholars ignore 
empirically tested generalizations for untested “commonly accepted 
methods in world history
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assumptions”. Widgren devotes his chapter to a critical discussion 
of four myths based on such assumptions: the myth of empty land 
in areas that were actually populated and used in different ways; 
the myth that current foraging systems are representative of their 
assumed counterparts in prehistory; the myth of agrarian inertia in 
the past; and the myth of environmental determinism. Along with 
his critical discussion of these myths, Widgren suggests how best 
to distinguish between reliable and unreliable secondary sources.
Like Janken Myrdal and Mats Widgren, Eva Myrdal addresses 
some of the problems with sources. Her particular aim is to raise 
warnings against a reliance on comparisons between regions or count-
ries where data are really not on par due to their different degrees of 
resolution. She illustrates the general problem by charting how to 
achieve comparability of certain aspects of the long-term  economic 
development of Sweden and Sri Lanka. The ultimate goal is to over-
come such imbalances and thus establish a more solid ground for 
globally oriented comparative research. 
All these chapters address a series of methodological shortcom-
ings in the field of world history research. In contrast, Arne Jarrick’s 
and Maria Wallenberg Bondesson’s purpose is instead to argue that 
the methodological obstacles are not as non-negotiable as is often 
claimed and lamented. With a number of examples from their ongo-
ing comparative research into the long-term history of law-making 
worldwide, Jarrick and Wallenberg Bondesson show that it is indeed 
possible to make intelligible – and so comparable and contextualized 
– texts from cultures at huge temporal and geographical distances 
from one another. Basing their research on primary sources, they 
also give an outline of the particular tools needed to come to grips 
with tough but nonetheless digestible matter of this kind.
Continuing the theme of comparisons, both of the two concluding 
chapters deal with different aspects of comparative economic his-
tory. Drawing on Immanuel Wallerstein’s world system theory and 
ecological economics, Rikard Warlenius takes a structural- ecological 
approach to shed some light on the long-standing dispute over 
whether the early modern world economy centered on Europe or 
China. The case of the eighteenth-century tea and iron trade between 
Sweden and China is the subject of Warlenius’ analysis, which he 
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carries out using time-space appropriation (TSA), in which the land 
and labor embodied in the commodities exchanged are calculated 
and compared. Since prices are considered highly cultural, and are 
not simply an outcome of supply and demand, this approach lays 
bare the power relations beneath what on the surface looks like 
equal exchanges. Warlenius demonstrates how to use the method, 
developed at the Human Ecology Department at Lund, making it 
possible for others to apply.
Like the other contributors to this volume, Rodney Edvinsson 
combines the identification of a methodological problem with sugges-
tions of how to find a solution to it; in this case, how to estimate the 
long-term development of the GDP of different countries in order to 
make them reasonably comparable. Such work could be immensely 
time-consuming, and the challenge is how to find a shortcut which, 
being good enough, could become widely  accepted – and far more 
valid than Angus Maddison’s heavily criticized “time series” which 
spans the entire era from 1 CE to the present. After addressing a 
number of potential pitfalls, Edvinsson ends by proposing what he 
calls the expenditure approach.
In conclusion, the intention of this volume is to serve as a starting 
point for constructive developments in the field of global history 
research. We are well aware that there are many more methodolog-
ical issues that need to be addressed than those discussed here, and 
our aim is to mark a baseline for this most vital discussion about 
world history.
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chapter 1
Historians, superhistory,  
and climate change
J.R. McNeill
That we are now in an age of rapid climate change is disputed in 
only in a few places, and there mainly for political purposes. Con-
cern over what changing climate might mean has motivated a surge 
of research into climate history, using all manner of proxy evidence 
to inquire into temperature conditions, droughts and floods, the 
frequency of hurricanes and other major storms, El Niño events, 
and much else besides.
Only a small proportion of this new evidence on climate history 
comes from textual sources, the familiar terrain of the historian. 
Instead it comes from tree rings, ice cores, speleothems (mineral 
deposits in caves), fossil pollen, marine corals, varves (layers of 
silt or clay on the seafloor) among other places. Climate history is 
undergoing a renaissance thanks to all these new data. At the same 
time, as I will explain below, new evidence of other sorts, pertaining 
to other sorts of history, is also cascading forth.
Fifty or sixty years ago, under the influence of Fernand Braudel and 
his friends, professional history took a turn toward the social sciences. 
Thirty years ago, under the influence of other French scholars, no 
friends of Braudel, professional history took a “linguistic turn”. Now 
it looks to be taking a “natural science turn”. Historians seem to be 
rather like windmills, turning this way and that in response to the 
prevailing winds of other intellectual disciplines. There is nothing 
wrong with that. Surely it is often preferable to adjust one’s research 
methods in response to innovations, whether they come from physics 
or from literary studies, rather than to remain resolutely unaffected 
by changes in intellectual life.
methods in world history
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In this chapter, I will try to explain some of the opportunities and 
challenges presented by the volcano-like eruption of new historical 
data from the natural sciences, with special attention to climate data 
and what some prominent historians have thought about climate. 
I will also raise the question of how the new data might affect the 
choices historians make about the scales on which they pursue their 
research, in particular the logic of selecting a global scale.
Superhistory and why historians 
need to overcome the text fetish
The past, always a foreign country, is growing more foreign to text-
based historians.
If historians wish to improve their – our – ability to address 
puzzles from the past (and for that matter to remain central in the 
study of history), they – we – need to embrace what is fast becoming 
superhistory. Superhistory amounts to a methodological revolution 
by which textual evidence jostles together with that of ice cores, 
marine sediments, peat bogs, stable isotopic ratios, and the human 
genome – and a few other genomes as well. The revolution takes 
historians to new terrain, to geo-archives and bio-archives, as well 
as to the more familiar archives containing old documents. Climate 
history is part of this revolution, so far perhaps the biggest part.
While careful analysis of documentary texts is the bread and butter 
of the historical method, historians for at least a century have found 
ways to use other sources such as art, literature, and the findings of 
archeologists. For those times and places at which abundant texts, 
art, and archeology overlap, such as the Roman Mediterranean of 
the first and second centuries CE, the interplay among specialists 
using different sorts of sources is a long tradition and a fruitful one. 
Such melding of sources has yielded information and insights rarely 
matched for times and places with fewer texts, less surviving art, or 
low appeal to archeologists. So superhistory has its precedents, and 
perhaps should be regarded as an expansion upon a methodological 
tradition (Myrdal 2012).
Superhistory nudges us, and perhaps drives us, in the direction of 
global history. Texts come in languages, and those languages some-
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times correspond to political structures such as states and nations. 
Japanese is spoken in Japan and almost nowhere else; similarly with 
Danish and Denmark. Thus text-based historians who know these 
languages are tempted to write their histories on the national scale 
or smaller. Moreover, much textual documentation has been pro-
duced by bureaucrats employed by states and concerns the business 
of states. Thus textual history – what we still call history – exhibits 
a strong bias toward the affairs of nations and states. It encourages 
historians to accept nations and states as appropriate units of  analysis, 
which for some questions they are and for others they are not. This 
tendency towards national-scale history has probably weakened in 
recent decades; the advent of superhistory will weaken it further.
The evidence of superhistory bears much thinner relationships to 
nations and states, and encourages historians to play around with 
other units of analysis, both larger and smaller. Of course, textual 
historians for centuries have worked on a variety of scales. Some 
attempted global history or thematically defined subsets of global 
history, such as warfare, marriage, or agriculture. The new torrents 
of climate evidence and the genomic data easily lend themselves to 
global-scale analyses. Thus the evidence from the natural sciences 
that is now spewing forth invites a new generation of historians 
to adopt world-historical perspectives. And those scholars already 
employing world history perspectives probably find the new evi-
dence of superhistory more interesting, exciting, and compatible 
with their ambitions than do other historians.1
Superhistory bears a cousinly resemblance to Big History. Scholars 
such as David Christian (in Australia) and Fred Spier (in the Nether-
lands) have spearheaded a very long-term perspective on human 
affairs, which they call Big History. It involves situating the human 
story inside the story of life on Earth, inside the story of Earth, inside 
the story of the solar system, our galaxy, our Universe. At this scale, 
mind-boggling for most historians, Christian and Spier find pat-
terns that are not readily visible on the brief time scales familiar to 
historians and archeologists. They see, for example, recurrent stories 
of energy capture and advancing complexity, in celestial bodies and 
civilizations alike, over time (Christian 2005; Spier 2010).
Big History, moreover, necessarily requires a plurality of sources, 
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disciplines, and perspectives. Big historians such as Christian (a his-
torian of imperial Russia by background) and Spier (an anthropol-
ogist with an undergraduate degree in biochemistry), must wrestle 
with cosmology, astronomy, earth science, evolutionary biology, 
paleoanthropology, archeology, as well as history as conventionally 
understood. Big History is stunning in its ambition, and requires 
an Aristotelian reach on the part of its practitioners. No wonder 
there are comparatively few who practice the art.
Superhistory calls for something less. First of all, it is not con-
cerned with the origins of the Universe, stars, planets, galaxies, solar 
systems, or life. Nor is it concerned with much of the first four bil-
lion years of life on Earth. Rather, it is concerned with the human 
experience and only the human experience. It is a few notches less 
ambitious, and less demanding, than Big History. But it shares with 
Big History a recognition of the value of approaches to the human 
past through multiple disciplines and multiple types of sources. In 
this chapter I maintain that historians, like it or not, would be well 
advised to accept the implications of superhistory and acquaint 
themselves, where appropriate to their subjects, with the evidence 
from the natural sciences. But I do not claim that they need to 
become practitioners, or devotees, of Big History. While I have the 
greatest respect for the achievement of Christian (2005) and Spier 
(2010), and am among those fascinated by the larger patterns they 
identify, I do not yet see that their elegant nesting of human history 
inside so many other histories necessarily changes the way historians 
should see their subjects. In a sense, Big History changes everything 
and changes nothing. It tells us that our species’ story conforms 
to a larger pattern. But it does not change our species story. In a 
nutshell, superhistory represents a revolution in historical methods 
but no change in subject; Big History is a revolution in subject, 
perspective, and method.
Before going any further, let me turn to some of the dark sides of 
superhistory. Among the risks one runs in globalizing history is the 
temptation to seek simple explanations for things outside one’s area of 
expertise. This temptation operates within history itself, and a fortiori 
with respect to scholars venturing beyond its traditional confines and 
dabbling in superhistory. So, historians of modern or late imperial 
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China for example, who would never accept a simple explanation of 
the fall of the Qing dynasty, are tempted to accept one for the fall of 
the Maya city-states or for the empire of Mali. This is only human: it 
would take time and effort to educate oneself in the complexities of 
Yucatan and Guatemala in the eighth to the tenth century, or West 
Africa in the fourteenth and fifteenth. Who can justify the time? 
Historians who forage in other disciplines to enrich their sense 
of the past run a still greater risk. Climatology, genetics, historical 
linguistics, isotopic analysis, and other specialist realms, of course 
have their complexities and controversies, and informed assessment 
of them requires some considerable education in fields most his-
torians have steadfastly avoided since secondary school. Hence the 
powerful temptation to accept simplistic explanations – or, what is 
probably worse, to ignore novel sorts of evidence and pretend that 
texts are all that matters.
That last position, while comforting to those of us trained to 
examine texts, is increasingly naïve and intellectually unsustain-
able. By fetishizing documents, professional historians for nearly 
200 years have presented caricatures of the past based on what were 
often accidents: what happened to get written down, and, of that, 
what happened to be kept, and, of that, what happened to survive 
rot, fires, floods, ravenous insects, important people trying to hide 
a sin or two, or any of the several other hazards to which paper, 
papyrus, clay tablets, or oracle bones might be subject. As a result, 
a great deal remained hidden to historians, many of whom found it 
congenial and comforting to pretend it therefore did not happen.2
Confining oneself to data present in texts is now a worse  method 
than ever before. Nowadays the chemically-inclined physical anthro-
pologists can tell us, by examining strontium-calcium ratios in 
bone and teeth, where the food was grown that nourished any 
particular body. They can tell which alpine valleys Ötzi the Iceman 
frequented during his childhood, and, if given a tooth, could tell 
us whether or not President Obama was raised in Hawaii and Java 
as opposed to Kenya, as a remarkable proportion of Americans 
believe (not that strontium-calcium ratios would likely change 
their opinions in the matter!). They can tell us, from chemical 
analysis of human remains, that Italians in 900 CE ate almost 
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no seafood unless they lived on the coast, but that by 1300 even 
inland Italians ate it routinely.
The microbiologists can tell us which antibodies prevailed in which 
populations, providing indications of past experience of bubonic 
plague or malaria. From teeth, they can tell us which skeletons in 
London cemeteries from 1348 belonged to bubonic plague victims 
and which did not. They can map the geography of the 1918 influ-
enza epidemic’s intensity at least as well as can historians working 
with texts. The geneticists can tell us that the founding mothers of 
the Icelandic population were overwhelmingly from Britain and 
Ireland, presumably abducted or purchased by Norsemen en route 
to settlement in Iceland in the decades after 874 CE, something 
on which the Icelandic texts are mute and archeology unhelpful.
Microbiologists and geneticists have also resolved what for Amer-
icans was a detail of some importance: that Thomas Jefferson did 
indeed father children by a slave woman named Sally Hemings. 
Jefferson’s paternity of Hemings’ children, once widely doubted, is 
now denied only by his fiercest apologists. It is not merely the distant 
past that new methods illuminate, although their value is indeed 
greater in that very foreign country because of the paucity of texts.
It may be disconcerting for most of us, but history is in the throes 
of a methodological revolution or two, one for which none of us 
are trained and few of us prepared. To the extent that we shy away 
from it, we will be shunted further to the margins in some of the 
important debates of our time, such as that over the significance 
of climate change, and – incredible as it may seem to historians – 
perhaps also in some discussions of the past. To the extent that we 
embrace it, we will have a voice in all these conversations.
I will finish this discussion with a cheerful example of the promise 
of superhistory drawn from my own experience. While a doctoral 
student in the early 1980s, I grew interested in the history of yellow 
fever in the Caribbean. At that time, no one knew if yellow fever 
was originally an American or an African disease, no one knew 
whether its vector, a particular species of warmth-loving mosquito, 
was American or African, and no one knew why the texts seemed 
to show a stronger prevalence of the disease in the eitghteenth and 
nineteenth centuries than before. (I should also say that as far as I 
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could tell no one other than myself seemed to care about that last 
point.) I wrote an amateurish paper on yellow fever in the Caribbean, 
thinking I would follow up with more research soon. 
Fortunately for me, I let life intervene for a quarter century before 
I returned to the subject. In the interim, geneticists had shown 
that the yellow fever virus circulating in the Americas is of African 
origin; and that the vector mosquito is also a migrant from Africa. 
These new data help explain the immunological basis for a racist 
discourse of difference between Africans and others in the Carib-
bean, one that claimed Africans were more fit than others for labor 
in the torrid zone. (Being African or black was widely thought to 
be important but in fact was irrelevant; disease resistance to yellow 
fever was based on whether or not one spent one’s childhood in 
an endemic yellow fever zone such as most of West Africa – and 
perhaps whether one’s ancestors over hundreds of generations had 
done so. Many Africans and many blacks had neither acquired nor 
heritable resistance to yellow fever.) But many did carry immunity 
to yellow fever, and resistance to malaria as well. And so once these 
diseases became established and endemic in the West Indies (by 
about 1650), it seemed to most observers (or, more precisely, to those 
whose opinions happened to get written down and preserved) that 
African bodies were by nature suited for labor in the Caribbean.
Meanwhile, historical climatologists studying the chemistry of 
the shells of sea creatures had shown that the warming at the end 
of the Little Ice Age (already known as a European phenomenon 
in my student days) extended to the Caribbean. As the Caribbean 
got warmer, conditions improved for the yellow fever mosquito. 
 “Vector abundance”, as specialists put it, is crucial to the preva-
lence of mosquito-borne diseases, so climate’s suitability from the 
mosquito point of view was an important factor affecting the risk 
presented by yellow fever. Climate scientists, in the interim, also 
had constructed a database of El Niño events over the centuries, 
allowing respectable hypotheses about drought frequency and vary-
ing conditions for mosquito breeding.
So, by 2005, without having done any of the research myself 
– which indeed I was not competent to do, having sidestepped 
microbiology and climate science in my education – I was in a 
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much stronger position to make sense of the fragmentary textual 
record concerning yellow fever outbreaks available in a handful 
of archives. All I had to do was read the recent work of a handful 
of scientists. And the book I wrote on these subjects was more 
convincing than it could have been in 1985, thanks to the emer-
gence of new data from the natural sciences – convenient bits of 
superhistory (McNeill 2010).
Natural scientists provided these convenient bits of superhistory 
not because I wanted them, but because such research suited their 
own agendas. Had it been up to me, I would have asked for research 
on some other issues pertaining to yellow fever as well (particularly 
the unresolved issue of whether or not there is any heritable resistance 
or even immunity to the disease). Unfortunately for me, I was not 
in a position to direct the efforts of microbiologists and geneticists. 
Few historians, if any, will ever be in that position. This, then, is a 
limitation of superhistory: the findings pouring forth result from 
research agendas that historians do not shape, and generally do not 
even influence in the slightest. But this is only a limitation. And if 
historians join interdisciplinary research teams before those teams 
fully set their research agendas, the odds of affecting those agendas 
improve dramatically. This limitation is not reason enough to scorn 
the data of superhistory.
Why historians need to elbow their way 
into the climate change debates
A big part of the new superhistory, and the only part I will deal 
with henceforth, concerns the history of climate. So far the archeo-
logists and paleo-anthropologists have gone further than historians 
in taking historical climate change seriously. There are several pos-
sible reasons for their eagerness to embrace climate change in their 
work. One is that they live off research grants to a larger extent than 
do historians, and to elbow their way to that feed trough amidst 
the legions of cancer researchers and hunters of the Higgs boson, 
they need to make plausible claims to be doing relevant and useful 
science. And among the few routes open to them is to offer results 
that speak to societies’ experience with climate change. A second 
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possible reason is that because they typically deal with sparse evi-
dence – a few bones and potsherds – any new evidence looms large 
for their interpretations. 
Historians, at least most of us, do not compete at the same trough 
as natural scientists. Our survival is not so directly tied to providing 
useful science, so our quests for funding do not propel us toward 
the issue of climate change. And most of us, at least, do not thirst 
for new kinds of information. We have enough of the old sort to 
keep us occupied. There is no shortage of texts awaiting examina-
tion or re-examination in light of new concerns. But all that, like 
the limitations mentioned above, is not reason enough to shy away 
from the new data offered by natural scientists, especially on climate.
Scientific American, an excellent popular science magazine, recent-
ly printed a fine overview article on current climate change and its 
implications. The author, a distinguished earth scientist from one 
of the world’s foremost research universities, makes several trench-
ant arguments for the importance of the ongoing pulse of climate 
change. Then he writes:
Human civilization is also at risk. Consider the Mayans. Even before 
Europeans arrived, the Mayan civilization had begun to collapse 
thanks to relatively minor climate changes. The Mayans had not 
developed enough resilience to weather small reductions in rainfall. 
The Mayans are not alone as examples of civilizations that failed to 
adapt to climate change (Caldeira 2012: 83).
This is all he says about the potential significance of climate change 
for humankind. And, unfortunately, it is probably mostly wrong. 
According to current expert opinion, the Maya collapse – if that is 
the right word for it – consisted of a decentralization and de-urban-
ization that took place over several decades in the ninth and tenth 
centuries. It was bad for ruler, but ordinary Maya might well have 
regarded it as a liberation. (They left no texts so we cannot know 
for sure). Royal demands for tax and conscripts disappeared. With 
respect to climate, a severe and prolonged drought, one of three 
Central American “megadroughts” of the past 2,000 years – not 
“small reductions in rainfall” – deflated the rural economy. Many 
methods in world history
28
things contributed to the “collapse”; specialists point to soil erosion, 
increased warfare, and half a dozen other unfavorable trends. And 
so to say it occurred “thanks to relatively minor climate changes” is 
doubly wrong – the climate changes were major and they provide only 
part of any explanation. Lastly, resilience to fluctuations in rainfall 
was probably among the strengths of the Maya, who had sophis-
ticated water management (Stahle et al. 2011; Beach et al. 2015).
The Scientific American article (Caldeira 2012) illustrates some of 
the hazards of interdisciplinary work mentioned above. The author 
accepted blithe assertions about the Maya, without probing the 
specialist literature. Perhaps he felt he was too busy to research an 
issue tangential to his article; perhaps he trusted a careless research 
assistant too much. 
My point is not to castigate a distinguished earth scientist for 
writing a few sentences of ill-informed history, or not merely to do 
so. It is, also, to argue that historians must bring their skills and 
sensibilities to the issue of climate change. Otherwise oversimpli-
fied histories penned by earth scientists, journalists, environmental 
activists, and climate deniers will prevail unchallenged.
What have historians done with climate so far?
The great majority of professional historians for the last 200 years 
have completely ignored any possible significance of climate. In many 
cases, this neglect is justified: climate had nothing to do with King 
Henry VIII’s unhappy marriages or Marx’s debts to Hegel or any 
of countless other matters important to historians. But on bigger 
scales, when one considers the trajectories of regions and societies, 
this persistent neglect is surely unjustified.
When thinking about historians and climate, and about how 
climate affected human history, it is important to draw a funda-
mental distinction, one that historians, and others, have from time 
to time ignored. That distinction is between climate regime and 
climate change. By and large, until quite recently, among those 
who attributed any significance in human affairs to climate, it was 
climate regime, not climate change, they pointed to.
Once upon a time, most thoughtful and educated people believed 
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the global climate was fixed. Some thinkers, from the time of Theo-
phrastus – a student of Aristotle’s – if not before, thought that local 
climates might change. Aristotle himself in one passage implied 
climate had changed over the centuries in the Argive plain around 
Mycenae, and, further, suggested that pattern might be more general.
In the time of the Trojan wars the Argive land was marshy and 
could only support a small population, whereas the land of Myce-
nae was in good condition (and for this reason Mycenae was the 
superior). But now the opposite is the case, for the reason we have 
mentioned: the land of Mycenae has become completely dry and 
barren, while the Argive land that was formerly barren owing to 
the water has now become fruitful. Now the same process that has 
taken place in this small district must be supposed to be going on 
over whole countries and on a large scale.
This passage, so far as I know, is a rarity among ancient thinkers, 
who preferred to believe that climate was fixed except perhaps local-
ly in response to loss of forest cover. (The indispensable guide to 
ancient environmental thought is Glacken 1967). And there is some 
difficulty of interpretation here: Aristotle did not mention climate 
specifically, even though the passage quoted above appears in Book 
I of his Meteorologica. Perhaps he had something else in mind, such 
as drainage. If Aristotle did have climate change in mind, as seems 
most likely to me, he was out of step with his age. The fact remains 
that (as far as the textual evidence can tell us) thinkers of the ancient 
world typically regarded climate as fixed rather than changeable. 
Modern historians, on the rare occasion when they gave the matter 
any thought, normally agreed.
Many deep thinkers, however, supposed that climate regimes shaped 
the essence of societies or the characteristics of peoples. Herodotus, 
Hippocrates, Aristotle, Ibn Khaldun, Montesquieu and thousands 
of shallower thinkers shared this view. The various bands of latitude, 
they maintained, each had their own climates, and each climate 
had its impact on people’s abilities or society’s characteristics. The 
fourteenth-century polymath from today’s Tunisia, Ibn Khaldun 
(1967: 58) for example, following the ancient Greeks, claimed that:
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The human inhabitants [of the 3rd and 4th zones, bands of latitude 
in his scheme] are more temperate in their bodies, colour, character 
… such are the inhabitants of the Maghrib, Syria, the two Iraqs, 
Western India, and China, as well as Spain; also the European 
Christians who live near by, the Galicians … Iraq and Syria are the 
most temperate of all these countries.
Ancient and medieval writers typically thought, in short, that cli-
mate regimes were very important in human affairs because climate 
shaped, or even determined, temperament and intelligence. More 
recent commentators on these issues, such as the Baron Montesquieu, 
thought in a similar vein. His influential book, L’Esprit des Lois 
(1856) is substantially devoted to climate’s supposed impact on 
temperament. Montesquieu, like his predecessors, attributed great 
importance to climate regime, but did not normally think in terms 
of climate change. That viewpoint was logical enough: no one lived 
long enough to see climate change in operation.
In the course of the nineteenth century, the idea that global climate 
might change acquired currency. Geologists convincingly demon-
strated the ebb and flow of glaciers, for example, a phenomenon 
which seemed to require changes in climate. Some deep thinkers 
began to modify their views, and admit changing climate, at least 
on regional scales, as a possible motor in human affairs.
One of the first prominent historians to do so was the English-
man Arnold J. Toynbee. He held a marvelously contradictory set 
of positions about the role of climate in human history. His signi-
ficance, perhaps, is that he was a transitional figure, who attributed 
importance both to climate regime and to climate change. 
Toynbee was born in London in 1889, in the same week as Adolf 
Hitler and Charlie Chaplin. He was a scholarship boy at a famous 
public school, where he learned Latin, Greek, and German very well. 
He had a humanistic education with minimal exposure to natural 
science. After distinguishing himself at Oxford and logging a stint 
in the Foreign Office during World War I, he settled into his work 
as a historian – of everything.
Few historians outworked him: by the time he was 28, he had 
written 7 books. Then he hit his stride, and from 1921 to 1974 he 
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published, on average, upwards of 200,000 words a year. Between 
1947 and his death in 1975 he was the most famous historian alive. 
Perhaps no other historian has achieved such celebrity – before or 
since.
His most famous work was his 10-volume Study of History, which 
he began to write in the mid-1920s. The cartoon version of it is that 
human history over the past 6,000 years featured 21 civilizations (he 
eventually admitted a few more), each of which followed roughly 
the same trajectory. 
He believed that the proper unit of historical analysis was not 
the state or nation, but the civilization. All civilizations arose, he 
believed, as creative and original human responses to specific chal-
lenges. Their eventual demise he attributed to failure to respond to 
subsequent challenges, usually political and economic. The whole 
scheme had a mystical quality to it. Its greatest merit was its scope: 
true global history.
In the first volume of A Study of History, published in 1934, he 
included a section on the insignificance of environment as a factor 
in the rise of civilizations. Favorable climates did not necessarily 
promote achievement, greatness, or anything in particular. Nor did 
harsher climates necessarily make achievement harder. The opposing 
view, which he sometimes called “The Hellenic Theory” and attrib-
uted to Hippocrates and Herodotus, he disparaged. 
However, by the middle of the first volume, Toynbee had modified 
his position somewhat: changes to climates could be important. In 
discussing what he called Egyptaic civilization, he found that it arose 
as a human response to a challenge, specifically the desiccation that 
he – following the archeologist Gordon Childe – believed affected 
all of North Africa and southwestern Asia around 5–6,000 years 
ago. To cope with growing aridity, peoples of the Sahara poured 
into the Nile valley and built dikes, dams, berms and canals, and 
more broadly, built a civilization. 
Moreover, he decided that Sumeric (to use his preferred term 
for what others call Sumerian) and Minoan civilizations arose as 
responses to the same challenge of climatic deterioration. Several 
other civilizations arose from the challenges of “untamed” envi-
ronments, whether tropical rainforests (the Maya) or arid plateaux 
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(in the Andes). In every case, changing or difficult environments 
formed part or all of the challenge that provoked the response of 
creating a civilization. But, as he pointed out frequently, the envi-
ronmental challenge alone was insufficient explanation: not every 
case of desiccation gave rise to a civilization. Indeed, most did not. 
While Toynbee’s giant book is full of contradiction and incon-
sistency on this point, most of the time, despite his initial protesta-
tions against it, he granted environmental factors a significant role 
in provoking the origins of civilizations. Climate changes fit nicely 
into his overarching scheme of challenge and response.
He put his faith in climate regimes as well as climate change. He 
not only adapted desiccation theory to help explain the origins of 
three Eastern Mediterranean civilisations, but he posited what he 
sometimes called “the Golden Mean”. Some climates were too easy 
and presented no challenge. Some were too harsh, and presented 
challenges that could not be overcome. Others offered a challenge 
that was “just right”.
He used this concept to explain, for example, the success of New 
Englanders in dominating – as he saw it – the history of North 
America. In a most confusing argument, at least to an American, 
he finds the New England environment more stimulating than that 
of French Quebec, Dutch New York, English Virginia, or Spanish 
Mexico. In an equally confusing passage, he attributes the economic 
vitality of the North of England to the quality of its environment, 
and contrasts that to the softer challenges of the Thames valley and 
the Home Counties. He draws a line between the estuaries of the 
Severn and the Humber, to the northwest of which the environment 
provides a bracing challenge, and to the southeast of which it does 
not (Toynbee 1934–61, 2: 64–73). 
Toynbee (1934–61, 2: 65) concludes his discussion of climate and 
environment in Britain by claiming that the contrast between the 
“legendary Scotchman – solemn, parsimonious, precise, persistent, 
cautious, conscientious and thoroughly well educated – and the 
legendary Englishman – frivolous, extravagant, vague, spasmodic, 
careless, free-and-easy, and ill-grounded in book learning – follows 
the same lines, and corresponds to the same contrast in the local 
physical environment …”. 
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Since Toynbee wrote these words in the 1930s, the economic his-
tory of Britain has not been kind to his interpretations. The south-
east of England has flourished, and the industrial north declined in 
relative terms. The contrast between the legendary Scotchman and 
the legendary Englishman, which must have struck some readers 
as strange even then, now seems ludicrous.
In these passages he does not specify what he means by “environ-
ment”. Almost everywhere else he brings it up, he mainly means 
climate, and here descriptors such as “near-Arctic” for Quebec sug-
gest he had it in mind here too. 
When it came to the decline of civilizations, a matter of equal 
concern to Toynbee as their rise, he left out climatic variables alto-
gether. Declines were a matter of weakening moral fiber among 
cultural and political elites. On this, at least, he was consistent.
Toynbee’s ideas show that it is not only distinguished earth  scientists 
who may entertain simplistic ideas about the relationships between 
societies and climates. Great historians with Oxford educations can 
make a hash of it too. Historians of today will have to do better to 
deserve a voice in today’s climate debates and to earn the attention 
of those seeking wisdom in climate history. Fortunately, we can do 
better, and some have already done so.
More recent historians, to whom I will now turn, if interested 
in climate at all, saw matters almost precisely the other way around 
from Toynbee: climate change mattered more than climate regime, 
and it mattered in the fall of societies, states, and civilizations more 
often than in their rise. Where Toynbee sometimes saw climate  crisis 
as the spur to creative moments, more recent historians usually saw 
only crisis. 
Among more recent historians the most prominent to inquire 
deeply into climate’s role in human affairs was Emmanuel Le Roy 
Ladurie, born in 1929 to a farming family in Normandy. In the 1950s 
Le Roy Ladurie began to research climate change, mainly in Europe, 
for the period after 1000 CE. He began publishing on climate, har-
vests, subsistence crises and so forth in 1956, and eventually took 
on board the evidence of glaciers and tree rings – proto-superhistory 
– in a book (Le Roy Ladurie 1967) called Histoire du climat depuis 
l’an mil.3 While amassing evidence for changing climate, especially 
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of the Little Ice Age, Le Roy Ladurie made minimal claims for the 
significance of climate change outside of areas marginal for human 
occupation such as Iceland and Greenland. It was an unusual history 
book, both for its methodological innovations, and for its conclusion 
which was, in essence: my subject, on which I have labored mightily 
for ten years, is unimportant for human history.
In 2010, I had the opportunity to ask Le Roy Ladurie about his 
climate history work. He told me, and he has told others the same 
thing, that in the 1950s and 1960s he was afraid to claim signifi-
cance for climate variables. He disguised his true views. He was then 
making his way upward in French academia, and feared (probably 
correctly) that being labeled a climate determinist or environmental 
determinist would derail his career. His friends and those whose 
good opinion he needed in order to flourish, were Marxists or at 
least marxisant, as he was himself. (He was a member of Parti Com-
muniste Français from 1945 to 1963, but inactive after the Soviet 
suppression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising). The eminences grises of 
French academia would surely have reacted with scorn if he were to 
suggest, for example, that the French Revolution happened in part 
because of adverse climate shifts of the 1780s. Such conformism 
did not hurt Le Roy Ladurie’s career: he became a member of the 
Collège de France in 1973 and was later director of the Bibliothèque 
Nationale. After reaching the pinnacles of French intellectual life, 
Le Roy Ladurie in effect recanted, publishing a three-volume work 
in which he claims a much larger role for climate change in shaping 
human events (Le Roy Ladurie 2004–2009).
Le Roy Ladurie’s prominence – he was for a while among the 
most famous historians in the world and is still widely, and justly, 
admired – helped open the subject of climate change for other text-
based historians to explore. So too did the example of archeologists 
who increasingly took climate change seriously – an important story 
I will not try to sketch.
Toynbee and Le Roy Ladurie stood as giants in the historical pro-
fession. Their books reached a wide public. Their specialized work, 
although not always their broader efforts, enjoyed the admiration 
of their peers. No one since has achieved such stature, certainly 
among those taking positions on the significance of climate in 
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history. Nonetheless, an adventurous minority of historians, when 
looking for more than rises and falls, found climate change almost 
everywhere. In the 1980s, Joe Miller (1988) used new information 
on the history of drought to help explain the waxing and waning 
of the slave trade in Angola. In drought years, vulnerable people 
had to sell their children or surrender themselves to the more for-
tunate, who in turn sold some of them to transatlantic slavers. In 
the 1990s, Wolfgang Behringer (1999) offered a bold new inter-
pretation of the witch craze in western European history: the bad 
years of the Little Ice Age, especially 1560–1660, sharpened the 
persecution of women held to be witches in early modern Europe. 
They were accused of, among other crimes, arranging bad weather 
through their pacts with Satan. Climate fluctuations, thus, pertain 
to social history as well as to harvests and the various collapses of 
this or that dynasty.
As one might expect, the history of arid and semi-arid regions more 
often suggests a strong role for climate change. Where rainfall just 
barely allows agriculture, and people survive with little margin for 
misfortune as a result, small droughts could have big consequences 
– rather like modest reductions in average temperatures in Scandi-
navia. The Middle East offers a fine example. Recently, historians 
such as Richard Bulliett (2009) and Ronnie Ellenblum (2012) have 
offered climate-driven analyses of the economic and political history 
of the region in medieval times. The same centuries that brought 
warmer and moister weather to Europe, brought cold and drought 
to the Middle East. From 950–1200 or so, conditions frequently 
proved unfavorable for farming. The Nile more frequently carried 
too little water for Egyptian agriculture. Dry farming in Iran often 
failed altogether. States that depended on revenues from agriculture 
collapsed and opportunities for invaders, such as the Seljuk Turks from 
Central Asia, improved markedly. These historians, both essentially 
text-based scholars, but influenced by the findings of natural scien-
tists, have opened exciting new vistas on the medieval Middle East. 
For a later period of Middle East history, Sam White has done 
something similar (White 2011). Using a large amount of proxy 
evidence from historical climatology, as well as the familiar texts of 
historians, White has made a strong case for the relevance of drought 
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and cold – the Little Ice Age – to a series of revolts in the seven-
teenth-century Ottoman Empire. White was not the first to suggest 
a connection between the Little Ice age and the Celali rebellions, 
but he argues the case much more carefully and convincingly than 
his predecessors. None of these authors, Bulliet, Ellenblum, White, 
may be fairly accused of reducing Middle East history to climate. But 
all of them make climate changes one of the driving forces behind 
deep political and cultural changes in the region.
Chinese history has become an especially welcoming environment 
for arguments based on climate change. A telling indication is the 
recent work of Timothy Brook. Brook is a text-based historian of 
imperial China with formidable abilities in East Asian languages, 
well aware of rival explanations for dynastic cycles. Brook (2010) 
argues for secular climate shifts as a major factor in the decline and 
fall of several dynasties in the last millennium. 
China historians may be more easily converted to the gospel of 
climate because Chinese texts often have detailed information about 
it, more so than the available texts from India and the Islamic world, 
for example. Gazetteers compiled more or less systematically since 
the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) include weather observations, espe-
cially of strange anomalies. Indeed China historians and Chinese 
texts may be more predisposed than most to take climate seriously, 
because the concept of the Mandate of Heaven, important for two 
millennia in China, invests anomalous weather with political mean-
ing. When floods, droughts or any meteorological mishaps seemed 
to come thick and fast, it was taken to mean the emperor and his 
lineage had lost the Mandate of Heaven, and thus the right to rule. 
Locust plagues, which apparently came more often on the heels of 
cold snaps, invited similar conclusions. 
China’s economy may also have proved more sensitive to climate 
shifts than economies elsewhere. Like other parts of Asia where 
irrigated rice was important, the quantity and timing of monsoon 
rains mattered deeply to Chinese harvests. Monsoons varied, partly 
in response to the giant Pacific climate oscillation known as El Niño 
or ENSO. Beyond this shared feature, the Chinese transportation 
system depended to an extraordinary degree on boat traffic on 
canals. The unique degree of marketization in China since the Song 
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Dynasty (960–1279), matched nowhere in the world until perhaps 
the Netherlands in the seventeenth century, rested on networks of 
canals. When these froze, transport was hobbled. When they froze 
for more months than usual, cold year after cold year, the ability 
of the market (or the state) to move grain to areas of shortage was 
correspondingly diminished. China was, in effect doubly sensitive 
to climate shocks: both in the production of food and in its delivery.
The same cold and dry spells that were apparently devastating 
in China probably helped their chief enemies, the steppe peoples 
and Mongols in particular. (Brook does not make these arguments: 
they are my extrapolations from discussions of Mongol warfare).
For at least a century, some scholars have supposed that irrup-
tions of pastoral nomads of the East Asian steppe were driven by 
episodes of drought. I expect that, at least some of the time, this 
was true in part. But perhaps the extraordinary cold of the thir-
teenth to fourteenth centries – now known in detail thanks to proxy 
evidence – made Mongol warfare easier? Frozen rivers and canals 
paralyzed transportation for China and inhibited it for most of the 
other peoples of Asia. But for Mongol war parties, frozen rivers 
and canals were highways. Given ice a few inches thick, they could 
move quickly and reliably through vegetated landscapes that in 
other conditions they would have had to try to burn to the ground 
in order to pass through.
Large patches of East Asia and Iran, and even larger ones of Russia 
and Eastern Europe, still carried forest cover in the thirteenth cen-
tury. That forest provided barriers against equestrian forces – except 
when rivers or canals were frozen to sufficient depth for thousands 
of horses to ride along safely. The longer and colder the winter, the 
more mobile the Mongols, and the less mobile their enemies. Rivers 
usually led to cities, the prize targets. So to reduce this argument 
to its essence: the onset of the Little Ice Age cold raised the odds 
somewhat of Mongol military success, not on the steppe itself, but 
in China and especially in Eastern Europe. (Notice I do not say the 
Little Ice Age caused the Mongol success or permitted the Mon-
gol success. It might have happened anyway – it was merely made 
more likely by the extraordinary cold.) This Mongol example is the 
only original one – at least I think it is original – in this paper, and 
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should be distrusted as a result. It is only a hypothesis, yet to be 
tested against the evidence, such as the seasons of the year in which 
the Mongols did most of their campaigning and conquering.4
The most ambitious examples of text-based historians taking 
climate evidence and putting it at the center of an analysis are now 
Geoffrey Parker (2013) and John Brooke (2014). In a sprawling work, 
Parker catalogues the rebellions, revolutions, and wars of the seven-
teenth century, from southern Africa to Japan and from Southeast 
Asia to the Andes, and in almost every case finds a strong dose of 
adverse climate change – typically drought or cold associated with 
the Little Ice Age – prominent among the causes. Parker is a major 
figure in the community of historians of early modern Europe, as 
Bulliet is among Middle East historians and Brook among China 
historians. His work commands attention. Almost every historian 
working in the early modern period will need to confront Parker’s 
analyses, and wrestle with the significance of the Little Ice Age.
Brooke (2014), meanwhile, has attempted to put climate shifts 
and extreme climate events at the center of historical causation. His 
magnum opus takes the entire human career as its subject, and finds 
climate variables involved in almost every major historical episode 
until the end of the Little Ice Age. From about 1800 onwards, he 
argues, humankind has changed climate more than climate has 
affected us.
Dozens of ingenious and properly researched arguments about 
the significance of climate now exist in the historical literature. The 
situation is now far removed – and far better – from the facile for-
mulae of Toynbee or the timid position of the early Le Roy Ladurie. 
Openness to the data coming from ice cores, pollen, tree rings, 
glaciers and so forth has made a gigantic difference in the strength 
and precision of arguments historians can now make. 
Not only are the climate data better than ever, but the nuance 
and subtlety with which historians link climate to historical events 
has moved far beyond Toynbee. Besides the obvious and direct rel-
evance of climate shifts to harvests, grain prices, famines, and social 
and political unrest – itself quite enough – historians have found 
climate shifts important in other ways, through other linkages. One 
is the changing populations of insect disease vectors, whether the 
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fleas of bubonic plague or the tsetse flies of trypanosomiasis – or my 
beloved mosquitoes. Vector abundance is crucial in determining the 
prevalence of diseases such as malaria, dengue fever, or yellow fever. 
Another linkage is the impact of climate upon natural fire regimes, 
consequential in Australia, Indonesia, and western North America 
among other places. Yet another is the effect of climate shifts upon 
the movements of animals such as deer and fish, from which some 
peoples have at times drawn goodly portions of their livelihoods. 
Almost all these linkages concern climate’s impact on basic human 
concerns, such as food supply and health.
Some of the arguments, no doubt, are overdone. I confess skep-
ticism especially about some of the claims made for the deeper past 
for which we now have some climate proxy evidence but very little 
of other sorts, a situation that leads us into temptation. While his-
torians of recent centuries are as a rule probably too skeptical about 
climate’s significance, because they have too much other evidence, 
historians (and archeologists) of the deeper past are perhaps too 
credulous because they have too little.
Some historians, upon discovering the new proxy evidence on 
climate, write with the zeal of the convert. This is all the more 
 reason for more historians to wade into the discussion, to bring 
their awareness of context and rival explanations to bear. But to 
do it responsibly and well, they must come to grips with the new 
evidence pouring forth from the natural sciences, and to practice, 
in effect, the new superhistory. 
Soon historians will also need to take proper account of the 
human impact upon climate change rather than merely changing 
climate’s impact upon humans. Le Roy Ladurie (2004–2009, 3) 
has begun to do this. Other scholars, not historians but geoscien-
tists, have posited strong human impacts upon climate from the 
early millennia of agriculture, and claimed the depopulation of the 
Americas after 1492 deepened the Little Ice Age (Ruddiman 2005). 
The idea here is that resurgent vegetation in the Americas took 
carbon out of the atmosphere, weakening the greenhouse effect, 
and cooling the planet. Historians have yet to grapple  seriously 
with Ruddiman’s contentions. It remains to be seen whether his-
torians will see their craft differently in an age of anthropogenic 
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warming, as a prominent cultural historian, Dipesh Chakrabarty 
(2009), following in the path of Richard Foltz (2003) has recently 
urged that we should. 
Conclusion
My conclusion takes the form of a parting question. Let us suppose 
historians do take climate seriously and continue to find more and 
more occasions, and more and more pathways, by which its oscilla-
tions affected human affairs. And suppose historians also find more 
occasions on which, and pathways by which, our affairs affected 
climate. At the beginning of this chapter I considered how the new 
kinds of evidence from the natural sciences might affect the choices 
historians make about geographical scale. But what about tempo-
ral scale? How might that evidence, and in particular, attention to 
climate change, affect the schemes of periodization that historians 
use and need? 
We historians live with a cacophony of incompatible periodiza-
tions. In the Americas we typically have pre-Columbian, colonial, 
and national. Each of these is subdivided, and rather differently from 
place to place. Europeanists typically begin with ancient, medieval 
and modern, but subdivide those categories differently from place 
to place. Historians of India sometimes take these terms, but use 
them differently so that medieval India can last until 1857. China 
historians use dynasties. African history features the pre-colonial, 
colonial, and independence periods, which has the curious con-
sequence that almost all African history falls in the first of these 
periods, which ends about 1885. George Brooks (1994) tried to 
create a periodization for West Africa based on the rhythms of wet 
and dry periods between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries, 
but his approach did not catch on.
The old habits are comfortable, and have with a bit of buffeting 
stood the tests of time. Feminist historians have raised questions 
– e.g. did women have a renaissance? (No, said Kelly (1977)). But 
they seem nonetheless to have accepted the basic frameworks. Other 
historians have asked whether India had an early modern period 
(Yes, said Richards (1997)). Global historians have struggled to find 
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a single scheme into which to wedge all the twists and turns of world 
history, but without much luck to date (see the effort in Bentley 
1996). Will climate change ever seem powerful enough in human 
history to suggest its own scheme of periodization? 
If not, will climate change rearrange our sense of continuities and 
discontinuities enough to make us question some, maybe most, of 
our periods? Will the end of antiquity come with the climate dis-
asters of the 540s, felt throughout the world, rather than the sack 
of Rome in 476, which specialists now regard as merely a coup de 
grâce? Will the end of the Little Ice Age come to provide the dis-
tinction between early modern and modern? Will the onset of rapid 
warming create for historians a new period after 1950, which we 
now know variously as postwar, post-1945, postmodern, and after 
1960, postcolonial? 
Unlike geologists, we historians are at liberty to adjust our periodi-
zation as we please. We can label any period anything we like, without 
consulting anyone. Geologists must propose any new vocabulary of 
periodization to a series of committees and ruling bodies, a process 
that is now in train for the term “Anthropocene”, suggested to refer 
to the present period of the Earth’s history in which humankind 
has played a preponderant role in shaping environmental processes. 
Geologists will formally decide, by vote, in 2016 as to whether or 
not the Anthropocene exists. In the meantime, historians, thanks to 
our institutional anarchy, can steal a march and begin to write the 
history of the Anthropocene, a history of a new age, for a new age, 
an age of – among other things – rapid climate change. 
We will do so with new evidence, evidence from ice, from tree 
rings, from our own DNA, from that of camels and viruses, and 
no doubt from sources as yet unimagined. That evidence at times 
will corroborate the information coming from textual sources, and 
sometimes will challenge it. This presents a familiar quandary to his-
torians, who have always had to reconcile divergent textual accounts. 
But we will need to learn new skills to parse the validity not only of 
one text versus another, but of texts versus isotopes and alleles. This 
is a revolution in historical method which, like most revolutions, 
will involve mistakes, confusion, and wasted effort. But, like most 
revolutions, it should be exciting and revealing nonetheless.
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Notes
 1 In addition to early practitioners such as Rashid al-Din, Ibn Khaldun, or Sir Walter 
Ralegh, see the twentieth-century tradition of world and global history, excerpted 
and analyzed in works such as Manning 2003; Dunn 1999; Costello 1995; Bentley 
2012.
 2 Not Bernard Bailyn (1982), who wrote about “manifest history” and “latent his-
tory”.
 3 Le Roy Ladurie was substantially influenced by the Swedish scholar Gustaf Utter-
ström, especially Utterström 1955.
 4 My remarks here were composed before the appearance of a fascinating and provoc-
ative paper by an interdisciplinary team that seeks to explain early Mongol success 
by reference to a few years of above-average rainfall in the Mongols’ homeland. 
This fifteen-year period, 1211–1225, is the only one over the past 1,112 years that 
shows above average rainfall in every year, so it amounts to a unique moment in 
the history of the Mongolian steppe. According to this argument more rainfall 
meant more grass, more sheep and ponies, and more Mongols, giving them an 
advantage in numbers (both of people and ponies) over their neighbors who did 
not enjoy the same good meteorological fortune. This argument, based on tree 
ring evidence from Mongolia, refers to the early Mongol expansion, not their 
subsequent conquests in China, Iran, and Russia for which (I claim) cold climate 
was helpful. See Pederson et al. 2014.
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chapter 2
On source criticism  
in world history
Janken Myrdal
As noted by several authors in this volume, the lack of discussion 
about source criticism in world history is a serious problem. It is, 
in fact, a threat to the credibility of this branch of history. When 
world history forms the basis for grand theory, with implications 
for how we deal with current problems in the world, source criti-
cism will be of particular importance. We must develop methods of 
 evaluating overarching surveys and syntheses. Preferably, they should 
be testable in a Popperian way: it should be possible to refute them 
(Popper 1965: 220, 232). 
One way to write world history is as a general synthesis valid for 
a large part of the world and involving key elements of historical 
change: macrohistory. Such surveys are often constructed as narra-
tives and combine condensed descriptions of processes with selected 
facts and extensively described examples. Indicators are combined 
to sustain a grand theory.
In testing such a general synthesis I will focus on a specific kind 
of indicator: the measurable. I include not only numbers in tables, 
but also presentations in maps and graphs. The reason I focus on 
this kind of indicator is that the results can be corroborated or, if 
necessary, rejected. Thus they form a kind of touchstone for grand 
theory in world history. If a grand theory is contradicted by important 
measurable indicators, this will affect the plausibility of the theory.
This may seem like a plea for quantitative methods, and to a 
certain extent, this is correct, but any such quantification requires a 
detailed qualitative analysis and description. Measurable indicators 
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also form only a minor part of all empirical evidence that is combined 
to corroborate grand theory, and critical methods must be devel-
oped to evaluate how other indicators are handled and combined. 
Another way to construct world history is to combine examples, 
typically regional studies, into comparative history, which also can form 
the basis for grand theory. There is some, but not sufficient, method-
ological discussion about this kind of world history. Issues related to 
context, depth, and consistency have been raised (Adas 2012). Since 
including elaborate studies is a goal, multidisciplinary area studies 
become a base for such comparisons (Manning 2003: 86–91, 146–162, 
221; Manning 2011: 112). A problem treated by Eva Myrdal in this 
volume is the different quality and intensity in research regarding the 
areas compared. Another important problem is that the examples often 
are presented in ways that are not comparable. This is treated by Arne 
Jarrick and Maria Wallenberg Bondeson in this volume.
A further major problem in comparative history, seldom discussed, 
is representativeness. If a comparison between cases forms the basis 
for a synthesis, a bias in the choice of examples may weaken the 
conclusions. Often it seems that cases are chosen from well-explored 
regions, or from regions the participants in the volume, or the pro-
ject, themselves know well. The most common method of handling 
this problem is to provide a context. If, for instance, a region in the 
Philippines is chosen, then we also get an overview of such things as 
early colonial history, contacts with China, and so on. This implies 
that macrohistory is important also for comparative history – and 
certainly both these ways of writing world history are integrated 
and sometimes merging into each other.
Below I will treat some problems with measurable indicators for 
world history. I start with surveys based on subjective measurements, 
arguing that reporting the basis for measurement is always prefer-
able. Then I move on to surveys based on out-dated measures. A 
third step is to accept that these indicators only show one aspect, 
and alternative measurements will make different aspects appear. 
Next I discuss how strict selection can create a better basis for 
interpretations, which also relates to the question of the categories 
utilized. The last part is devoted to a test of a grand theory, where I 
use the proposed methods. I focus on a part of the theory, or more 
specifically on a prerequisite for the theory. 
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My examples are from different investigations I have made, most 
of them instigated by a frustration I felt facing the lack of a meth-
odological discussion in this branch of history. All the indicators I 
discuss are related to statehood and ideological-political processes, 
as it seemed to be an advantage if they were roughly in the same 
field and in some way related to each other. In a parallel project I, 
together with Mats Widgren and others, am doing a survey of the 
world history of agriculture, which forms a background to my work 
with source-critical problems. I do not touch upon that project in 
this text, but see Widgren’s contribution to this volume. My purpose 
is only to discuss methodological questions, and if results concerning 
political world history are presented, they are a side effect. Before I 
start to discuss how source criticism can be developed, something 
must be said about the sources.
Sources 
Literature is the main source that world historians work with, a 
fact that is sometimes mentioned in passing but seldom discussed 
at length (e.g. Conrad 2013: 89). To put it a bit drastically: other 
scholars should be treated as sources to be scrutinized in a source- 
critical way. I will refer to three layers: besides primary and secondary 
sources I also discuss tertiary literature for works mainly relying on 
secondary literature. 
Primary sources. A researcher who works with large syntheses may 
obviously have been using primary source material to substantiate 
the discussion, but this research is usually published separately. 
Sometimes world historians work with editions of primary sources 
and then are dependent on translations and secondary literature – 
see Jarrick and Wallenberg Bondeson in this volume – and also the 
example about agricultural treatises below.
It can be an advantage if the author of a synthesis has researched 
primary source material in depth. The historian who has devoted 
years to archival research or the archaeologist who is experienced in 
fieldwork has an advantage in realizing how fragile factual evidence 
can be. Important syntheses can certainly be written by others than 
historians and archaeologists, such as sociologists, but those who have 
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not worked with primary source material sometimes have difficulty 
in understanding the need for source criticism.
Secondary sources are interpretations of primary sources, such as 
archaeological excavation reports or monographs based on a specific 
series in archives. Any scholar working with inclusive world history 
can only cover a small fraction of this literature, and strict selection 
must be made in using secondary literature. 
In a discussion about methods for comparative history as a 
basis for synthesis, Theda Skocpol argues that it is imperative to 
make occasional “targeted primary investigations” referring back 
to the primary sources (Skocpol 1984: 382–383). An extensive 
reading of original research on specific topics in secondary liter-
ature is equivalent in a general synthesis to Skocpol’s principle of 
targeted investigations. In-depth studies can be made as a general 
control, but there are also specific reasons to make such controls. 
A scholar may find it necessary to read secondary literature when 
tertiary literature is not available for that region or period. Other 
situations forcing the scholar to be acquainted with secondary 
literature are when the tertiary literature presents results that are 
difficult to interpret or when alternatives rendered by different 
scholars are contradictory. 
When scholarly literature is regarded as source material, the 
researcher is faced with a major concern, namely evaluating  secondary 
source material. When evaluating one can be content with just iden-
tifying researchers to be trusted, as Chris Wickham once frankly 
stated in his grand synthesis about the early Middle Ages in Europe 
(Wickham 2007: 7). Sometimes one has to resort to this method, but 
it has risks. Skocpol has pointed out that there is danger in relying 
mainly on well-known scholars. Important texts may sometimes be 
found in the forgotten corners of research (Skocpol 1984: 382–384). 
In this volume Mats Widgren discusses source-critical problems in 
secondary literature.
Tertiary sources, then, are based on secondary sources and form 
the foundation for much of current world history. A fundamental 
issue to be addressed is that older texts are less useful because of 
the rapidly growing amount of research on primary sources. This 
problem does not apply to the same extent to secondary sources, as 
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a study of primary source materials may be relevant even if it was 
published many years ago. 
Besides world history proper, several other types of tertiary sources 
can be used, such as national surveys, which tend to focus on political 
history but can also include economic history, cultural history, or 
more specific areas; standard works for larger regions about specific 
topics (e.g. Needham’s series on science in China, Needham 1954–); 
specialized encyclopaedias (e.g. Der Neue Pauly for antiquity, Cancik 
& Schneider 1996–2003); historical atlases, and statistics. 
To evaluate tertiary sources, scholars use a number of simple checks 
as a matter of course. One is to run through the dates of publica-
tion of works included in the references. If the latest publication in 
the list is old then the text as a whole may be less useful. Another 
control, which can be done mainly by those who have worked with 
primary sources, is to assess sections on specific topics that one is 
particularly familiar with. If there are too many errors the entire 
text may be unreliable.
It must also be recognized that the limits of critical world his-
tory are determined by the quality of the existing literature. When 
working with measurements, descriptions in historical sources or 
in scholarly literature often have to be transformed into something 
measurable, be it a map or a graph. In the discussion below I will 
try to reveal such weaknesses also in my own investigations. 
Synchronoptic graphs
The first source-critical problem I will discuss concerns how to avoid 
subjective measurements. 
Eurocentrism is often in focus when bias and source-critical 
problems are discussed (see several of the chapters in Bentley 2011 
and in Northrop 2012). A popular kind of synthesis is synchronoptic 
graphs, which try to describe historical change at one glance, but 
they are seldom discussed or analyzed in scholarly world history. 
Visualizing is an instrument used in world history. In texts about 
world system analysis, graphs or maps are often used to describe 
core and periphery or the economic systems covering large regions. 
In the graphs I will discuss Eurocentrism is obvious, and therefore 
methods in world history
50
they form a good example of what subjective measurements may 
entail. But the problem lies not only in this bias, but also in that these 
graphs cannot be tested because the basis for the measure ments is 
not indicated. The same criticism affects many of the sketches made 
in world systems research. I do not suggest that such sketches should 
not be made, but they could be supplemented by graphs or maps 
where the underlying dataset is reported in detail. In this volume 
Rikard Warlenius discusses measurements that could be developed 
to sustain theories about world systems.
A synchronoptical graph typically describes the rise and demise of 
nations and empires. Each nation’s history is converted into a flow, 
like a stream through history. The width depends on the influence 
awarded to this nation. The flow runs from top to bottom, sometimes 
from left to right. For example, the Roman Empire begins as a small 
stream, grows into a mighty river and then disappears completely. The 
aim is to give an immediate picture of world history as a whole. Such 
graphs have been mass-produced, and have influenced the popular 
view of world history. In all these graphs, what is measured is a sub-
jective estimate of importance, and they show a clear Eurocentric bias.
The graphs are often quite beautiful, like works of art, and are 
also collectibles. Daniel Rosenberg and Anthony Grafton (2010) 
have provided a thorough description of their historiography. In 
the mid-eighteenth century the first real flowchart was made by the 
carto grapher Thomas Jeffreys in 1753; among later examples the 
most famous were by Joseph Priestly in 1769 and Fredrik Strass in 
1804. Flowcharts became popular in the United States. Sebastian 
Adams published a pictorial variant in 1871, still sold today as a 
curiosity; it starts with God creating the world. 
The most common flowchart during the twentieth century was 
the Histomap from 1931. It was made by an amateur, John Sparks, 
and was on sale until the late twentieth century. According to rel-
atives he began constructing the chart for his own amsusement, to 
pass the time. The success when it was published came as a surprise 
to him (Rosenberg & Grafton 2010: 217–219).
Europe is dominant in the charts from the eighteenth century. 
Jeffrey in 1753 allots 50 per cent of the space to Europe, and Priestly 
in 1769 allots 57 per cent, with Asia awarded a surprisingly high 
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proportion, 37 per cent in Jeffrey and 27 per cent in Priestly. The 
German Strass from 1804 is slightly harder to estimate as the regions 
in the flowchart are of different sizes in different periods, but around 
1800 Europe took up 75 per cent of the space.
This distortion remains today. To exemplify this Figure 2a and 2b 
show how two modern graphs describe four countries: the United 
States, France, China and Japan. One is based on the very widespread 
American Histomap from 1931 (here used in its 1990 edition), the 
other is a French graph from 1991 (Fournet 1991). As expected, the 
American graph awards great significance to the US in the twentieth 
century, and both emphasize the importance of the West. Europe is 
awarded 41 per cent around 1900 in the American graph (in the 1931 
version Europe was awarded as much as 48 per cent). In the French 
graph Europe covers 34 per cent. A graph that has replaced the Histomap 
as the most popular, the World History Timeline (2014, produced by 
Figure 1. The final part of Spark’s Histomap in the 1990 version, from c.1600 
until today. The lower half of this section covers the twentieth century, which 
thus has been made much longer than other centuries. The triangle to the left 
is the US. Immediately to the right of the US we find the British Empire, and 
two other large “streams” in the middle are France and Germany. 
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Oxford Cartographers), has similarities with 
the French graph and gives Europe 32 per cent 
of the space and Asia 31 per cent Interestingly, 
we find the same pattern in a Japanese graph 
from the 1990s (Yamasaki 1999). All parts of 
the world are placed within strict rectangles 
and Europe gets about 40 per cent of the 
space, East Asia about 25 per cent. 
These graphs reveal a marked Eurocen-
trism: one reason they remain influential is 
that scholars seldom discuss them. In fact a 
challenge came from Arno Peters, best known 
for his world map, presented in 1973, where 
he used a projection of the world giving a more 
accurate and less Eurocentric representation. 
The map caused intense discussion (Kuchen-
buch 2011; Oswalt 2015: 185–202). Though 
the map as such was not accepted by geo-
graphers, it contributed to a change in stand-
ard projections. The map actually was a sequel 
to Peters’ earlier project, the Synchronoptische 
Weltgeschichte (Synchronoptic World Histo-
ry), first published in 1952. This was also 
based on his opinion that all civilizations had 
the same value, and his choice of presentation was guided by his inter-
est in propaganda and outreach. Instead of a graph of states he had a 
timeline with people, political events and cultural achievements. His 
book was criticized by conservative historians (see Kuchenbuch 2011: 
834–839). Today such timelines are rather common and Eurocentrism 
is less pronounced (e.g. Teeple 2002).
The synchronoptic graph, like all other means of presentation, 
France
China &
Japan
USA
1990
BCE
0
CE
2000Figure 2a. A simplified sketch of the com-
plete Histomap 1990. Countries marked 
from left to right: USA, France, China, 
Japan. This graph illustrates a relative pro-
portion (i.e. where the whole is 100 per 
cent). Source: Sparks 1990.
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can be used as an analytical tool. To leave this kind of presentation 
to popular and subjective graphs is a scholarly mistake and under-
estimation of how powerful they are in visualizing a conception 
of history. Did the US really have such an influence in the world 
in the twentieth century as the Histomap indicates? Such a claim 
has to be sustained in a way that makes it possible to reject. These 
graphs, with their question about the influence of nations, could 
have been made verifiable by relating them to measurable factors 
such as population or military strength.
I have chosen to show how such a graph can be used to analyze 
a particular phenomenon. When the first larger states in Eurasia 
were established nearly all of them grew along a line across Eurasia 
from the Mediterranean to northern China. In the synchronoptical 
graph the measurements establish that these larger states were situat-
ed approximately along a line at a latitude of 40 degrees N. Unlike 
more subjective measurements this can be tested and questioned. 
The dataset is a survey of the historical atlases published in the 
decade around 2000 (see below and Figure 3). This is a tertiary 
source, and my graph cannot compensate for the weaknesses in 
this source. One such weakness could be that the earliest states, 
such as the Shang dynasty in China, should be marked differently 
to emphasize their different character.
USA France China Japan
3000
2000
BCE
0
CE
Figure 2b. A sketch of a French synchronoptical graph from around 1900. This 
graph illustrates how states occupy an absolute proportion of the world. The 
French graph starts in 3000 BCE, and every century is assigned the same space. 
Source: Fournet 1991.
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The graph does not go beyond 500 CE. The Islamic caliphate and 
subsequent empires can no longer be portrayed as an approximate 
band across Eurasia. (Even in my graph states with an extension 
along the north–south axis, such as the Maurya Empire, will be 
underestimated,) The graph includes the larger early states, gradually 
concentrating on the empires, defined as entities united under one 
authority and eventually transformed into a mega-state. 
Thus in the later part of the diagram states of similar size as Egypt 
in the earlier part are not included. Had all such states been included 
there would have been hardly any white space in the lower part of the 
diagram. It would have been difficult to read and even more difficult 
to construct. The main reason I have simplified the lower part of 
the graph so that only the largest states have been included is that a 
complete reporting would have added nothing essential to the inter-
pretation about a rapid increase of larger states around 500–200 BCE. 
The dotted line includes the area under the influence of these larger 
states from the middle of the first millennium BCE (concerning influ-
ence, see below). What is depicted is a partially irreversible process, 
and even if larger states were dissolved, such as in China where three 
states replaced the Han dynasty, the structure of the society had fun-
damentally changed. The graph illustrates how larger states and their 
influence became of major importance over most of Eurasia from the 
middle of the first millennium. This process started in the core area in 
West Asia. In the following centuries it spread, at first eastwards and 
then to the west. Around the beginning of our era Eurasia, in a broad 
band across the mega-continent, was organized under large states. 
The interpretation of this graph is here mainly left aside, with 
questions remaining, such as how long-distance trade across Eur-
asia contributed to the growth of states in relation to intrinsic 
state-forming processes. The example is intended, rather, to show 
how this form of presentation would be used in a falsifiable way as 
a contribution to the analysis of a phenomenon in world history.
The graph is based on the newer generation of atlases discussed 
in the next section, and maps are of course approximations. What 
the graph gives is a basic outline and its exactness should not be 
overestimated.
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Figure 3. The major empires approximately along a line at a latitude of 40 
degrees N across Eurasia until 500 CE.
Note: The X axis is the map above the diagram. Narrow protruding land areas 
have not been included, such as the Chinese corridor covering the trade routes 
into central Asia over the Taklimakan Desert. The dotted line marks the area 
of influence for larger states.
Source: Myrdal 2003.
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Measuring empires and states 
I now turn to the source-critical problem that appears when scholars 
use outdated datasets. It came as a surprise to me when I realized 
that many world historians used a dataset based on atlases from the 
1960s and 1970s, although a shift in cartographical description of 
world history had occurred around 2000. Thus I started to measure 
empires and nations in the new atlases (Myrdal 2012). 
Research on large states and empires is a classical field of world histo-
ry, and it is most often written descriptively. A number of well-known 
empires are described and then conclusions are drawn. In addition, 
there is a long tradition of measuring the strength of empires with 
quantitative data. The possibility of finding a quantitative indicator 
is based on two related factors. First, rulers have been interested in 
marking the extent of their power with monuments or in documents. 
Thus the approximate area of states can be followed far back in history, 
for some early states back to around 3000 BCE. Second, historians 
have traditionally been interested in political history. When histori-
cal atlases were first put together, the extent of states was the wholly 
predominant phenomenon to be mapped. (A very simple definition 
was used: a state is a political entity that controls a territory.)
These factors seemed to make it possible to measure the area of 
states, and this has been done for more than a hundred years. In 
the late 1970s an Estonian scholar who had emigrated to the US, 
Rein Taagepera, decided to measure all the states in available atlas-
es. His articles were, for the time, an impressive attempt. The most 
often-quoted graph was his diagram of the extent of the three largest 
states through history, that is to say, those that at a given time were 
the largest. He was able to prove their almost constant expansion, 
with some peaks on the way: 1) the Roman Empire/Han dynasty, 
2) the Mongol Empire, and 3) the British Empire (Taagepera 1978, 
with the most-used graph and the summarizing article in Taagepera 
1997). Taagepera bases his measurements on a number of historical 
atlases from the 1960s and around 1970. 
First it must be said that Taagepera’s graphs marked a major 
advance, and he also meets the Popperian requirement. These graphs 
can be tested and – partially – rejected, as there is a problem with 
them. The dataset has changed.
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In the late 1970s a totally new generation of historical maps 
appeared. This shift occurred first in the United States, but was also 
accepted in other Western countries. The Times atlas of world history 
(Barraclough 1978) was the first in this new generation, with the 
first edition published in 1978. The idea was to give a fair descrip-
tion of other countries in the world apart from Europe and North 
America. Then other atlases followed, and around 2000 a number 
of new historical atlases were produced. 
The historiography of historical atlases is described in two impor-
tant books by Jeremy Black (Black 1997a; Black 1997b). In par-
ticular he highlights the shift in the 1960s and 1970s and onwards 
from Eurocentrism. He also notes examples of historical maps used 
for political purposes or to enhance the author’s own nation. Two 
historical atlases that provide an exemplary scientific apparatus and 
detailed references are Schwartzberg (1978) and Grosser historischer 
Weltatlas. Erläuterungen 1–4 (1976–1996). In the latter there are 
essays about each map. In the former, besides long texts accompa-
nying each map, there is also a thought-provoking review of ten 
different accounts of the Kush (Kushan) Empire’s limits, and of 
nine accounts of the Mughal Empire. This is one of the best source- 
critical reviews I have read about measuring empires (Schwartzberg 
1978: xxix–xxxv).
These new generations of atlases were not only less Eurocentric, 
they were also based on new research that tended to problematize 
the concept of state and state control (for a discussion of archaeol-
ogy, see Yoffee 2005, for history Manning 2003: 190). 
A different picture emerged for the first 3,000 years. Taagepera’s 
measurements did not even come close to those found in the new 
atlases. The area under the firm control of early states was much 
smaller in the modern cartographer’s view. Another important fea-
ture is that modern cartographers sometimes work with two units 
of measurement: direct control and influence. This is the result of a 
deeper understanding of the different nature of earlier states compared 
with later states. In a world with large tribal areas, states often did not 
have a border against other states, but against tribal areas where state 
control was not a strict border but a gradient. If the area under direct 
control had been vastly overestimated in earlier atlases, the area under 
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state influence often stretched beyond the area earlier considered to 
be under state control. We then get two curves, one much lower than 
the Taagepera curve and the other much higher. They approach each 
other in the last centuries before our current era (see Figure 4a–b). 
In contemporary atlases there is growing awareness of this. In the 
atlas to Der Neue Pauly from 2007 (Wittke, Olshausen and Szydlak 
2007) this principle of separating areas of control and influence is 
used consistently. Guy Halsall has made an interesting attempt with 
maps of the fall of the Western Roman Empire. With shades of 
white and black he shows the empire’s gradual loss of control over 
the provinces during the fifth century (Halsall 2007: 235, 246, 275).
We also need to problematize later periods. One example is that 
for some large empires such as the Mongol Empire, we have to work 
with the two categories just mentioned. The same is valid for the 
British Empire in many of its colonies: firm control versus influence. 
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Figure 4a. Area of the largest empires–three 
largest empires. Taagepera’s curve from 1978, 
complemented with values for the last decades 
and adjusted.
Note: the largest state (lower curve) and the 
three largest together (upper curve). Time is compressed for earlier periods 
on x axis; y axis logarithmic.
Source: Myrdal 2012.
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The atlases today do not give any basis for such estimates. Perhaps 
future generations of historical atlases will incorporate such intricate 
measure ments. Still, the two different patterns in Figure 4b will remain 
a result that one must relate to. In an earlier period we had a more 
gradual, floating structure with regard to states and state control.
An interesting conclusion might be that if we have different pat-
terns in older periods a new pattern may emerge. If the whole world 
is divided up into states, as it is today, a number of alliances will be 
formed. Such alliances will develop into very firm structures and if 
in the future historians want to understand late twentieth-century 
politics, a map showing NATO and the countries of the Warsaw 
pact would probably be more instructive than a map showing dif-
ferent nations. One might describe this as a return, on a new and 
Figure 4b. Areas of control and under direct 
influence, curve based on atlases from around 
2000.
Note: Lower curve under direct control, upper 
curve area of influence, middle curve Taage-
pera’s estimate. Later part of the curve similar to Taagepera’s curve, but must 
also be problematized (see text). Time is compressed for earlier periods on x 
axis; y axis logarithmic.
Source: Myrdal 2012.
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higher level, to the phenomenon of core and influence zones (e.g. 
with the Unites States as the core and NATO as the influence zone). 
Another conclusion based on these findings is that earlier graphs 
tended to underestimate the changes in the last centuries BCE. State 
power grew more than was previously thought, and a politically 
new landscape of increasing state control over nearly all of Eurasia 
followed. 
Other measurements of states and empires
The next source-critical problem to be treated is that a single indica-
tor yields a simplification. Thus one should strive to present several 
indicators of the same phenomenon. To phrase it differently: one 
can produce differing results by changing the conditions for the 
calculations. Two such different methods of computing are first, 
to look at the largest states’ share of the population, and second, 
to look at all states rather than just the top three (Myrdal 2012).
Population is an important unit of measurement because it indi-
cates a state’s ability to organize a social structure. I calculated the 
two largest states’ share of world population (see Figure 5). For an 
analysis of the development of human societies this is a more impor-
tant measurement than the ability to control territory.  Taagepera 
(1997) made such an attempt, but it is difficult to identify individual 
states. His calculations, which show the same tendencies I observe, 
are seldom referenced.
I have to make a small digression about population estimates. 
Like other historians, I use McEvedy and Jones as the basis for cal-
culations, though their book was published nearly four decades ago 
(McEvedy & Jones 1978). The advantage of McEvedy and Jones is 
that they present calculations for every country in the world, with 
at least one page of discussion and often more about what the fig-
ures are based on. The reader also learns about the available sources.
Recent discussions about the history of world population often 
compare alternative estimates (see the website of the United States 
Census Bureau), but mainly refer to publications from the 1970s 
(except for the last 200 years where newer surveys exist). In an 
attempt to construct data for economic development over long 
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periods Angus Maddison made estimates, but they were based on 
a rather small number of older references to demographic literature 
(Maddison 2007: 230–240). I will try to identify the weakness in 
the data presented by McEvedy and Jones, which is seldom done 
by those who utilize these data. 
In comparison with other estimates, McEvedy and Jones often give 
low figures, especially for older periods. To understand why, something 
must be said about McEvedy, who was the leading author. He produced 
a number of historical atlases, also widely used, as he had a talent for 
summarizing knowledge and presenting it in a condensed and easily 
understandable manner. McEvedy was a psychiatrist by profession, 
but his passion was history (Oles 2011). Late in his life he worked on 
a book about towns in the Roman Empire, using the same method 
as in his population book. For 120 cities he discusses a possible size, 
mentioning estimates by other scholars. His own estimates tend to 
be cautious. An example is Rome itself, where the figure he gives is 
far below other estimates (McEvedy 2011: 319–320). 
We are in great need of a new compilation of the kind made by 
McEvedy and Jones. It would affect many branches of world history, 
for instance GNP, which Rodney Edvinsson discusses in one of the 
chapters in this volume.
The relative proportion, which I have used, would be a more relia-
ble measurement than absolute numbers if McEvedy and Jones were 
consistent in their low estimates during a certain period. However, 
it seems that they underestimated Africa and America more than 
Europe and Asia (following their precautionary principle – less was 
known at that time about these parts of the world). Thus the relative 
proportion given below would tend to be higher than the actual 
proportion, as none of the states included were situated in Africa 
or America. This overestimation is not dramatic, as Asia always has 
had by far the largest share of the world population and was home 
to the most important empires. The uncertainty margins are never-
theless so large that I only included the largest empires (more than 
c.15 per cent of the world population).
One cannot get further than the best available tertiary literature 
allows (without starting a project to replace it). At the same time, 
this calculation, with its weaknesses, allows us to reach a more rele-
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vant conclusion than one based only on area. There is no tendency 
that a few empires increasingly dominate the world. 
The result of the calculation was instead a long wave, with two 
crests: one during the period 200 BCE– 200 CE and the other in 
the period c.1500–1900. The two largest states’ share of the total 
world population was about 45–50 per cent during these peaks. In 
the intervening periods, it was about a third of the global popula-
tion, which is also true today.
The first conclusion from this is the surprisingly large share of 
the world population that was organized under empires in the 
centuries around the beginning of our current era. In the Eurasian 
corridor along a latitude of 40 degrees N, not being subordinate 
to an empire was actually atypical. Then this pattern broke down, 
and the empire became just one form of state organization among 
others. There is no historical trend towards a greater concentration 
of population in major empires. 
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Figure 5. Relative populations of the two largest empires or states. The two larg-
est states’ approximate proportion of world population at the times indicated.
Note: The second largest state is represented by a pattern of horizontal lines 
if it is less (<) than c.15 per cent; if more (>) it is marked with diagonal lines. 
The bars with horizontal lines, less (<) than 15%, are all represented as 15%, 
but actually most of them ought to be shorter as they reach lower percentages. 
The reason for not giving precise numbers below 15% is that the uncertainty 
of these figures increases for smaller empires. Source: Myrdal 2012.
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The other alternative estimate was the entire area under state 
control, and for this I have used two newer atlases. It turns out 
that there is a substantial increase in outright state control of the 
Earth’s surface over the last 200 years, from half of the surface to 
the whole world. Colonial powers increased their share, which gave 
rise to subjugated nations’ desire for liberation. What happened was 
that social organization increased, which was certainly not accom-
plished by the colonial powers alone, but was a result of social and 
economic change in general.
Table 1. Area controlled by states as a per centage of the total landmass, based 
on two atlases from the late 1990s.
Haywood Black 
2500 BCE 1 1
2000 BCE 1 1
500 BCE 8 9
250 BCE 12 15
0 13 15
250 14
500 13 21
800 19 31
1000 20 30
1200 29
1300 32 40
1400 37
1500 23 38
1600 29 38
1700 49 55
1800 69 71
1850 74 82
1900 96 98
Source: Haywood 1997; Black 1999; cf. Myrdal 2012: 41.
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To conclude this critical assessment of measuring states, three accom-
panying patterns appear. First, the three largest states controlled 
an increasingly large part of the landmass – today, however, the 
curve has turned downwards. Second, the two largest states’ share 
of the total world population has remained fairly constant over the 
last 2,000 years, with fluctuations between one third and one half. 
Third, over the past two centuries the entire earth has come under 
state control. The concomitant increase of medium-sized and small 
states is the reason that the area belonging to the three largest states 
has decreased during the last decades.
Different pictures emerge, and all of them contribute to an overall 
interpretation of the long cycles in state-forming processes. The leap 
forward in the centuries between 500 and 100 BCE was dramatic, 
but just as dramatic was the inclusion of the whole world under 
state control in the period c.700–1900. 
These measurements of states and empires are based on what I 
have labelled tertiary sources, mainly atlases. In the future, when 
population estimates have been compiled and when atlases consist-
ently work with core areas and areas of influence for earlier states, 
better data will become available. Another improvement would 
be atlases that also include such estimates for later periods, taking 
alliances and dominance into account. My investigations are thus 
only a part of the necessary process of methodological development 
in measuring states and empires.
A further question relates to the definition of a state. Most of 
these maps and calculations work with a simple definition: a state is 
a political entity (a “government”) which controls a territory. Indeed 
it could be claimed that a state in 2000 BCE is quite different than 
a state in 1500 CE. A refinement of the definition would probably 
result in several overlapping graphs for different periods. Here we are 
faced with limitations in the source material, historical atlases that 
are tertiary sources. The question about categories will be crucial in 
the next section about popular rebellions, where I have created the 
dataset by also utilizing secondary sources.
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Categories and rebellions
I now turn to the essential question about working with strictly 
defined categories, which is a core issue of source criticism relating 
to measurable indicators.
Categories being compared must be similar. Lack of consistent and 
comparable units makes comparison futile. In comparative world his-
tory geographical units should preferably be of equal size. We cannot 
compare England with all of China. Instead, for example, the Yangtze 
delta and a European nation such as England give a more balanced 
comparison (Pomeranz 2000: 7). In general synthesis this is not a 
problem as all regions are included. Instead the definition of what to 
compare is crucial. Here I want to highlight that the goal is not to 
acquire as much evidence as possible, but to obtain comparable units. 
Sometimes a smaller number, carefully analyzed, is more revealing 
than a larger number of cases. My example will be popular rebellions 
in Europe from the High Middle Ages to the early modern period.
A large number of cases allow more complex calculations, and 
there is a lower limit to what can be considered as providing a basis 
for measurability. The advantage of a smaller number of cases is that 
a stricter selection can provide greater similarity between the cases. 
It is also a means to avoid assigning better explored regions greater 
weight in comparisons. Moreover, one can discuss the individual 
cases in detail.
That the cases may be discussed in detail establishes similarities 
to comparative world history. The crucial difference is that here 
the cases are selected through an all-inclusive survey. A common 
pattern in earlier scholarship has been to present some well-known 
popular rebellions, overestimating the significance of those in France 
and England, and then perhaps supplement the discussion with 
German cases from the end of the Middle Ages. To survey Europe 
in its entirety means that important cases in Eastern Europe and 
Scandinavia are included and discussed. Another part of such a strict 
selection of cases is that numerous rebellions that do not meet the 
criteria are excluded. In well researched areas too, some cases often 
mentioned in the scholarly literature have to be excluded.
States cannot be understood solely by investigating forces that 
held them together. It is obviously equally important to understand 
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the forces that tended to break them down and divide them. One 
of the occurrences that scholars have tried to count is the number 
of wars. Since major wars are mentioned in chronicles, the source 
material allows such calculations as soon as we have written sources. 
Pitirim Sorokin was one of the first to attempt this, and since then 
there have been several compilations. William Eckhardt’s calculation 
is one of the most ambitious (Eckhardt 1992). Similar calculations 
have formed the basis for other conclusions such as Steven Pinker’s 
reasoning about the decreasing use of violence (Pinker 2012). I will 
argue that a deeper understanding of large-scale conflicts has been 
hampered by methodological shortcomings.
Eckhardt’s figures are not based on a selection of cases with clear 
boundaries between different types of conflict. He does not provide 
descriptions of the individual conflicts. There are simply too many 
cases in the statistics, and the conclusions are doomed to be sweeping. 
With clear demarcation of a manageable number of cases, one can 
cross the boundary between the quantitative and the qualitative and 
achieve a descriptive catalogue. Sorokin is in fact easier to work with, 
as he has a catalogue with a description of all conflicts. He also sepa-
rates wars from civil wars, though in the latter category he mixes strife 
within the upper class with popular rebellions, which makes his results 
blurred (Sorokin 1937–1941, 3: Appendix to part three, 579–620). 
I will focus on one type of conflict: popular uprisings. There 
are several compilations of revolts, all suffering from the problem 
of mixing large and small. Hugues Neveux (1997) published an 
ambitious catalogue of more than 150 revolts in Europe during the 
period 1300–1675. In his mixture, pillaging a monastery is one of 
the smallest conflicts and nationwide rebellions like the German 
Peasants’ War are among the largest. His catalogue provides infor-
mation, but it is difficult to use as an analytical instrument.
Another example comes from Geoffrey Parker’s book from 2013 
about the crisis in the seventeenth century. He argues that political 
unrest around 1635–1666 has to be understood in a worldwide per-
spective, partly as a result of economic problems caused by climate 
change. As a starting point, he enumerates 49 “major revolts and 
revolutions” of which 22 led to regime change (Parker 2013: xviii–xix, 
map and list). The list contains rather disparate political revolts. The 
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Danish Revolution in 1660 was a coup carried out by the King to 
gain more power. The Pequote War was an armed conflict between 
American Indians and English settlers. The rebellion in China did 
not last a single year (as one might believe from the table), but went 
on from c.1636–1646 and was one of bloodiest popular rebellions 
ever, with millions of casualties. The Goa rebellion against Portugal 
was a religious movement, when the Christian community decided 
that they would not submit to Portuguese dominance. And so on.
Of course Parker is aware of this mixture. In another and much 
earlier publication he has made a distinction between areas affected 
by war, areas affected by popular revolt and areas affected by polit-
ical rebellion (Parker 1978: 5, map). One must take into account 
that his intention in the 2013 book is to paint a picture of general 
unrest, and he describes many of the conflicts in detail. Neverthe-
less, we cannot be sure that he is correct without a delimitation of 
cases and comparison with other periods using the same criteria.
A set of criteria must be established when conflicts of a similar 
kind are identified. To separate popular rebellions from other civil 
wars, one criterion must be that broad strata of the population take 
part and that they have some influence over the rebellion. A key 
indicator to estimate the influence of the common people is to look 
at the demands made during the uprising. Another indicator is to 
examine the composition of the army, but this indicator is weaker 
because peasants could be involved in conflicts between leading 
groups in the society, being recruited as soldiers. Another criterion 
to identify the major revolts is to examine certain kinds of violence. 
This is a relevant criterion for the period I have chosen, since armed 
rebellion was the option available for common people to put pressure 
behind their demands. In a time series stretching into later periods, 
and especially into contemporary times, that would not be a relevant 
criterion as it would exclude, for example, large strikes. 
Visibility in the secondary and tertiary sources is essential and 
thus smaller conflicts have to be excluded. The assumption is that 
large rebellions are always mentioned in national surveys of political 
history. Smaller conflicts can be enumerated for particular regions if 
a scholar has endeavoured to go through all the documents and look 
for them. (I have done that for medieval Sweden, and know that it 
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is extremely cumbersome work). Such surveys cannot be included in 
an interregional comparison, since this would result in an overrep-
resentation of regions where scholars have carried out such surveys. 
To present the goal for the rebellions is important for an analysis. 
A religious movement is not the same as a nationalistic movement or 
a rebellion among peasants against oppression by the king or local 
lords. Certainly goals are mixed, but identifying them facilitates 
discussion of long-term trends. This also implies a descriptive text 
about every case, which works against including too many cases.
For Europe I have put together such a catalogue of large popular 
rebellions from the eleventh to the seventeenth centuries, using the 
aforementioned criteria (Myrdal 1995). I also added the restriction 
that the rebellions should be rurally based, thus excluding some urban 
revolutions. The source materials, besides a number of books specifically 
about rebellions, consisted of national histories published in  languages 
that I could read. In the catalogue, every conflict was described, which 
is the same method McEvedy and Jones used for population.
Figure 6a–d. Large popular rural rebellions 1250–1650 in Europe.
Source: Myrdal 1995; Myrdal 1999.
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Conflicts, as I defined them, did not exist until a state apparatus 
was established. Between 1100 and 1250 a number of conflicts 
were related to the spread of feudalism to the European periphery. 
In Scotland, Scandinavia and the Baltic states the conflicts had ele-
ments of popular rebellion but also resembled conflicts among the 
upper classes and even conflicts between regions. It was not until 
around 1250 that a kind of popular rebellion comparable to later 
equivalents appeared over large areas of Europe.
The catalogue detailed about 80 large popular and rural rebellions 
that took place during the period 1250–1650. After an increase 
from c.1250–1350, the number of large rural rebellions was fair-
ly constant, about 20–30 per century until the early seventeenth 
century. When they were mapped, patterns emerged more clearly. 
The increase from the mid-fourteenth century is clearly evident 
on the series of maps. 
Another interesting fact is that large rebellions in the late medie-
val period occurred in the economic and political core areas of 
Europe, whereas at the beginning of the early modern period 
there were instead more large rebellions in the periphery. (Figure 
6 a–d. For the earliest period, Russia on the eastern periphery is 
excluded due to lack of sources.) The core areas were also those 
where a strong state was established, partly as a reaction to large-
scale popular rebellions.
Feudal rent was in focus directly after the Black Death, but then 
state taxation and control over the administration of the nation 
became more important (Myrdal 1995; Myrdal 1997). A sequence 
of rebellions with increasing demands from below for influence dur-
ing the late Medieval period came to a halt with the establishment 
of strong states in the core of Europe during the sixteenth century. 
The strong state was the main deterrent to large popular rebellions 
in these parts of Europe. 
If this study were to be extended in time and space to include the 
whole world, criteria would obviously have to change to cover greater 
diversity. Another, more feasible method might be to establish a com-
plementary time series, such as before and after the establishment of 
the state. This prospect offers very interesting work on methodology. 
Instead of one long time series of rebellions (or wars, or conflict of 
methods in world history
70
other kinds), we have to identify several series, overlapping each other 
and illuminating different aspects. Such a methodological approach 
is probably also valid for several other phenomena where we want to 
create a basis for long and worldwide time series. 
Critical test of a theory – the axial age
In the following two sections I apply the source-critical requirements 
I have introduced in the preceding sections. I focus on an easily 
measurable aspect of the theory, starting with indicators that include 
a number of cases, and then turn to a more strict selection of cases.
Theories are a blessing. Without them we could not reflect on 
history. They do, however, have to be tested. A provocative theory 
will often instigate research, but sometimes theories are not tested 
using stringent methods and verified data. One argument might be 
that such grand theories are impossible to test. That may be correct 
if we look at the theoretical structure as a whole, but elements of 
it can always be tested, and if it is proved that several element are 
incorrect, the rest of the theory is in jeopardy. 
The example will be the theory concerning the axial age. A real test 
would require a much longer text, and I will only hint at possible 
ways to test parts of the theory. The relationship to previous exam-
ples is that states are not held together solely by military power; even 
more important is legitimacy. A loyal bureaucracy and an ideology 
that persuades individuals and groups to accept and even support the 
state are necessities. Large-scale changes of socio-political structures 
normally go hand in hand with ideological shifts. The theory of an 
axial age, however, goes far beyond ideologies for governing a state.
Before I delve into the theory itself it must be admitted that it does 
not belong to mainstream world history. In two extensive overviews 
covering more than 700 pages each, the axial age is mentioned just 
once (Northrop 2012, in connection with Eurocentrism) and twice 
(Bentley 2011). On the other hand, its adherents are a confident 
group, and lately their ideas have reached a wider audience through 
the eloquent writer Karen Armstrong (who is not a member of this 
scholarly coterie). 
To summarize the theory: nearly 70 years ago the philosopher 
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Karl Jaspers noticed that between the eighth and second centuries 
BCE, with a focus around 500 BCE, a number of large-scale intel-
lectual systems were created, both religious and philosophical. In 
this intellectual leap forward, people in different parts of Eurasia 
started to consider intellectual phenomena such as contradictions 
and especially transcendence. The term “axial” refers partly to the 
axis through Eurasia where these ideologies took form, from  China 
to Europe, but the core of the metaphor is that these new ideas con-
stitute an axis for all intellectual history (for an interesting visual 
presentation of the theory see Holenstein 2004: 50–51.)
This has been developed by several generations of scholars. Among 
the leading ones is S.N. Eisenstadt, who emphasized the tension 
between the transcendental and the mundane as a result of the emer-
gence of an intellectual elite. With the formation of a more compli-
cated society, social protest, solidarity and the social division of labour 
became important issues (Eisenstadt 1986: 11). Utopian ideas attracted 
followers imagining another world order.
Björn Wittrock has proposed a definition. He sees the axial age 
as the emergence of an institutionalized critical reflexivity together 
with historical awareness about change and the possibility of change. 
Arenas for intellectual discussion were established. Wittrock also 
emphasizes that different but parallel paths were followed, which 
gave the new way of conceptualizing the world a partly different 
content in various large regions such as Europe, West Asia, South 
Asia and China. This follows from what he labels “cultural crystalli-
zation”, when structures for creating order and teaching knowledge 
were established (Wittrock 2005).
A partly different approach has been suggested by Karen Armstrong. 
Her interpretations can fairly easily be combined with the group of 
ideas discussed above. She takes her starting point in the “golden rule” 
(one should treat others as one would like others to treat oneself ), and 
aims to describe how this basic moral approach developed during the 
axial age. Jesus was only one of the later prophets who advocated this, 
building on a long tradition (Armstrong 2007).
There are also opponents. Jan Assmann, for one, has argued against 
the idea of one crucial moment with a common outcome, asserting that 
we must identify changes before and after this period (Assmann 2012). 
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Scholars working with the axial age today do not, in fact, focus 
solely on the first great leap forward, but also on other fundamental 
and structural intellectual leaps. The period around 1000–1300 in 
Eurasia and the European Enlightenment around 1600–1800 have 
been regarded as such epochs of intellectual change (for examples, 
see chapters in Arnason & Wittrock 2011). 
Neither supporters nor opponents have exposed the theory to 
stringent tests with quantitative data. Here one aspect is chosen that 
tests the underlying prerequisites for the theory rather than the theory 
as such. My question is: are there periods – long or short – when the 
development of ideas and ideologies is more rapid than during other 
periods? I will avoid the question of how rapid a change must be to 
justify the term “revolution”, a discussion that seems pointless to me. 
If such periods can be identified it makes the idea of an axial age more 
probable. The next step would be to analyze their significance, which 
would demand a selection of texts to be closely examined.
Attempts to identify periods of intellectual change with quanti-
tative measurements have been made, though not directly in con-
nection with this debate. An example is Jan Luiten van Zanden. 
His question was how a society based on knowledge developed. A 
main indicator is the quantity of manuscripts and published books 
in Europe for the last 1,500 years. A decline occurred around the 
middle of the first millennium an increase began in the eighth and 
ninth centuries. After a short stagnation this continued to a peak 
from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. Then a new rapid increase 
started with mass-production of printed books from the end of the 
Middle Ages, and the increase continued into the sixteenth century. 
The next increase, which was a leap, came from the mid-eighteenth 
century and onwards (van Zanden 2009).
Another grandiose attempt was made by Pitirim Sorokin. One of 
his goals was to identify a large intellectual cycle where the focus went 
from more materialistic to idealistic and the reverse. He registered 
thousands of philosophers, whom he labelled “thinkers”, according to 
certain main schools of thought and ideas. Here I am only interested 
in the quantity of “thinkers” he registered. He graded them according 
to influence and presented them in appendices, using the ninth edi-
tion of the Encyclopædia Britannica, although he was aware that this 
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overestimates Anglo-Saxon thinkers (Sorokin 1937–41, 2: 143, 152), 
and also two American, one British and two German  philosophical 
lexicons published in the 1920s (Sorokin 1937–41, 2: 635). His 
accounts apply only to the West. In his tables and diagrams we see a 
long period of high numbers from the fifth century BCE to the fifth 
century CE, then a shorter peak in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, 
and from the seventeenth century an ongoing upward trend (Sorokin 
1937–41, 2: 29–31, 185–189 and 4: 353; Sorokin 1957: 288–289).
An interesting fact is that Sorokin and Jaspers were contemporaries 
(though without referring to each other). Jaspers was less Eurocent-
ric, but did not substantiate his theory, as Sorokin attempted to do. 
A recent and corresponding publication gives another basis for 
calculations. Randall Collins has registered nearly 3,000 philosophers 
during the last 3,000 years and the intellectual connections among 
them (Collins 1998). His goal is to identify the flow of ideas, and 
he gives all his data in diagrams and appendices. The sources are 
modern books about the history of philosophy, published according 
to different regions. He emphasizes the value of measuring philo-
sophers’ influence long after they were active (Collins 1998: 58–61). 
For China he uses nine different publications, all of them published 
from the 1950s to the 1980s, seven in the US and Britain, two in Sin-
gapore and China. As a source of additional information, he refers to 
eighteen other books published during the same period. For Greece in 
antiquity he uses a mixture of texts from that period and books from 
the twentieth century. Besides three historical sources he draws on 
eleven books from 1915–1990 as the main source, and twelve addi-
tional scholarly books from the same period as supplementary sources 
(Collins 1998: 950). He also points out that the numbers for China 
and Greece cannot be directly compared. He has similar sources for 
other regions and periods such as India and early modern Europe.
Collins is a typical example of how a tertiary source is limited by 
the quality of secondary sources (which cannot be examined here). 
Though he strives to give the same weight to every part of the world 
that produced philosophers, he is limited by having to rely on texts 
written in the languages he has mastered, which in practice means 
texts from Anglo-Saxon countries.
Collins establishes a hierarchy of philosophers, distinguishing 
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between major, secondary and minor figures. His categorizations 
are based on the space they are given in the books used as sources. 
Collins focuses on the major figures.
If crucial periods exist, the number of philosophers remembered 
today should be larger during those periods, assuming the thinkers 
made valuable contributions. Collins argues that minor philosophers 
often lack “originality and depth”: they are followers, though in 
their own time they may have been considered major figures (Col-
lins 1998: 62–63). To him only major and secondary philosophers 
produced real change in the world of ideas.
Collins discusses certain periods as hotspots. One such is Greece 
between 500 and 265 BCE with fourteen major and thirty-one sec-
ondary philosophers. Another is China from 365–235 BCE with 
five major and nine secondary philosophers (Collins 1998: 57–59). 
These periods stand out distinctly from other periods: the figures 
seem to be in line with the notion of an axial age, though it occurs 
later than Jaspers proposed.
Collins does not expend much effort on discussing all the hun-
dreds of “minor” philosophers. As a further test I have counted all 
the names in his tables and diagrams for China between 500 BCE 
and 700 CE. From this it seems that the number of philosophers 
mentioned in modern works is fairly constant, but with a dip around 
the beginning of our current era (see Table 2). A calculation for 
Greek and Roman philosophers shows a similar pattern, but with 
an expected dip in late antiquity. 
The explanation for a constant number of minor philosophers 
could be the institutionalization of an earlier breakthrough. The 
minor philosophers did not formulate new ideas, but they transmit-
ted accepted ideas in an established intellectual structure. 
The decrease in Europe in late antiquity is easy to explain. The 
decrease in China around the beginning of our era would require 
a longer discussion. Here I only point out that during this period 
we see one of the most dramatic intellectual upheavals in China. 
Under emperor Wang Mang (9–23), an usurper who did not belong 
to the royal family, a number of reforms were tested. Needham has 
mentioned that historians of science have a weakness for Wang 
Mang because he was interested in science and called together the 
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first assembly of experts. After he was overthrown all his reforms 
were rescinded (Needham 1954: 109–110). This could be significant 
for the later recognition of minor philosophers from this period.
The methodological conclusion is that a qualitative analysis is 
necessary. The numbers in the table give a rough indicator of a long 
trend of a rather constant number of minor philosophers remembered 
in much later surveys. A further refinement of these data would be 
to make a more strict selection, perhaps using the methods suggested 
by Sorokin: selecting them according to the main content in their 
preserved publications.
Table 2. All philosophers, mainly “minor”, in China mentioned in Collins 1998.
500–400 BCE 20
400–300 BCE 17
300–200 BCE 27
200–100 BCE 28
100–1 BCE 9
1–100 5
100–200 13
200–300 25
300–400 27
400–500 24
500–600 28
600–700 25
700–800 15
Note: As some philosophers were active over the turn of a century, I have 
assessed which century they belong to.
Source: Collins 1998. In his catalogues for China he lists 25 major philo sophers, 
61 secondary and 356 minor from 535 BCE to 1565 CE. For Greece he has 
28 major philosophers, 68 secondary and 237 minor from 600 BCE to 600 
CE. He has corresponding figures for other parts of Eurasia, such as India. In 
all, more than 2600 persons are mentioned (Collins 1998: 77). 
The number of philosophers only provides a framework for an 
interpretation. Data from Sorokin and Collins indicate that during 
a long period, mainly after what is normally considered the peak 
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period of axial change, a relatively large number of thinkers/philo-
sophers were active. 
An in-depth analysis would require working with a restricted 
number of texts to see if reflexivity and historical awareness become 
more prevalent, preferably also using quantitative methods. A very 
important factor is then the selection of texts. In the next section I 
will look closely at one category of texts.
The axial age exemplified by agricultural treatises
The emergence of natural science, which started to replace natural 
philosophy and religious thought, is a part of the Axial breakthrough 
(Wittrock 2005: 53). Texts on agriculture are the first extant genre 
about science. I have made a survey of all texts before 1500 (Myrdal 
2014). Here I will address their number.
In my investigation of these texts I also discuss their content, 
but then in terms of a question not directly related to the theory of 
an axial age. As they are a main source for agricultural history, my 
question was how closely they relate to actual agricultural praxis. 
The answer was that to a large extent they describe a reality, though 
with some bias towards larger estates. 
To find comparable units by strict delimitation is essential. Only 
original works that had been preserved were included, since they were 
the only ones that could be checked. Early translations are certainly 
an indicator of interest in these issues, but are often harder to date. 
Only longer treatises were included (with a lower limit of 10,000 
words/Chinese characters). This was based on the assumption that 
longer texts were mentioned in secondary and tertiary sources, which 
had to be the basis for my compilation. 
If shorter texts had been included there would have been a bias 
favouring regions that have elicited more extensive research about 
agricultural history. One of the best-known medieval agricultural 
treatises was written by Walter Henley in England in the thirteenth 
century. It contains fewer than 10,000 words, and its influence 
was restricted to England, compared with, for instance, the Italian 
Crescentiis, who in 1315 wrote a long text that continued to be 
copied and referred to until the end of the Middle Ages; it was even 
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translated into French. One reason Henley’s text is mentioned so 
frequently is that in modern agrarian history regarding the Middle 
Ages England is predominant and often serves as a role model for 
research on other countries. In Table 3 Henley is not included.
After 1500 the number of agricultural treatises increased world-
wide. In Europe, explosive growth followed, especially of printed 
texts, and a further leap came in the eighteenth century.
Table 3. Number of extant agricultural treatises by century.
 Rome-
Byzantium
China (and 
East Asia)
The Islamic 
World
Europe India
200–100 BCE 1     
100–1 BCE 2     
1–100 2     
100–200      
200–300      
300–400 1     
400–500   1*     
500–600   2* 1    
600–700 1 1    
700–800  2    
800–900  1   1*
900–1000   1*     
1000–1100 7 3  1*
1100–1200 5 2   
1200–1300 6 2  
1300–1400 4    5+ 2  
1400–1500   2# 1 2  
Note: During antiquity, Italy is included in “Rome-Byzantium” and during 
the Middle Ages in “Europe”. Post-eleventh century, Byzantium essentially 
does not exist as a separate cultural sphere, although it did exist as a country 
for a few more centuries.
* Datings are uncertain for the late classical-Byzantine period and for the 
Indian texts. + Including one Persian work. # Both from Korea. 
Source: Myrdal 2014.
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In the case of China, it seems that texts from the Han dynasty 
(c.200 BCE–200 CE) may be as many and as long as those from 
the Roman Empire, although the Chinese texts have not been pre-
served. Some of the oldest ones preserved were of an impressive 
length: e.g. Columella 210,000 words (60–65 CE) and Palladius 
80,000 words (c.400–425). A second increase came during the period 
1000–1300. The longest European text, with 220,000 words, was 
by Crescentiis in 1315, and the longest Chinese text, with 110,000 
characters, was by Wang Chen, c.1315 (in older Chinese a character 
normally corresponds to a word). Both were surpassed by the longest 
agricultural treatise in the medieval world, by Ibn al-Awwam, with 
500,000 words, written in Spain in the twelfth century and based 
on the scholarship of the Islamic countries.
These texts represent an accumulation of knowledge and an 
interest in such topics among intellectual groups, essentially the 
upper class. Several of the texts, but not all, are related to periods 
of agricultural expansion. In periods of threats to agriculture, texts 
were written to preserve knowledge built up under preceding peri-
ods, such as the text by Wang Chen written under the reign of the 
Mongols (Yuan dynasty). 
Agricultural treatises are just one category of texts with detailed 
descriptions of natural phenomena, but they indicate that the break-
through for this intellectual endeavour came after the axial age proper. 
They belong to the empire-building periods in Rome and China, when 
a large upper class and a substantial group of bureaucrats could form 
the basis for such an interest. A second crucial period came around 
1000–1300, and a third leap in the sixteenth century. Without a strict 
limitation the importance of Europe would have been overestimated. 
Summarizing my attempt to test the hypothesis about crucial 
periods of intellectual change, the evidence indicates that they 
exist. It has yet to be established, however, that there was a specific 
Axial period around 500. Rather, the data presented here point to 
the period after the formation of the first larger states in Eurasia as 
more crucial: this was a period of rapid change in economies and 
political structures. A second Eurasia-wide intellectual change seems 
to have occurred in the centuries around and after 1000 CE, again 
a period of economic and social restructuring. An alternative theory 
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would then be that large intellectual leaps tend to be coordinated 
with periods of general changes in the society.
A basic idea in the Axial theory is that certain ideas are launched 
during one period of time. An alternative hypothesis is that such 
ideas are formed more stepwise during several periods. One also 
has to consider the possibility of setbacks and then a reformulation 
of the core ideas. 
I have not tried to quantify core ideas such as reflexivity – but 
I claim that it would be possible to make such quantification in a 
strictly selected number of texts spread out over a long period. 
A major objection is that preserved written sources form a restriction 
for testing the theory. Other indicators have to be utilized. For instance, 
art and buildings could be such sources. The erection of large buildings 
for religious purposes in all of Eurasia during the centuries around 
1000 CE is a further indicator of a crucial change of belief systems. 
My findings challenge the idea of a changed mentality around 500, 
pointing to a later period and different context for the major change. 
Indeed, an empirical investigation with measurable estimations of 
the core ideas in a restricted number of texts still needs to be done.
Conclusions
I have mainly considered inclusive syntheses for world history and 
have focused on graphs and tables that can support general synthe-
ses and grand theories. Below are my suggestions for improving the 
standard of these.
 1) The first step is to define a measurement. It is certainly justifiable 
to illustrate a theory or hypothesis with a sketch. The synchron-
optical graphs widely distributed today show a Eurocentric bias. 
Future synchronoptical graphs may have a less pronounced 
Eurocentric bias, but if the measurement remains subjective they 
cannot be used as analytical tools.
      This critique also applies to several of the maps and graphs used 
in world system theory. They are presumably not as biased as the 
graphs I analyzed – but it would be preferable to find indicators 
that could be a basis for showing contacts between regions. 
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 2) The next step is to try to use the latest research findings. Tertiary 
sources will always be lagging behind the secondary literature 
– and both change. Data based on tertiary sources, such as his-
torical atlases, must therefore be renewed constantly. 
     The arc of the largest states is just one example, and one of 
the most desirable new databases would be population statistics. 
Data compiled and discussed at length, country by country, 
based on the newest demographical research, would produce a 
new reference work for world history.
 3) It is inherent in quantitative synthesis, maps and graphs that 
they only show one aspect, and thus scholars must seek several 
indicators that will show different aspects of the course of events. 
     In such a pluralistic approach different disciplines could work 
together. For instance, archaeology and history could together 
reconstruct a history of world trade over millennia by using 
 several indicators. This would also reveal different aspects of how 
long-distance trade has developed.
 4) To collect as much evidence as possible is tempting and has 
advantages, but it could lead to blurred results, which are diffi-
cult to interpret. A strict limitation leading to a smaller number 
of cases will often allow a closer analysis. 
     Such a restriction can be combined with detailed descriptions 
of every case, and in this respect it has similarities with compara-
tive world history. However, the difference is that the limited 
number of cases in a global survey still requires a complete and 
inclusive search for such cases.
 5) Even grand theories can be tested by selecting phenomena related 
to the predictions of the theory. My attempt to test the theory of 
the axial age seems to indicate that the process was more complex 
and diverse than what was anticipated – but also that elements 
of the theory, about periods of more rapid change, probably are 
correct.
Accumulating data to support or refute a theory is not the only way 
to test it. Instead it is better to have fewer criteria that are better 
controlled and discussed. Two doubtful graphs or diagrams do not 
give more support than one that is carefully selected and scrutinized.
81
on source criticism in world history
Finally, I want to return to what will always be a main method in 
world history, narrative description. I have not argued for replacing 
this, only for developing methods so that this kind of world history 
could be better controlled, refuted or substantiated. To end with a 
quote from Popper, just as I began this chapter, I concur with his 
claim that if a theory “passes certain tests it will be better than some 
other theory” (Popper 1965: 217).
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chapter 3
Four myths in  
global agrarian history
Mats Widgren
It is in the nature of global history to have to rely on secondary 
 sources. An important role among those secondary sources is played 
by existing syntheses addressing individual countries or regions (cf. the 
discussion in Myrdal 2009 and in this volume). The author of global 
syntheses must therefore navigate through mountains of  secondary 
literature and be able to separate the wheat from the chaff, or in this 
case, substantial, empirically based conclusions from shortcuts and 
sweeping generalizations lacking substance. 
This chapter is based on observations made while reading secondary 
literature for the project Mapping global agricultural history (Widgren 
2010b). The project aims to summarize the existing evidence for 
global agrarian systems in the last millennium. A central point has 
been to present current knowledge of global agrarian history using 
maps, in a format that can be easily compared with other datasets. 
In my reading of different types of secondary material it has struck 
me how often authors rely on commonly accepted assumptions 
rather than on empirically based generalizations. In this chapter, I 
will focus on four such assumptions that I claim take the form of 
myths. They especially creep into scholarly literature in regional and 
global syntheses, where scholars, for lack of empirical research, need 
them to help paint a broad picture. Often they are myths that once 
served particular interests. Although they may have been refuted 
a long time ago in the specialist literature, they are exceptionally 
resilient. They tend to resurface in new syntheses and in new guises, 
time and time again.
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Previous maps of global agricultural history
Previous work on mapping global agriculture can be found in schol-
arly works in two very different fields of research: climate modelling 
and global history. In our project we aim to present a synthesis in 
map form that communicates with these two different fields of 
research. Both these fields often suffer by replacing actual empirical 
evidence with assumptions that may seem to be based on common 
sense, but are in fact deeply problematic.
In climate research, it is a well-established fact that there is a close 
causal relationship between changes in land use and greenhouse 
gases. Forest vegetation sequesters carbon during its growth, while 
the clearing of forests leads to the emission of CO2 into the atmos-
phere. It is thus increasingly recognized that early developments in 
land use had implications for the global climate system. Historical 
aspects of land use have come more and more into focus in climate 
research, especially following the seminal article by Ruddiman 
addressing the effect on climate of early human influences on land 
cover. Ruddiman proposed that the Neolithic revolution, as well as 
continued agricultural expansion well before the industrial revolu-
tion, impacted on the emissions of greenhouse gases and the global 
climate system (Ruddiman 2003; Ruddiman et al. 2011).
In the modelling of the relations between long-term carbon cycles 
and historical land use, different data aimed at reconstructing his-
torical cropland change are used. The SAGE dataset was initially 
published in 1999, and covers the period 1700 to 1999 (Ramankutty 
& Foley 1999). At the same time the HYDE database was built up 
and initially also covered the last 300 years. Pongratz and co-authors 
in 2008 published a dataset covering 800 CE–2000 CE (Pongratz 
et al. 2008). All these datasets are based on recent global distribu-
tion of croplands, from which the cropland distribution in previous 
centuries is calculated, based on historical population estimates. 
The most commonly used and quoted dataset now is probably 
HYDE and the most recent version of HYDE covers the last 12,000 
years (Goldewijk et al. 2011). The basic assumption behind the 
HYDE dataset is that previous croplands only existed within the 
boundaries of the recent distribution of croplands and that these 
areas of cropland were successively filled up. Allocation of historical 
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cropland between recent state territories (and in some cases between 
regions within states) is made in relation to historical population 
estimates (mainly based on McEvedy & Jones 1978, with some 
recent updates) and an assumption on cropland per capita. The dis-
tribution within these geographical territories is based on algorithms 
and weighting maps which take into consideration such things as 
soil suitability for crops according to recent FAO maps of global 
agro-ecological zones. In addition, coastal areas and river plains are 
weighted positively and steep terrain is weighted negatively. 
Historical data on agricultural history and cropland distribution 
cannot be entered into this weighting model. Only a few evident and 
well-known facts from agrarian history are taken into account in the 
underlying datasets and weighting procedures, and this is seldom 
stated explicitly. In sum: in the absence of an empirically-based, 
spatially-explicit history of agricultural land, a dataset based on hind-
casting and environmentally deterministic algorithms is used here.
One would perhaps expect that in the fast-growing field of global 
history one would find a more evidence-based view of agricultural 
history. But that has so far not been the case. When agricultural sys-
tems are treated in works on global history, the overviews are often 
based on relatively dated and Eurocentric overviews. An alarming 
example is Malanima’s recent work on the premodern European 
economy in which a global map of agriculture in the year 1500 
shows only sparse occurrences of agriculture in America, and no 
agricultural lands in Sub-Saharan Africa (Malanima 2009: 99). 
The French historical geographer and geohistorian Christian 
Grataloup (2007) discusses why Western Europe and the United 
States became the main axis of control. In that argument, he bases 
his understanding of the material background, sixteenth-century 
global agricultural systems, on a map originally published in 1954. 
Grataloup quotes Braudel, but Braudel in his turn based his map on 
the works of the American ethnologist Gordon Hewes, who in 1954 
published a map of world cultures in 1500 CE (Hewes 1954). In a 
critical article on Braudel’s work, Samuel Kinser pointed out how 
Braudel’s interpretation of Hewes’ work emphasized a hierarchical 
interpretation of the relations between different agricultural systems 
and thus gave support to a Eurocentric view. This was, according 
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to Kinser, an aspect that was much less pronounced in Hewes’ own 
categories and Hewes in fact argued against such simplifications 
and against a Eurocentric world-view (Kinser 1981: note 20). But 
 Grataloup chose to use Braudel’s interpretation rather than Hewes’ 
and thus supports the idea of modernity emerging in Western Europe 
and later spreading throughout the world. With its foundation in a 
timeless ethnographic perspective it replaces time with space, and 
assumes that the agricultural systems recorded by ethnographers 
can be ordered along an evolutionistic timeline. 
As can be seen from the above, both quantitative modellers and 
global historians thus easily fall into the trap of replacing empirical 
knowledge with assumptions. The quantitative modellers use envi-
ronmentally deterministic assumptions that are clearly at odds with 
what we actually know about where and when different agricultural 
systems developed and decayed historically. In global history on the 
other hand, there is a tendency for assumptions about a hierarchi-
cally ordered historical sequence of agrarian systems to replace the 
empirical evidence.
Mapping global agricultural history
It is thus clear that there is a need to develop methods for reconstruct-
ing land use, methods that accord the established empirical facts of 
agrarian development greater importance than hindcasting models 
or evolutionistic assumptions can ever do. For many regions of the 
world, historians, archaeologists and historical geographers have, 
after all, fairly good documentation on the timing and location of 
expansions, the abandonments of agricultural settlements and lands, 
and also of technological changes in farming. A project has therefore 
been set up with the aim to produce a series of maps covering the 
last millennium, in which the known agricultural history is made 
spatially explicit. Three cross-sections in time have been chosen: 
• 1800 – before the second wave of globalization that drew large 
parts of the global south into commercial agriculture
• 1500 – or more precisely 1491, on the eve of European oceanic 
expansion and before the Columbian exchange
89
four myths in global agrarian history
• 1000 – a period when African and American polities and land-
scapes were distinctly different from those of the late fifteenth 
century
The design of the project was inspired by the work done by historical 
geographers in the United States on pre-Columbian agriculture in 
North and South America. The perspectives outlined in the works 
by Bill Turner and Karl Butzer (Turner & Butzer 1992; Butzer 
1992;Turner et al. 1995) and in three syntheses on the cultivated 
landscapes of different regions of the Americas (Doolittle 2000; 
Denevan 2001; Whitmore & Turner 2001) formed a model for 
our work. In the dissemination of that work to a broader audience, 
Charles Mann also later showed that it was possible to summarize 
such knowledge in map form (Mann 2005).1
Syntheses like these, expressed in map form or readily converted 
to map form, are not yet available when it comes to the rest of the 
world. In a few cases, archaeological and historical research has pro-
vided overviews that are spatially and chronologically explicit and 
can be directly used in the mapping. This is the case, for example, 
with regard to the archaeologically documented irrigation structures 
in the Angkor Wat settlement in Cambodia. Here recent analyses 
based on a combination of ground surveys and remote sensing make 
possible a detailed mapping of the distribution of irrigated fields in 
that period (Evans et al. 2007). In a number of other instances, the 
spatial detail of current and abandoned irrigation and terracing can 
be accurately mapped based on later maps and aerial surveys, but 
the chronological issues remain vague. This is the case for many of 
the instances of terraced agriculture in Western Africa and the Sahel. 
There are strong arguments that many of these areas were in exist-
ence in 1800 CE, but their exact distribution at that time cannot 
be accurately mapped (see the map in Widgren 2010a).
Scholars in China have taken a leading role globally in spatially 
explicit reconstructions of croplands, based on historical sources. 
This reflects a strong tradition of Chinese historical geography based 
on the rich material of early written sources. Also, comparatively 
strong state funding has been decisive for climate-related research, 
including a specific focus on the role of land cover history. This 
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research is also fuelled by geopolitics concerning climate change. 
Conflicting results have been presented by American and Chinese 
scholars on the role of earlier land conversions regarding the historical 
debt of emissions. Ge and co-authors (Ge et al. 2008) claimed that 
a detailed study based on Chinese historical records for the past 300 
years showed significantly lower emissions caused by land use con-
version than that previously established by Houghton and Hackler 
(2003). According to Chinese researchers, these discrepancies are 
due to an underestimation of early agriculture and deforestation in 
China. By assuming that present croplands were cleared during the 
last 300 years and not earlier, a larger part of the burden of historical 
emissions is transferred to recent times. A larger share will thus be 
attributed to the period after the mid-1800s, which is usually the 
starting point for calculating historical emissions.
In this research, tax records and other information are transformed 
into gridded data in the format used by climate modellers. This has 
been done for the nineteenth and twentieth century expansions of 
croplands in the Northeast of China (Ye et al. 2011) and for central 
China in 1820 (Lin et al. 2009), but more remarkably also for the 
Song Dynasty (1004–1085 CE) (He et al. 2012). Of course, the usual 
source-critical caveats commonly applied to agricultural statistics 
based on tax records also raise questions in this case. Nevertheless, 
the chronological and spatial detail is far greater than what is usually 
possible for such early periods. 
For most areas of the world, such detailed data on historical agri-
cultural systems and land use is not available. For some regions of 
Eurasia, however, general works on economic and agrarian history 
are sometimes precise enough in their verbal characterization of 
agricultural systems in different periods and in different regions to 
permit a mapping of changes in agriculture over time. Examples of 
such works are the grand synthesis of China by Joseph Needham, 
with a contribution by Francesca Bray on agriculture (Bray 1984). 
Similarly, Irfan Habib’s atlas work mapping surplus products from 
different parts of the Moghul Empire permits conclusions to be 
drawn about the types of agriculture in different parts of present-day 
India and Pakistan in about 1500 CE (Habib 1982). Although not 
as detailed in its evidence, James Scott’s history of upland Southeast 
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Asia makes possible a mapping of the contrasts between intensive 
rice-producing and stratified areas and more extensively used areas 
with shifting cultivation (Scott 2009). These are just a few  examples 
of scholarly work that can fairly easily be transferred to regions 
with different agricultural systems with a reasonable chronological 
specification.
Only a few regions of the world, however, can boast such syntheses 
of agrarian history. We are thus dependent on general works of history. 
This is the case for most regions of Africa and for many regions in 
Asia, apart from India and China. Many regional histories include 
an introductory chapter on land, people or subsistence, and often 
take the early nineteenth century situation as their starting point. 
The qualities of such overviews vary considerably. A few are based 
on actual agricultural history, while others substitute assumptions 
of different kinds for knowledge. The reflections in this chapter are 
based on a substantial trawling through such works for facts on 
agricultural development. Then, a sharp eye has to be used to weed 
out the shortcuts, so common in syntheses, from the genuine facts. 
It is in such situations that the checklist of four myths discussed 
in the remaining part of this chapter is important to bear in mind.
Similar myths or assumptions on agriculture of the past also 
flourish in much work on rural and agricultural development. As 
Daryl Stump has shown, these references to past agriculture may go 
in one of two directions. They either emphasize the inefficiency and 
inertia of traditional agriculture or they hail indigenous knowledge 
and the sustainability of previous farming systems (Stump 2010). 
The four myths
Myth 1: Empty or under-utilized land
Narratives of empty or under-utilized land are common in descrip-
tions of areas that were in fact populated by foragers, pastoralists 
or shifting cultivators. This is the myth that has most clearly been 
connected to political and economic interests, especially in the 
power relations of colonization. Historically, arguments about emp-
ty land have served to legitimate colonial interests in many parts 
of the world. The notion has also often gone hand in hand with 
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the notion of under-utilized land, and with the idea that itinerant 
hunter-gatherers and pastoralists have weaker rights to the land than 
permanent farmers.
One of the clearest cases of this myth is the contested settlement 
history of South Africa. The idea that European and African farm-
ers entered South Africa at about the same time was disseminated 
as part of apartheid history writing, but the notion was not at all 
confined to the direct political interest of the apartheid regime. 
Much scholarly work outside South Africa was also based on this 
understanding. One does not have to search for long to find it in 
historical works and atlases, both in South Africa and in the rest 
of the world. In his history of Africa south of the Sahara, Donald 
Wiedner gives a vivid illustration of this idea in a map showing the 
“Occupation of South Africa 1652–1775” (Wiedner 1964: 123). 
Black and white arrows indicate “Bantu migration” and “European 
migration” respectively. While Europeans advanced eastwards and 
northwards from Cape Town, black African settlement was assumed 
to have advanced southwards at the same time. According to this 
map, these two migrations arrived at the Fish River in the Eastern 
Cape in 1775. “Conflict inevitably ensued when the Caucasian Boers 
and the Negro Xhosa met on the Fish River in 1775” writes Wiedner 
(1964: 125). A similar myth of empty land was also put forward for 
a later period in South African history, when it was claimed that 
most parts of the Highveld in the eastern parts of present-day South 
Africa were “depopulated by the Zulu wars before 1834” (see map 
from Theal 1891 reproduced in Davenport & Hunt 1974).
In the 1970s, archaeologists in South Africa moved to a position 
from which they were able to challenge this view with empirical 
facts. With the help of radiocarbon dating they had gathered enough 
evidence to revise some of the previously accepted chronologies 
based on pottery only. In the early 1980s, Tim Maggs presented 
the detailed evidence that once and for all refuted the idea of par-
allel black and white colonization. He compiled detailed maps of 
the spread of archeologically known African farming settlements 
north and east of the Fish River. In the era of apartheid, the need 
for meticulous work on indisputable empirical evidence of this 
process was important. From these maps it is clear that the expan-
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sion of African farming communities along the coast had already 
reached the Fish River more than 500 years before Europeans even 
set foot in the Cape. Two grains of truth contained in the myth 
were first, that African farming expansion towards the south was 
indeed a continuing process that had not yet ceased when the first 
European explorers arrived in the area. Second, the Fish River did 
coincide with an important climatic boundary, and African farmers 
were not able to expand into the winter rainfall region in the south-
western area beyond the Fish River, where African grains (sorghum 
and millet) would not grow. It was only with the introduction of 
European grains that the Western Cape could become a farming 
region (Maggs 1980; Maggs 1984). 
The South African case might seem to be an extreme version of 
politicized settlement history, and one might perhaps expect the 
idea of empty land to be an obsolete myth, but the idea of a sparsely 
populated Southern Africa survives in recently published historical 
land cover reconstructions (Goldewijk 2011). Such reconstructions 
use as their main input what is known today about historical pop-
ulations. Unfortunately, the work on historical population recon-
structions for early periods in Africa has advanced very slowly. It 
has not taken into account to any great degree the last thirty to 
forty years of archaeological work in Southern Africa. The atlas of 
world population history from 1978 still forms the basis of much 
work on African historical populations (McEvedy & Jones 1978). 
Nobody has yet seriously used the new archaeological evidence to 
reconstruct populations in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
As noted above, the notion of empty land is also closely connected 
to the idea of under-utilized land. The idea that land is used below its 
full capacity has in history and in the present often been formulated 
as a motivation for state-led colonizations or for large investments 
in agribusiness to the detriment of the existing users of the land. In 
the context of recent large land acquisitions, Olivier De Schutter 
has pointed out the problematic use of the term under-utilized for 
occupied lands whose existing use is not perceived by governments 
as productive (De Schutter 2011: 260).
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Myth 2: Historical sequences of agrarian systems
The notion of a historical sequence of land use intensity (foraging 
– pastoralism – shifting cultivation – permanent cultivation) is 
part and parcel of much work on regional and global syntheses in a 
long-term perspective. In a long-term perspective, human use of the 
environment has indeed progressed towards more intensive forms. 
The sequence from foraging to cultivation and from there to more 
intensive forms of cultivation is unquestionable. However, in the 
light of the most recent research, there are two question marks in 
the sequence presented above. One concerns the role of specialized 
pastoralism in such a sequence, and the other concerns the role of 
shifting cultivation. I will show how the idea of a historical sequence 
must be used with caution. Its predictive value across space and time 
is weak. In two broader fields, where an assumed historical sequence 
is often used, it can be considered a myth. 
The first field of dubious usage is the idea that the resource uti-
lization systems and the social organisation of ethnographically 
documented foragers, pastoralists and shifting cultivators, truly 
reflect previous stages in the evolution of technology and social 
organization. As has been shown in many recent studies, this is 
indeed a problematic assumption. It does not take into account 
the history of these people and their changing use of the land. At 
the same time, this interpretation most often ignores the wider 
political economy under which these extensive systems of land use 
exist today. With regard to the San-speaking peoples (bushmen) of 
Southern Africa, Wilmsen has argued that their present situation 
as foragers in the peripheral drylands of Southern Africa is a recent 
development that must be seen in relation to their subordination to 
incoming Tswana farming communities. It is not their isolation from 
the outer world that explains their lifestyle, but rather their contacts 
and interactions with politically and economically stronger groups 
(Wilmsen 1989). Similarly, it has been shown in Eastern Africa that 
specialized pastoralism developed during the last 200–400 years 
among groups who previously had much more diverse economic 
strategies based on small-scale dryland agriculture and foraging. 
This is, among other things, based on meticulous research in oral 
history to assess the time depth of age-sets in these pastoral groups 
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(Bollig et al. 2013). Specialized pastoralism reflects developments 
in exchange and political economies rather than being a stage in a 
historical sequence (Håkansson 2012).
In a parallel argument concerning inland South East Asia, Scott 
shows that crops and agricultural systems do not reflect stages in a 
historical sequence. Shifting cultivation was instead a political choice 
to stay away from rice-based hierarchical societies. Scott classifies 
farming systems and crops, not along an evolutionary ladder, but 
according to their political significance as means to escape the hier-
archical state: escape agriculture and escape crops. The post-Colum-
bian introduction of American crops into Asia strengthened shifting 
cultivation and escape agriculture. Cassava and sweet potatoes in 
particular were not only perfect escape crops but also made shifting 
cultivation more productive than before (Scott 2009). To summarize, 
we are now in a position to avoid seeing today’s foragers, pastoralists 
and swidden cultivators as “Stone-Age survivors” in the midst of 
modernity, and rather to see their present subsistence strategies as 
defined by a wider political economy.
The second field where ideas about a historical sequence of agricul-
tural systems erroneously influence broader synthetic work in history 
is the assumption that the early stages of farming must always have 
involved some form of shifting cultivation. If farming is proved in 
the archaeological record (e.g. from macrofossil finds of grain), or in 
the historical record as areas with a surplus of agricultural produce, it 
is often assumed that it must have been based on shifting cultivation 
whenever there is no definite evidence of permanent agriculture. In 
many of these cases it is only the assumption of a historical sequence 
that supports the idea that shifting cultivation must have been the 
first stage of cultivation in a specific region. Strangely enough, for 
all other forms of agriculture (permanent, irrigated etc.) the bur-
den of proof seems to be heavier than for shifting cultivation. A 
source-critical view of shifting cultivation would say that we need 
proof to show that slash-and-burn was actually practised as a rota-
tion system, not just that burning was used to clear fields. There is 
also much evidence to support the idea that intensive permanent 
agriculture in many contexts may predate shifting cultivation (see 
for example Davies 2015). It might also be useful to be reminded of 
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one of the earlier classifications of stages in agricultural development 
that emphasize horticulture versus agriculture rather than shifting 
versus permanent (Lenski 1966: 91ff.).
Concerning the Eastern Woodlands in North America, there was, 
for example, for a long time a consensus that Native Americans prac-
tised slash-and-burn or a swidden-type of shifting agriculture before 
Europeans arrived. This idea is still represented in many general 
works on the history of Native Americans (see e.g. Stoltman 2000: 
571). However, a detailed investigation of the evidence by William 
Doolittle leads to the opposite conclusion. Doolittle scrutinizes all 
available sources by early European writers in the area, many of 
which had previously been taken as evidence for slash-and-burn 
systems. He convincingly argues that Native Americans practised 
a form of permanent agriculture on large fields where stumps were 
removed. As has previously been argued by Denevan concerning 
the Amazon, there is thus strong evidence that shifting cultivation 
was also a post-European phenomenon in the Eastern Woodlands 
of North America, to a large degree made possible by the arrival of 
iron tools (Doolittle 2004).
 
Myth 3: Agrarian inertia
Assumptions about agrarian inertia have often substituted for real 
historical studies of agrarian change in periods and regions where 
sources are deficient. Such ideas have also played a political role, and 
have gone hand-in-hand with pleas for agrarian modernization. This 
was true for eighteenth-century agrarian reformers in Europe as well 
as in the mid twentieth-century colonial sphere, but such assumptions 
also form a part of many uninformed development agendas of the 
twenty-first century. They are also present in the debate concerning 
European landscapes, where the idea of “traditional landscapes” 
conveys a vision of unchanging landscapes (see Antrop 2005 and 
for a critique Widgren 2012). Many scholarly overviews of African 
history take their point of departure from a timeless description of 
precolonial agriculture, as if it had not changed since its beginning. 
Agriculture is then often described on the basis of late nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century ethnographic observations and it is com-
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mon to assume an almost essentialist connection between  ethnical 
groups and their types of agriculture. As was pointed out by Paul 
Richards in 1983, many Marxist scholars have also fallen into this 
trap in their discussion of a “natural economy” as a starting point 
when discussing capitalist penetration in African agriculture. He 
argued that 
the demographic and ecological processes subsumed under the cate-
gory “natural economy” (or alternatively “precapitalist subsistence 
production”) are more plausibly viewed as products of capitalism 
(Richards 1983: 1).
Many such assumptions emphasize the primitive nature of agriculture 
and the lack of technological change over time. There is however often 
no basis for such assumptions. For example, overviews of African 
agricultural technology are sparse but the recent very informative 
overview by Blench of the diversity of agrarian implements gives an 
indication of a long period of innovation and change (Blench 2013).
The idea that agriculture has not changed over time is, paradoxical-
ly, not only applied to what are seen as backward and unsustainable 
forms such as shifting cultivation, but also to more intensive and 
seemingly sustainable forms involving, for example, terracing and 
irrigation. Such forms of agriculture are often assumed to be much 
older than they actually are.
The Balanta in present-day Guinea-Bissau were known from 
early records for being good paddy rice producers. The connection 
between the Balanta and paddy rice production is manifested in 
local proverbs and in creation myths. This would indicate a long 
history of paddy rice cultivation. However, in a detailed history of 
the relation between agricultural systems and the political economy 
of the area, Walter Hawthorne has shown that the expansion of rice 
production among the Balanta was a gradual process that occurred 
as a result of colonial penetration. Before the Portuguese arrived in 
the area, the Balanta cultivated other crops than rice, and in more 
extensive systems. Paddy rice production at that time in the sixteenth 
century, was restricted to Mandinge speakers in the Senegambia. 
Through their control of the trade in iron, they had also developed 
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a technologically advanced rice cultivation in which large iron tools 
played an important role. With the arrival of the Portuguese traders, 
other groups along the coast like the Balanta were able to get hold 
of iron. The Portuguese demand for rice made it possible for the 
politically decentralized Balanta to evade slave raiding by producing 
rice. Paddy rice cultivation spread southwards during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries and came to form an integral part of the 
slave-trading network. The story of the labour-intensive paddy rice 
cultivation among the Balanta in Western Africa from the eleventh to 
the nineteenth centuries thus reflects an intricate interplay between 
the political economy of the slave trade, ethnic affiliations, and an 
advanced iron-using technology (Hawthorne 2003).
Another case of intensive agriculture thought to have had a long 
history is the area of rice terraces in the Philippine Cordilleras. Unesco, 
on their website, claim an early dating of these World Heritage areas:
For 2,000 years, the high rice fields of the Ifugao have followed 
the contours of the mountains. The fruit of knowledge handed 
down from one generation to the next, and the expression of sacred 
traditions and a delicate social balance, they have helped to create 
a landscape of great beauty that expresses the harmony between 
humankind and the environment (Unesco 2014).
However, recent archaeological excavations and radiocarbon dating in 
the area have shown that the expansion of these rice terraces occurred, 
not 2,000 years ago, but during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, and was related to movements of people in response to 
the Spanish colonization (Acabado 2012). Prior to that, taro would 
probably have been the most important crop in these areas. More-
over, Håkansson has shown how this expansion of investments in 
rice terraces was closely connected to regional economic networks, 
and thus is an expression of changes in world systems rather than a 
purely local development (Håkansson 2014).
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Myth 4: Environmental determinism
The problem of environmental determinism would, like that of his-
torical sequences, really need a longer treatment. Most geo graphers 
are strongly opposed to anything that has the slightest smell of 
environmental determinism. We are sometimes misunderstood by 
other scholars, who think that we oppose the idea that physical 
factors such as climate and soils have a profound influence on the 
type of agriculture developed in a particular environment. That is 
not the point. What the historical geography of agriculture tells us 
is that the major regional types of agriculture in the world cannot be 
explained on the basis of the environment alone. Areas with similar 
environments exhibit very different types of agriculture. Geographers 
have been aware of this for a long time (some examples: Whittlesey 
1936: 209; Morgan 1988: 69).
Ideas based on environmental determinism have, however, con-
tinued to thrive in many other disciplines. For example, it is evi-
dent that the idea of Oriental despotism, as well as the notion of 
the Asian mode of production, were to large degree based on a 
misunderstanding by Marx and Engels of the determining factor 
that arid Asian environments supposedly had their own modes of 
production (Blaut 1993: 82–4).
In 1954, on the basis of her experience of archaeological work 
in South America, the American anthropologist Betty Meggers 
formulated what she called “the law of environmental limitation 
on culture”. She argued that 
[d]ifferences in soil fertility, climate and other elements determine 
the productivity of agriculture, which, in turn, regulates population 
size and concentration and through this influences the sociopolit-
ical and even the technological development of culture (Meggers 
1954: 802).
and formulated her law as 
the level to which a culture can develop is dependent on the agricul-
tural potential of the environment it occupies (Meggers 1954: 815).
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Her argument was to a large extent based on contemporary knowl-
edge of archaeology in the South American Amazon rainforest, 
which she claimed could only support hunting and gathering or 
slash-and-burn agriculture. However, Hirschberg and Hirschberg 
criticized her arguments very early on, on theoretical grounds. They 
reformulated the law as follows:
The level to which a culture develops is dependent on the amount 
of food the people know how to raise (Hirschberg & Hirschberg 
1957: 891).
However, for a relatively long period, the position that Meggers 
took on the agricultural potential of the Amazonian rainforest 
became part of a general assumption about what kind of prehistory 
one would expect there. Towards the end of the last millennium, 
archaeological research came to reverse that story fundamentally. 
Complex societies based on dense settlements and advanced agricul-
ture from pre-Columbian times were discovered and this completely 
overthrew Meggers’ ideas about the “the level to which a culture can 
develop” in a tropical rainforest environment (Heckenberger et al. 
2003). It has also been shown that the type of agriculture that was 
fundamental for these settlements was to a large extent based on 
permanent agriculture rather than on the slash-and-burn agricul-
ture known in the area from later times. Permanent agriculture was 
based on a form of soil improvement that had been unknown until 
these archaeological discoveries were made. Woody vegetation was 
charred and the charcoal incorporated into the soil, forming what is 
now known as a new type of anthropogenic soil – Amazonian Dark 
Earths (Glaser & Woods 2004). The discovery that the Amazonia 
rainforest was not virgin has also raised the issue of a new research 
agenda addressing the cultural history of other rainforest areas in 
the world (Willis et al. 2004).
The interpretative mistake that Meggers made was to assume that 
the type of agriculture that was practised in the area in later times 
was a good indication of the type of agriculture that was possible 
given the environmental conditions. This led her to conclude that 
similar adaptations might have existed in the past. 
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Recent findings from the Central African rainforests illustrate a 
similar case, where assumptions about what was possible in the past 
were erroneously based on recent agriculture. In the Central African 
rainforest, bananas and tubers play a decisive role in agriculture. It 
has been assumed that the earliest agriculture in this area must have 
been based on a similar repertoire of crops. It should, however, be 
noted that many of the crops important in the area in the present 
and in recent history, which form the basis of present forest vege-
culture systems are of American origin. Based on archaeobotanical 
evidence, Kahlheber and co-authors show that pearl millet and 
Bambara groundnuts were cultivated in the rainforests of South 
Cameroon in the period 400 BCE–400 CE. These crops have con-
ventionally been seen as part of a savannah type of agriculture usu-
ally found much further north, and the environment of the African 
rainforest is generally considered to be too wet for them (Kahlheber 
et al. 2013). The new finds thus suggest that the more recent forest 
vegeculture systems should be considered as a secondary phase of 
agricultural development in the area, and not the earliest and only 
possible adaptation to that environment (Fuller et. al 2013: 22).
Conclusions
Common to the four myths discussed above is that they deny agri-
culture and farming communities a history, and replace empirical 
facts with assumptions. In broader syntheses there is always the risk 
that such assumptions will creep in. The global historian must there-
fore always read secondary literature with a critical eye, having these 
resilient myths in mind. When land is described as virgin, is it only 
because there is no data available on the inhabitants and their land 
use? When agriculture is proved to have been present in an area, but 
is not known in detail, the burden of proof for arguing that it was 
based on shifting cultivation should be as heavy as it would be for, 
for example, irrigation. Ideas about historical sequences cannot be 
substitutes for empirical data. When descriptions of early land use 
are based on the empirical documentation of more recent forms of 
agriculture, there is always the risk that the author has fallen into the 
trap of environmental determinism, believing that recent  “traditional” 
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use of the land is the only possible option given environmental con-
straints, and that agriculture did not change in the past.
It is interesting to see how such myths have become part of a 
general discourse both in academic history and in applied fields such 
as development work. In many cases, the persistence of such myths 
must be understood within the relevant political (often colonial) 
contexts. They do indeed represent discourses, in the sense of ways 
of talking and writing that reflect existing power relations. How-
ever, in the cases I have referred to, when researchers have been able 
debunk such myths, they have not based their critique on discourse 
analysis but on painstaking and detailed empirical work, often of an 
interdisciplinary nature, in the field and in the archives. 
The results of recent research have also motivated us to be very 
humble when imagining past worlds. Most of the results disclosed 
by new research on agrarian systems of the past could not have been 
predicted from the environment, from population density, or from 
historical sequences of agricultural systems. When writing global 
history, one must be wary if syntheses and secondary literature use 
such assumptions about agriculture rather than referring to empirical 
investigations. The new results also illustrate, most clearly perhaps 
in the case of the Amazonian Dark Earths, that human ingenuity is 
immense, and that the variations of systems and techniques for produc-
ing food are many and indeed difficult to predict – let alone hindcast.
Notes
 1 For a cartographically clearer version of Mann’s map see http://www.utexas.edu/
courses/wd/MannMap%202013.pdf.
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chapter 4
Archaeological investigations,  
interpretations, and theories
The cases of Sri Lanka and Sweden compared
Eva Myrdal
The focus of this chapter is how field studies of the history of settle-
ments and land use, including the history of agriculture and metal-
lurgy, are more advanced for Europe than for Asia. This is not merely 
a question of a difference in the number of documented sites of a 
specific type. There is also a discernible difference in the types of 
former activities that has been searched for. 
One example of this phenomenon is premodern iron production 
(using direct and indirect production techniques), an undertak-
ing which consumes charcoal (trees). Historical sources and field 
observations have given us every reason to believe that South Asia 
was an important area for the production of iron as early as the 
mid-first millennium BCE, and for export of iron and steel at least 
from the mid-first millennium CE (Bronson 1986: 19–21; Forenius 
& Solangaarachchi 1994: 135–142; Juleff 1998: 2). This research 
potential has however not been followed up, in contrast to the sur-
vey coverage and close reading of the iron production landscape in 
Northern Europe. This has resulted in a mapping of the landscape 
of iron production with a low resolution in South Asia, and a high 
resolution in Northern Europe. 
A wide range of interesting questions arises from a detailed cover-
age of iron production sites if there is also good survey coverage of 
settlements and other production sites. These include the environ-
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mental impact, control of raw material resources, how production 
and trade were organized, and the possible presence of groups of 
people controlling the labour of others. 
Such studies could contribute to a global perspective on, for 
example, the long-term environmental impact of human activities. 
On the other hand lack of field data constitutes a problem when 
comparative or global perspectives are sought for, and if inequiva-
lence between sets of data is not acknowledged, the end result will 
naturally be slanted and biased. 
This is the more disturbing because as far as we can infer from 
historical sources, intensively surveyed case-study areas, and casual 
remarks regarding the field situation, large parts of Western, South-
ern and Eastern Asia should have a richer source material of ancient 
remains pertaining to settlement patterns and land use through 
time than most of Europe. In the case of what is now Sweden on 
the northwestern periphery of the Eurasian continent, this is defi-
nitely the case.
When certain types of data and perspectives of research pass 
unnoticed by mainstream actors in the field, they will remain almost 
invisible to the broader public of research consumers (including 
those who write global history) – in spite of the fact that they may 
represent lived experience for millions outside the academy. 
A node for a close and comparative reading of field data, which 
has no equivalent on the Asian continent, is constituted by the 
bi-annual conferences of RURALIA (held since 1995). Here the 
focus is on the archaeology of settlement and rural life in Europe, 
500–1700 CE. An introductory comment by Eva Svensson in the 
proceedings of RURALIA VI, “Arts and Crafts in Medieval Rural 
Environment”, can serve as a sounding board for the South Asian 
studies discussed below: 
Archaeology has the potential to challenge the stereotyped image 
of the medieval peasant. But it demands that we open our minds 
to the possibilities of the archaeological material, and not restrict 
ourselves to “prove” statements made by historians on the basis of 
written documents (Svensson 2007: 189).
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What is suggested below is that quite apart from Europe having a 
better coverage of archaeological surveys than Asia, the questions 
differ in focus. Tentatively, I refer to this difference as a problem 
of a social bias and I will discuss the implications of this below. I 
will also discuss the impact the concrete colonial experience may 
have had on the retrieval and documentation of ground truth and 
of archaeological field data in South Asia as compared to Europe. 
The view taken here is that this has had a bearing on the develop-
ment of fieldwork practices such as surveying for maps, and for the 
development of antiquarian practices. This refers mainly to how 
governmental practices in these fields have developed. The concrete 
examples are from Sweden and Sri Lanka respectively.1
A few basic remarks pertaining to “Sweden” and “Sri Lanka” 
introduce the comparative discussion, in “Setting the stage”. The 
section “Documentation of ground truth – maps in Sweden and 
Sri Lanka” introduces a discussion of the collection of field data 
in the nation state as compared to the former colony. This discus-
sion is followed up in “Documentation of ancient remains in the 
field: Sweden and Sri Lanka”, indicating that what was created as 
archaeological ground truth under these different regimes has had 
a bearing on how mainstream research perspectives have developed. 
In the section “A comparative perspective”, a more detailed account 
is given of the state of the art regarding studies of past land-use such 
as agriculture and iron production. 
The inequivalence of the sets of data will be returned to in the 
concluding discussion, as this has a direct bearing on the possibilities 
for discussion on a global level. 
Setting the stage
The lower time limits for this discussion are when mankind first migrat-
ed to Sri Lanka and Sweden and the upper time limit is the present. 
The oldest dated remains of human occupation in Sri Lanka 
found to date (2016) come from the 28,500 BP (before present) 
habitation site of Batadomba-lena (Deraniyagala 1992: 118). Stray 
finds of Palaeolithic implements have been documented, but no 
sites have been found and dated.
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The oldest dated remains of human occupation in Sweden found 
thus far (2015) are from the Aareavaara site, a Mesolithic campsite 
of reindeer hunters dated to c.8700 BCE (10,700 cal. yr BP), situ-
ated in the most northeastern area of Sweden, in the Pajala munic-
ipal region (Möller et al. 2012: 110). This site is representative of 
people coming from the east or northeast, following the retreating 
ice sheet. An almost contemporaneous site of a late Palaeolithic 
reindeer-hunting camp of the Bromme culture in the far south has 
been dated to 8500 BCE (National Atlas of Sweden 1994: 7). This 
is representative of people tracking the Ice Age fauna migrating 
northwards as the ice sheet retreats. 
Size in terms of square kilometres may be another factor to bear 
in mind when aiming at a comparative perspective. Sri Lanka covers 
an area of 65,610 km2. The area of Sweden is 450,295 km2 (CIA). 
However, since the end of the last Ice Age, the size and shape of 
the Sweden’s land area has undergone dramatic change. The main 
trend over time (decreasing in speed) is an increase in the land area 
available for human habitation.
Depending on the particular situation, human habitation and 
land use may be identified as either an asset or a problem in relation 
to the planning and realization of fieldwork. Population censuses 
have been carried out for the whole of Sri Lanka almost every tenth 
year since 1871 (National Atlas of Sri Lanka 1988: 62). In 2013, 
Sri Lanka had a population of 21,675,648. The average population 
density was 323 per km2. In 1950 the numbers were 123 per km2. 
The population of Sweden in 2013 was 9,647,386. The average 
population density was 20.6 per km2. In 1950 the population den-
sity was 16 per km2. 
Today’s figures give a rough understanding of Sweden as a country 
which is comparatively large in area, but with low population density, 
while Sri Lanka is the opposite, a comparatively small country with 
high population density. The figures for 60 years ago imply a similar 
situation, though the increase in population, and population density, 
is more dramatic in the case of Sri Lanka (United Nations; CIA). 
These average figures have to be complemented by more area-spe-
cific data in order to reflect different conditions in a fieldwork situa-
tion. A general observation is that intensified and mechanized use of 
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the landscape for agriculture or forestry threatens the possibility to 
learn the history of the area later, if it is not combined with relevant 
antiquarian practices of documentation in parallel. Likewise, local 
knowledge of the cultural landscape is an asset for field research, 
whereas a situation where people with this local knowledge been 
forced to move constitutes a loss of knowledge, and interviewing 
people who have had to move in adds a source-critical aspect to 
interpretation of the information retrieved. 
The amount of arable land will vary over time. Which factors 
were of importance for the increase or decrease of arable land in Sri 
Lanka and Sweden, and to what degree the amounts changed over 
time, is a field of study in its own right. However, the amount of 
arable land partly reflects what climate and geology permit. There 
are areas in both countries which have never been suitable for agri-
culture, and which remain so today.
In Sri Lanka, the Dry Zone has witnessed agrarian colonization 
based on artificial irrigation from c.300 BCE until the thirteenth 
century CE: irrigation facilities were abandoned between the thir-
teenth and the late nineteenth centuries, before re-utilization and 
construction of facilities for artificial irrigation took place during 
the twentieth century (see for example Myrdal-Runebjer 1996). 
The thirteenth century decline of irrigated agriculture and the 
demographic shift towards the western coastal areas has been a 
focus of academic and politically motivated discussion (Indrapala 
1971 and further references). The census indications of an unstable 
demographic situation and the decrease of inhabitants during the 
nineteenth century, after British colonial power established itself 
in the entire island, have been very little discussed (see for example 
Farmer 1976: 11–12). Neither of these presumed demographic 
shifts has been approached from a detailed reading of field data, 
which is why these issues have a direct bearing on the questions 
raised in this chapter, and will be returned to in the discussion of 
the state of the art.
Today, arable land in Sri Lanka constitutes 18.3 per cent of the 
total area (12,000 km2) and 980 km2 are covered by water. In Swe-
den, arable land constitutes 5.8 per cent (26,117 km2) of the total 
area, with water covering 39,960 km2. However, it is important to 
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bear in mind that with artificial irrigation, the same field for staple 
crops such as rice may be harvested two to three times per calendar 
year in Sri Lanka, a possibility created by climate and labour input. 
This gives a support potential (and potential of appropriation) that 
should also be considered in a historical perspective. The same goes 
for the seed/yield proportions. The wet-rice seed/yield proportion 
before modern high-yielding varieties of paddy rice were introduced 
has been given as 1:100 (Bray 1989: 15). For Sweden, the seed/yield 
rate for the staple crops wheat and barley during the fifteenth century 
has been estimated at 1:3–4 (Myrdal J. 1999: 235).
Documentation of ground truth: Maps
As is stated in the introduction to this volume, the task of writing 
global history implies using mainly secondary sources. The follow-
ing examples raise the question of who authored what, and why.
Fieldwork is necessary at some stage in most data-gathering under-
takings aimed at advancing knowledge of past physical processes and 
events. Maps are crucial to any fieldwork, and maps are most often 
drawn to be used in economic, military or legitimizing contexts. 
The oldest maps known today which show Sri Lanka are those of 
Ptolemy (127–151 CE) and Al-Idirisi (1100–1166), produced by 
foreigners who had not visited the island themselves (National Atlas 
of Sri Lanka 1988: 8). Al-Idrisi’s map of “The Island Serendib” (gezira 
sarandib) depicts and names the central highlands, as well as eleven 
coastal and four inland settlements, of which one inland settlement lacks 
a name (National Atlas of Sri Lanka 1988: 8; Idrisi). These early maps 
reflect Sri Lanka’s central geographical position for map-producing 
societies active on the ancient trade routes across the Indian Ocean.
The oldest maps depicting the Scandinavian peninsula have a 
character similar to the oldest maps of Sri Lanka, being small-scale 
maps initiated by people operating outside the area itself and thus 
not drawn from ground truth. However, the Scandinavian maps are 
1,300 and 300 years younger than the Sri Lankan ones (Nicolaus 
Germanus’ Cosmographia 1482; Olaus Magnus’ Carta Marina 1539, 
published in Venice). The later date reflects Scandinavia’s peripheral 
geographical position for early map-producing societies.2 
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As maps always have an author, and were often made to order, it 
may be useful to consider on whose behalf, or under what circum-
stances, the small-scale maps of  Sri Lanka and Sweden made during 
the following seventeenth to nineteenth centuries were drawn. 
In the case of Sweden, we may note that from the state authorities’ 
point of view, the country had never been occupied and ruled by 
foreign forces. Before 1658, border areas of what now constitutes 
Sweden belonged, in fact, to a neighbouring king, and additional 
neighbouring territory was subject to the Swedish crown. The present 
borders were established in 1809 when Russia conquered Finland. 
Historical experience in Sri Lanka before 1948 was different. 
Increasing areas of territory had been lost to colonial powers since 
the first arrival of the armed Portuguese in 1517. The process con-
tinued through the period of Dutch colonization and the subsequent 
British colonial warfare from 1796, with British victory over the last 
king of Kandy coming in 1815. The process finally culminated in 
the defeat of the all-island uprising in 1817–1818 (Emerson Tennet 
II 1977: 547–622; Davy 1983: 246–247).
After the various colonial powers had established themselves on 
the island, they initiated the drawing up of maps of Sri Lanka, based 
on some physical knowledge. Early examples of small-scale maps 
produced in a colonial context are those of Cypriano Sanchez (in 
1560–1566), Knox (in 1681) and John Davy (in 1821). 
In Sanchez’ map, produced during the early Portuguese rule of 
part of the island, the focus is on demography, with several remarks 
referring to “deserted land”, such as, for example, in the southeast-
ern part which is said to have been deserted for 300 years because 
of disease.3 Roads and many additional named inland settlements 
have been added to this map as compared to Idrisi’s. Information 
regarding economically important resources is also to be found. South 
of the central highlands a note refers to “Serra de Ferro”, Iron Hill 
(National Atlas of Sri Lanka 1988: 8). This relates to an area where 
iron production was carried out from the Early Historic period to 
colonial times (Coomaraswamy 1956: 190–193; Juleff 1998, see 
further below). Just east of the note “Reino de Candea”, the King-
dom of Kandy, reference is made to “Cardamome” which was an 
export item. (National Atlas of Sri Lanka 1988: 8). Geographical 
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information on “iron” and “cardamom” has not been a key factor 
when historians have told the “grand narrative” of Sri Lanka.
The geographically more correct outer contour of the island is 
easily recognized in Robert Knox’ (1641–1720) late seventeenth- 
century map. The map is an illustration in his book about his almost 
twenty years of captivity in the Kingdom of Kandy, and his flight to 
the coast and back home to England. He was not a subject of the 
then colonial power (the Dutch) and he named the map “A new 
map of the Candy Uda in the Island of Ceylon”. A more detailed 
depiction of named inland and coastal settlements, roads and rivers 
can be noted compared to previous maps. The focus is on political 
boundaries between the Kingdom of Kandy, the Dutch and the 
Vanniyars in the North (Knox 1981). 
The map by John Davy (1790–1868) from 1821 approaches 
ground truth in relation to settlements, roads and rivers to such a 
degree that it is possible to use it for at least an approximate orien-
tation in the field. John Davy (M.D., F.R.S.) was an army surgeon 
and physician and in Sri Lanka he was in attendance on the British 
governor, Sir Robert Brownrigg. In 1817–18 Davy accompanied him 
and British troops in the field during the all-island uprising against 
the colonial power. The map he produced has the title “Map of the 
Island of Ceylon. Showing military routes, Out posts and Forts of 
Early British Times” (National Atlas of Sri Lanka 1988: 10). 
A brief overview of map production in Sweden can help us to 
reflect over how the colonial situation exerted an influence on the 
production of maps and their subsequent use in Sri Lanka.
Andreas Bure (1571–1646) was commissioned by the king to 
produce a map over Sweden, and it was published in 1636. Two 
years later, he was received a royal commission to organize the Survey 
Department. The maps were produced in the interest of the State 
authority, the small-scale maps should be seen in the context of the 
crown’s interest in expansion to the north and east, while the large-
scale maps were made with effective taxation in mind. 
From the time of Gustaf III (1771–1792), the armed forces took 
over the responsibility for geographical mapping. A field corps 
of surveyors was organized at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century and it was not until 1937 that the work came under  civil 
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administration. The maps were made available to the general 
public from 1857. 
One important difference between Sweden and Sri Lanka is the 
production of large-scale cadastral maps, in Sweden from the seven-
teenth century and in Sri Lanka from 1800, and in whose interest 
they were made.
During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 
focus in Sweden was on large-scale cadastral maps as an aid to the 
state-initiated land reforms re-parcelling the agricultural land of the 
villages. The fieldwork was organized by the Survey Department. 
In parallel with this, personnel from the Swedish Navy triangulated 
the coastal areas in their entirety. 
As a basis for better statistics on agricultural produce, economic 
mapping started in the mid-nineteenth century. A mapping project 
which has a direct bearing on the organization of the antiquities 
survey (see below) was the “Economic map” started in 1935 and 
completed in 1978. Revisions and a change of scale have followed. 
This is a mapping project involving the whole of Sweden except 
the high mountains and their adjoining forest land in the far north 
and northwest of the country. The map was produced on the scale 
of 1:10,000 for the southern part of the country and on the scale 
1:20,000 for forested areas of inland northern and mid-Sweden. 
Buildings, homesteads, roads, footpaths, agricultural land, ancient 
remains and the names of farms and villages are depicted. The 
work was undertaken by “Rikets allmänna kartverk”, the national 
mapping office.
Four years after the British colonial power took the colonized 
part of Sri Lanka from the Dutch in 1796, land alienation and 
land settlement made it necessary to conduct cadastral surveys. The 
first cadastral maps were produced at the inception of the Survey 
Department in 1800. The objective was to separate state lands from 
private lands. Private land was not individually surveyed (National 
Atlas of Sri Lanka 1988: 12). 
In 1897 the colonial power decided to conduct a topographical 
survey of the entire country, and to produce a map on the scale 
one inch to one mile. In 1908, an adequate field methodology had 
been worked out for producing a contour map, necessary for the 
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planning of railways and roads. The one inch to one mile contour 
map of Sri Lanka was completed in 1924. 
A map publication project in a different political set-up was 
the National Atlas of Sri Lanka, published in 1988. A quotation 
from the introduction by the chief editor T. Somasekaram, Deputy 
 Surveyor General of the Survey Department, may help to highlight 
the difference as compared to the colonial period. He formulates 
the national agenda of the project and concludes the introduction 
with a statement on how to put the Atlas to use: 
The Atlas depicts graphically, as no words or tables can, the uneven 
distribution of people, resources and services in the country. How 
could a balanced development be achieved? … If the National Atlas 
enables people to ask such questions and seek answers, this labour 
of love of four years by a dedicated team would have been worth 
the effort (Somasekaram 1988: VII).
The Agricultural Base Mapping Project (ABMP) was started in 1977 
with the aim of producing a map series on the metric scale 1:50,000 
with 5 meter contours, using the old maps and aerial photography, 
and revised by surveyors in the field. The maps were to be used 
in planning for self-sufficiency in foodstuffs (National Atlas of Sri 
Lanka 1988: 12). 
Documentation of ancient remains 
in the field in Sweden and Sri Lanka
Sweden
The short overview of the history of documentation of ancient 
remains in Sweden given below focuses on the initiators and the 
results in terms of spatial and social coverage. 
The first antiquities law in Sweden was passed in November 1666 
and the registration of antiquities (in Swedish “Rannsakningar ef ter 
antikviteter”) started in 1667 after an initiative by the Director 
General of the National Heritage, Riksantikvarie Johan Hadorph 
(1630–1693). He argued that the memorials to the nation’s ances-
tors were under threat of destruction. A request was sent from the 
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state authorities to the Archbishop and the Bishops in which they 
were urged to contact all the parish clergymen in the country. The 
priests were requested to involve the churchwardens and the six lay-
men trustees in each parish in helping them to establish lists over all 
antiquities to be found in the parish. The lists were to be sent to the 
Committee for Antiquities (Antikvitetskollegiet). The Rannsakningar 
continued until 1693 (Rannsakningar).
The types of remains to be registered, and thus protected, were 
castles, hill forts and other types of fortification, runestones,  tumuli, 
the graves of Kings or other aristocratic persons, all graves in churches 
and in churchyards, and anything else that might serve as a memorial 
to historic achievements, persons, towns or families. Later, Hadorph 
added holy wells, old books, coins and folk songs.
The archive contains material from 1,200 parishes, none of them 
situated in the northernmost provinces of Norrbotten, Västerbotten 
and Lappland. Burial grounds, tumuli and hill forts from the Iron 
Age are among the registered remains. Very few remains older than 
the Iron Age were documented. Documentation, of runestones and 
sometimes of legends and traditions connected with them, domi-
nate the material. Further documentation of the immaterial cultural 
herit age exists in the form of legends regarding the building of parish 
churches, of holy wells and of various folk customs and traditions.
It is obvious that the survey was socially biased, not only in terms 
of results but also in terms of intentions. Nevertheless, the actual 
people working in the field were priests and laymen from parishes 
lying mainly in rural areas. The priests obviously prioritized written 
records (runestones) but to some extent what the locals related in 
connection to these and other objects has also been recorded. 
The geographical bias, with a total lack of material from the 
northern half of what is now Sweden, might partly be the result of 
the types of remains specified. 
The antiquities law of 1867 established that physical encroachment 
on ancient remains was punishable by law. It should be noted that 
ancient monuments are not private property in Sweden.
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, antiquarian 
activity was conducted through regional and local initiatives. Apart 
from priests with an interest in local history, regionally-based civil 
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organizations were important initiative-takers in compiling antiquar-
ian documentation during this period, until the state organized the 
antiquities survey of 1938. Among these civil organizations were 
the Rural Economy and Agricultural Societies (started in 1791 on 
Gotland and established in all counties in 1850), the Swedish Anti-
quarian Society (established in 1869) and the Swedish Hembygdsrörelse 
(home district movement, started in the early twentieth century).
This is not the place for a thorough discussion of this develop-
ment4. What is important, given the questions at issue here, is to 
note the presence of the Royal Swedish Academy of Letters, His-
tory and Antiquities (RSALHA, founded 1786) on the one hand 
– the Secretary of which was also the Riksantikvarie. On the other 
hand there were also a rich variety of regional and local practices 
which were organized but not tied to specific religious, political 
or economic interests, which however, is not to say that they were 
ideologically neutral. 
State-organized antiquarian practices developed through the 
RSALHA from 1826, when the Academy was established as the 
highest state authority for ancient remains in the country. The 
Swedish National Heritage Board was established in 1938 as an 
independent government agency. When the national antiquities 
survey started as a collaboration with the national mapping office 
for the production of the Economic Atlas the same year, it had the 
previous local and regional inventories as a basis for the field survey. 
The field personnel were also in communication with the local civil 
community during the surveys. With ancient monuments marked 
on the map, the landowners had an enhanced possibility of follow-
ing the Antiquities law.
The field surveys and production of the first edition of Economic 
maps ran from 1938 up until 1978. Over time there was develop-
ment in relation to the types of remains that were registered. This 
was partly linked to the revised Antiquities law (1942) that allowed 
for registering new types of remains such as production and settle-
ment sites from historical times (Selinge 1989: 17–18). However, 
the dominating categories of registered ancient remains during 
this period were hill forts, runestones and prehistoric graves. The 
latter represent a spatial and chronological overview of settlements 
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for some historic periods and regions, though the focus on visible 
burials involves a social bias (Jensen 1997: 115). 
As the survey covered new areas, additional types of remains were 
added: trapping pits for moose in the northern part of the country 
were noted as from the late 1950s, receiving the status of protected 
monuments in 1965. Stone Age settlement sites were incorporated 
into the register when the survey covered the rivers and lakes in 
Norrland in the 1960s, these having been separately registered from 
19425 in relation to the building of hydro-electric power plants. The 
remains of agricultural land use had been noted on the field maps 
from the start, and some remains such as the prehistoric stonewalls 
were given the status of protected monuments in the 1940s. Final-
ly, in the county of Jämtland the remains of farmsteads abandoned 
not later than the sixteenth century, including adjoining infield 
areas, were registered as protected monuments from the late 1960s 
(Selinge 1989: 20). An antiquarian interest in remains related to 
low- technology ironworks (bloomery furnaces, slag heaps etc.) is 
documented from at least 1874 when Hans Hildebrand, the Riks-
antikvarie at the time, documented slag along the river Dalälven and 
in the province of Västergötland (Magnusson 1986: 28). These types 
of remains were noted on field maps from the start of the antiquities 
survey, but they gained the status of protected monuments in the 
1960s during the survey of Dalarna and Norrland (Selinge 1989: 18). 
Since the early twentieth century, low-technology ironworks formed 
part of the archaeologists’ research agenda, more or less intensively, 
and parallel studies of the medieval and later historical ironworks 
were undertaken (Magnusson 1986: 28–29).
When the survey accompanying the revision of the Economic map 
started in 1974,6 a new and broader programme for the antiquities 
survey had been formulated (Jensen 1997:116). The broadened view 
of what constitutes ancient remains worth preserving was a result of 
communication between the public, after many local and regional 
studies had been undertaken since the eighteenth century, and the 
government agencies in the field of cultural heritage management, 
as observed by K-G Selinge (Selinge 1989: 21).
The revised survey thus had the ambition to register as many 
types of cultural remains as possible, not only those with the  status 
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of protected ancient monuments. Today there are 155 types of 
remains mentioned in the list used by the National Heritage Board. 
When actually working in the cultural landscape, it is apparent 
that the register gives a biased picture. There is still better cover-
age of the southern half of the country than of the northern half. 
There is better coverage of open agrarian landscapes than of forested 
areas. Also, the remains related to abandoned agricultural land, to 
preindustrial production, to the dispossessed section of the rural 
population in historic times, and to the Saami population, are 
less well covered. Many of the latter remains are to be found in 
present-day forested areas. The need for a complementary survey 
was felt since most forests in Sweden are actively used for highly 
mechanized forestry production, which, according to reports, is 
destructive towards protected ancient monuments as well as other 
cultural remains (protected by the Forestry Act of 1994, though this 
is not as strongly formulated). For details of the impact of forestry 
on the cultural landscape, see, for example, Myrdal-Runebjer 1998; 
Aronsson 1998; Hällström et al. 2001. 
The Forest and History survey of cultural heritage sites was initiated 
by the County Forestry Board in Värmland-Örebro in 1995, in close 
co-operation with the National Heritage Board and the County Anti-
quarian Agency. In the beginning of 2000, Forest and History surveys 
were under way in 14 counties (Myrdal-Runebjer 1999; Myrdal-Rune-
bjer 2002). Today 115,000 cultural heritage sites are digitalized in the 
Swedish Forestry Agency’s register on a national level, and relevant 
remains are being included in the National Heritage Board’s digitalized 
register of ancient remains at the pace allowed by available resources.
To conclude this overview, one may observe that the initiative 
to conduct the antiquities survey was taken within a national, 
ruling-class context, but with a strong focus on oral tradition and 
“Griffter och Ättebacker“ (burials and burial-grounds), the specific 
and local came to form part of the documentation from the begin-
ning. The various local initiatives that were subsequently undertaken 
and the continuous dialogue between laymen and the antiquarian 
professionals and later the Ministry of Culture and Parliament, 
have enabled field studies of land use history with both “castle” and 
“cottage” perspectives. For research purposes it should be possible 
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to develop syntheses of the local and the specific when it comes to 
analyses of power relations and the control of resources and the 
labour of others.
The development from the 1930s of one centrally-managed reg-
ister for ancient remains should be noted, as it forms a common 
ground for discussions of perspectives and evaluation.
Sri Lanka
The documentation of ancient remains in the field, before the 
Archaeological Department was formed in 1890, was carried out 
by representatives of the colonial power whose main duties were 
other than antiquarian documentation and cultural heritage man-
agement. The pioneers during the early nineteenth century were 
British military personnel. 
In 1818, Lieutenant Fagan, a British officer, was the first Euro-
pean to visit the ruined city of Polonnaruva from the Middle His-
toric Period. He arrived there in pursuit of some “rebels” during 
the military campaign of 1817–1818. He published an account of 
his observations in the Ceylon Gazette in 1820 (Ievers 1899: 213).
The Collector of Mannar, T. Ralph Backhouse, had taken part in 
Fagan’s military expedition the previous year, 1817. During this field 
campaign he had also visited Anuradhapura, the site of the ancient 
capital, and Mihintale and Kavuduluväva (“väva” means irrigation 
tank), measuring and describing ruins and tank bunds (Ievers 1899: 
213; Silva 1969: 1162).
The ancient capital had been abandoned as the main administra-
tive centre as early as the eleventh century. However, as with most 
once-settled areas in the world, the area itself continued to be used by 
people in various ways. In 1679, six hundred years after it had ceased 
to be the seat of kings, Robert Knox came to visit the site during 
his flight from the Kingdom of Kandy. He had been advised to go 
to Anuradhapura to procure meat. He describes the area as follows: 
It is a vast great Plain, the like I never saw in all that Island: in the midst 
whereof is a Lake, which may be a mile over, not natural but made 
by art, as other Ponds in the Country, to serve them to water their 
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Corn Grounds. This Plain is encompassed round with Woods, and 
small Towns [villages] among them on every side (Knox 1981: 353). 
He further describes how people outside the area perceived of the 
site as a former centre “where they say Ninety Kings have Reigned” 
(Knox 1981: 100).
The army surgeon Dr. John Davy never visited the site of Anur-
adhapura during the military campaign of 1817–18. However, he 
gathered some information from “natives” and an officer who were 
there during the rebellion, and he mentions that Anuradhapura 140 
years after the visit by Knox was “a small mean village in the midst 
of a desert”. He also writes that the site with its ruined dagobas was 
considered a sacred spot and a place of pilgrimage (Davy 1983: 225). 
The Assistant Agency of Nuwarakalawiya was located at  Anurad ha - 
pura in 1833. It initiated some clearing of jungle, bringing to light 
previously undocumented ancient remains such as stone inscriptions 
(Silva 1969: 1162). Lieutenant (later Major) Skinner was the first to 
give more reliable accounts of what was to be found above ground 
in Anuradhapura, based on a field survey in 1832–33. During the 
work he was able to gather information on the “traditional names” 
of specific buildings (Ievers 1899: 213). This is another indication 
that the site at the time was part of a cultural landscape in use.
In their proceedings of March 1831, the Board of Kandyan 
Commissioners notes the reuse of ancient constructions and warns 
against using local information on names: 
From this period onwards many of the caves and abandoned vihares 
were re-occupied by priests – generally natives of the Seven Korales. 
These priests frequently pretended to know the ancient names of 
the places they occupied, and gave names which their reading of 
the chronicles suggested. Thus it is not safe to rely on the names 
without further evidence (Ievers 1899: 213–214).
The various operators in the Anuradhapura cultural landscape 
had of course different objectives. The “priests – natives of the 
Seven Korales” were part of the local social network, as Buddhist 
priests having to be fed by others. They had taken advantage of 
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the overthrow of the King of Kandy by the British troops, and 
they now claimed the right to live in and name the structures. The 
representatives of the colonial administration, on the other hand, 
were in the process of finding ways of putting the colony to use, 
and were gathering various types of information for later practical 
and legitimizing ends. 
Using the Buddhist chronicles to identify structures in the field 
was a practice continued by the colonial rulers. In 1842, Major 
Skinner gave the plan of Anuradhapura to the British civil servant 
George Turnour (1799–1843) (Ievers 1899: 214). Turnour was the 
first European to study the Pali Buddhist chronicles of Sri Lanka, 
and his translation of the Mahavamsa was published in 1837.
Major Forbes was able to give an improved description of the 
site of Polonnaruva (the capital in the eleventh to mid-thirteenth 
centuries) during a visit in 1831. He was also the first European 
to document a visit to Sigiriya, which for a short period of time in 
the fifth century was the site of the capital (Paranavitana 1983: ii). 
From the mid-nineteenth century onwards, representatives of the 
colonial power other than military personnel become more visible in 
the documentation work. In 1848, Sir James Emerson Tennent, the 
Colonial Secretary of the British colony in Ceylon at the time, was 
obliged to tour the colony because of an uprising. The news that the 
monarchy had been overthrown in France and a republic established 
had been used by some people in the former Kandyan territories to 
raise awareness among the local people of the new taxes imposed by 
the colonial power on for example shops, firearms and dogs. They 
were aiming, in Emerson Tennent’s words, “for the restoration of 
their national independence” (Emerson Tennent 1977: 1009). 
During his tour, Tennent was able to visit various ancient sites, 
among them Sigiriya. He and his group were hindered from pen-
etrating the ruined galleries at the foot of the rock towards the 
Mirror wall by “insufferable heat” and “the oppressive smell caused 
by the bats that inhabit them in thousands”. Numbers of snakes 
and a bear added to the uncomfortable survey situation (Emerson 
Tennent 1977: 1018). 
T.H. Blakesley from the Public Works Department was the first 
to conduct a more detailed survey of the site of Sigiriya, including 
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part of the remains of the reservoir south of the moat and the city 
rampart (Blakesley 1876: 53–62). Not being a trained historian, 
his dating and historical interpretation of the site were incorrect, 
but the plan is useful.
Surveys of ancient abandoned reservoirs and canals, once used 
for artificial irrigation, were undertaken from the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. The surveyors were either engaged in ordinary 
surveys for the one-inch map or later specific surveys of particular 
irrigation systems with a view to renovation. This was not a field of 
study for antiquarians. The Superintendent of Surveys, R.L.  Brohier, 
wrote the first comprehensive report on the ancient irrigation sys-
tems in Sri Lanka in 1934 (Brohier 1979).
Was it, however, the representatives of the colonial power who 
were first to claim an interest in the ancient remains of the country? 
In Anduradhapura we note that pilgrims had been coming to the 
site long before the surveying and clearing work began, and that 
religious remains were reclaimed by Buddhist priests in parallel 
with the surveying and building of an Assistant Agency. The site of 
Sigiriya likewise formed part of a cultural landscape through time. 
The capital city was abandoned in 495 CE, but archaeology indicates 
various activities at the site until the thirteenth century. From the 
sixteenth century to the early nineteenth century (that is, until the 
British colonization) Sigiriya village and the surrounding settlements 
formed an outpost of the kingdom of Kandy according to the his-
torical records. Surface finds of material from the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries have also been documented  (Bandaranayake 
1984: 6). The site was not only used in a physical sense. For a period 
of 700 years after the city was abandoned as a capital, it was reflected 
upon and formed a site of fame and glory in a secular sense in the 
minds of at least the literate elite from various parts of the island. 
This is evidenced by poems scribbled by visitors to the site between 
the fifth and thirteenth centuries.
The epigraphist, Archaeological Commissioner and first Research 
Professor of Archaeology in Sri Lanka Senarat Paranavitana copied, 
deciphered and interpreted 685 of the verses dating from the eighth to 
the tenth centuries. They were published in 1956 (Paranavitana 1983).
The overwhelming majority of the edited poems, 666 of them, 
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refer to the paintings on the rock above. Twelve of the published 
poems were written by women, and 556 certainly by men. Sixty- 
five different villages in four different provinces are mentioned as 
the places of origin of the visitors, and fifty family or clan names 
are given. More than thirty of these early tourists were monks and 
nuns. The others were clerks, physicians, superintendents of slaves, 
military officers, merchants, keepers of elephants, ladies and wives 
(Gooneratne et al. 1984: 219–228). But in the thirteenth century 
a visitor states:
I am Jalaka a drummer by profession, who visited this place  (Priyanka 
1990: 215).
So we can conclude that before the Archaeological Department was 
inaugurated in 1890 there were two types of remains documented by 
two different types of colonial representatives. The remains relating 
to religion and the elite were documented by military personnel and 
later on by high colonial civil servants; and the large-scale abandoned 
constructions for artificial irrigation from 300 BCE to 1200 CE 
were documented by the Survey and Public Works Departments. 
Some of the irrigation structures were left in an abandoned state, 
but some were renovated and especially the minor tanks and irri-
gation schemes in particular were often renovated without any, or 
any further, documentation (Myrdal-Runebjer 1996: 21). 
The religious and elite-related buildings were later considered 
protected ancient monuments. To interpret the constructions with 
regard to dating and usage, antiquarians were in communication with 
representatives of the Buddhist sangha, and later with Orientalist 
researchers who had read and translated the Buddhist chronicles. 
The compilation of the chronicles has been dated from the fifth 
century CE (the Mahavamsa), up to and including 1815, when the 
British ousted the King of Kandy. 
An Archaeological Commission was appointed in 1868 with 
the aim of investigating the possibilities of preserving the architec-
tural structures of ancient monuments and of collecting copies of 
inscriptions. A programme for clearing ancient monuments and 
their surroundings in Anuradhapura was set up. Monuments with 
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stone carvings and sculptures came to light and personnel from the 
Public Works Department drew them to scale. In the following years, 
some government initiatives were made for the collection and study 
of ancient inscriptions, and the Ceylon Civil Service conducted 
excavations of buildings in the ancient cities of Anuradhapura and 
Polonnaruva, followed by conservation. 
The former District Judge of Kegalle, H.C.P. Bell, was appoint-
ed Archaeological Commissioner in 1890, and his first task was to 
conduct a complete survey and excavation of Anuradhapura and to 
survey the remains on and around the Sigiriya rock.
No legislation governed the protection of ancient monuments 
until The Antiquities Ordinance was passed in 1900. It was consid-
ered ineffective since there were, for example, limited measures to 
prevent the unscientific restoration of monuments on private land. 
Privately owned monuments gained extended protection through 
the Antiquities Ordinance of 1940 and the Ordinance passed in 
1955 facilitated the procedure for declaring an area an Archaeologi-
cal Reserve (Silva 1969: 1162–1175).
In the National Atlas of Sri Lanka there are two maps presenting 
the acknowledged state of the art regarding the ancient cultural 
landscape: “Archaeological Sites and Monuments” and “Ancient 
Cities and Settlements” (National Atlas of Sri Lanka 1988: 56–59). 
These maps are discussed below.
A comparative perspective
To follow up on the suggested high and low resolution of archaeo-
logical field data and the social bias in data collection, an overview 
of the types of remains registered and mapped in Sweden and Sri 
Lanka through time is given below. Two tables are used to frame 
the question: “Archaeological sites” and “Architecture and cultural 
environment”. The designations of types of cultural remains are 
taken from the national atlases of Sweden (1994) and Sri Lanka 
(1988) respectively, and all designations from the respective works 
have been included. 
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Table 1. Archaeological sites.
Sweden: National Atlas Sri Lanka: National Atlas
The History of the Settlement of Sweden Prehistoric sites (67 sites) 
Early Hunting Cultures
Stone Age Peasants
Bronze Age Settlement
Rock Art (prehistoric)
Graves and Iron Age settlement Proto- and Early-Historic period   
   (49 sites) 
Agriculture during the Iron Age and  
Middle Ages
Settlements
Strongholds and Power Cities
Other urban cities
Runic inscriptions Early Brahmi Inscriptions
Early and Middle Historical Period  
   Inscriptions
Routes and Fairways Ports and important landing centres
The Cultural Landscape of Iron
Traps and Trapping
The Saami Cultural Environment
Places of Sacrifices and Popular Belief
What is of interest here are examples of social bias, in that there are 
remains appearing in the Swedish atlas which are absent from the 
Sri Lankan atlas. This is not because these types of remains are not 
to be found in Sri Lanka, but because they have not been includ-
ed in what is considered to be “the heritage”. The tables further 
give examples of the low resolution of field data in the Sri Lankan 
case.
Table 1 shows archaeological sites that have been grouped  together 
in the atlases under these specific designations. “The Cultural 
Landscape of Iron” is discussed as the first comparative example. 
In the Swedish atlas this refers to remains of direct and indirect 
production processes such as Iron Age furnaces, charcoal pits, slag 
heaps, and so on. Medieval mining, ironworks and tilt hammers, 
and nineteenth-century ironworks are included. As discussed in 
the introduction, there are such sites in the field in Sri Lanka, very 
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few of which have been registered, and even fewer excavated and 
dated. 
During the British colonial period in South Asia, the then pre-
valent low-technology, direct process iron and steel production were 
commented upon, and documentation was undertaken, for  example, 
in the course of mapping raw material resources. Af  Geijerstam 
observes that in pre-1900 observations, approximately 150 locations 
of traditional iron production within the boundaries of today’s India 
are mentioned (Geijerstam 2004: 71). 
From the seventeenth century to the early twentieth century there 
Sweden: National Atlas Sri Lanka: National Atlas
Our Churches Dagoba (Buddhist)
Image-houses (Buddhist and Hindu)
Halls and dwellings of monks
Bathing places for royalty and monks 
Hospitals
Sculpture: Buddha Image
Sculpture: Boddhisattva image
Other important Sculptures
Moonstone (first ornate step of a flight of 
steps at the entrance of religious  
   buildings) 
Guardstones (decorated stones placed on 
either side of the   
   Moonstone)
Paintings (wall- and rockpaintings   
   of the historic period in elite or   
   religious contexts)
Buildings and Farms in Rural Areas
Castles, Palaces and Manor Houses
Public Buildings
Towns, The Cultural Environments of   
   Townships
Industrial Monuments
Place names
Table 2. Architecture and cultural environment.
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are many published accounts of low-technology iron and steel pro-
duction in Sri Lanka (Knox 1981; Davy 1983; Baker 1983; Emerson 
Tennent 1977; Coomaraswamy 1956). 
Until the 1990s, the dating of ancient iron or steel production 
was not related to the production sites (Ghosh 1990: 328). It was in 
settlement layers or burials where iron objects or indications of iron 
production were found and given dates. From the 1990s onwards, 
a growing number of iron production sites have been excavated in 
South Asia, including furnaces.
The generally agreed-upon beginning of iron production in India 
is now set in the fifteenth century BCE (Eran) and the thirteenth 
century BCE (Hallur), in the southern part of the country. By the 
sixth century BCE, iron was regularly used (Juleff 1998: 9). In Sri 
Lanka, tenth-century BCE slag contexts from the inner city of 
Anuradhapura constitute the earliest dating of inferred iron pro-
duction, followed by the ninth-century BCE dating of slag contexts 
at the Aligala protohistoric site in the Sigiriya region (Juleff 1998: 
14; Karunaratne and Adikari 1994: 58–60). 
At the fifth-century BCE to fourth-century CE Proto-Early 
historic settlement site Ibbankatuva in Sri Lanka, furnaces were 
located within the settlement itself (Karunaratne 1994: 107–108). 
During the SARCP archaeological survey (1988–1994) of the 
Sigiriya hinterland (45×35 km), thirty-three iron production sites 
were registered. The late second-century BCE to fourth-century 
CE Dehigaha-äla-kanda iron production site south of Sigiriya rep-
resents a specialization, with its huge quantities of slag from the 
production of tens of thousands of tons of iron, and its unusually 
large furnaces of which only five have been excavated (Forenius 
& Solangaarachchi 1994: 140). 
In Gillian Juleff’s archaeological survey of a 78 km2 area in the 
southern foothills of the Central Highlands in 1988–1996 two 
 hundred and fifty sites were registered in an area that had been 
described as having little historical importance. Of these, one hundred 
and twenty-three were sites for the production of iron or crucible 
steel (wootz). The dates obtained represent ironworking in the area 
from the fourth century BCE to modern times (Juleff 1998: 53, 
98). She remarks that, as there is a lack of field data, few models 
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have been developed to explain the nature and chronology of iron 
production in South Asia (Juleff 1998: 21). 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, proto-historical 
and historical archaeology in Europe gathered round a close and 
comparative reading of particular spheres of production, such as the 
production of iron. From the 1960s to about 2005 the Comité pour 
la Sidérurgie Ancienne helped archaeologists to keep in contact and 
gather at conferences, building a “research environment”.
This type of research has helped to develop a more holistic view 
of premodern times in Europe. In Norway, for example, several 
large projects relating to outland use during the Iron Age and early 
medieval period have changed perceptions of the inhabitants, at that 
time on the periphery of what is now a part of Norway (Narmo 
1997; Rundberget 2007).
The archaeology of iron production is now well established in 
Europe, but the Comité is no longer active. An Asian-based confer-
ence focusing on the technological development of metallurgy, the 
“Beginnings of the Use of Metals and Alloys” (BUMA), was founded 
in 1981 by a Chinese and an American archaeometallurgist. The 
conference meets every fourth to sixth year in Eastern Asia with a 
focus on the production and use of metals. It also takes an interest 
in cultural interactions and evolutions over time and space, especi-
ally between the West and Asia. Most certainly, this will enhance 
the possibilities of a future “global perspective” on history. Archaeol-
ogists from both India and the West have presented research on 
material from India.
“Traps and Trapping” in the Swedish atlas refers to remains of 
trapping pits for moose, reindeer and wolves. The spectrum of trap-
ping devices includes permanent fishing devices. Documentation of 
hunting, trapping and fishing show that similar types of traps are 
found in Sri Lanka even today, for other kinds of animals of course. 
Trapping pits for deer and wild boar are examples of trapping  devices 
which must have had a history and which are potentially visible 
after abandonment, though dating would constitute a problem 
(Myrdal-Runebjer & Yasapala 1994: 267–268).
About 3,000 registered inscriptions have been systematically 
docu mented in the field in Sri Lanka, which is clearly seen in the 
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wide distribution of registered sites for “Early Brahmi Inscriptions” 
and “Early and Middle Historical Period Inscriptions”. Similar types 
of remains (“Runic inscriptions” sixth to eleventh century, c.3,400 
registered) have been the focus of field documentation in Sweden 
since the seventeenth century. 
To follow up on the suggested social bias, we may note “Routes 
and Fairways” in the Swedish atlas. This refers to ancient routes and 
roads still visible in the terrain, constructed roads with milestones, 
road maintenance stones marking the stretch of the road which 
were the responsibility of specific landowners, stone-arched bridges, 
transport canals, harbours, beacons, remains of fishing huts, light-
houses and shipwreck sites. The Sri Lankan map lists “Ports and 
important landing centres”.
The entry “The Saami Cultural Environment” represents a start 
for acknowledging the remains of a traditionally non-agrarian and 
partly nomadic Fennoscandic population in the cultural heritage 
of Sweden. This practice started in earnest as late as the 1980s, and 
much fieldwork still remains to be done before coverage similar to 
other areas of Sweden will be reached. The remains listed are rec-
tangular hearths, cot foundations, early Saami graves, Saami metal 
hoards and (forest Saami) fenced enclosures. For Sri Lanka there is 
no similar entry, but it would be possible to discuss whether or not 
the remains pertaining to the activities of semi-sedentary swidden, 
hunting and trapping communities could form the basis for such 
an entry. 
“Places of Sacrifices and Popular Belief ” lists votive offerings, 
prehistoric and protohistoric cult sites with traces of cult buildings, 
traditional names indicating cult activities, sacrificial and holy wells 
that are in use even now, in modern times. Apart from these, indi-
cations of cult practices or popular beliefs not related to the main-
stream practices of the Christian church include guardian trees and 
heaps of votive stones or branches that are still being added to and 
thus are not exactly abandoned remains in the strict sense. Folklore 
and popular religion have been documented by ethnographers and 
social anthropologists in Sri Lanka, but although such practices will 
have had a history of development and change, the physical remains 
of the activities and place names indicative of specific locations for 
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practices are not included in the heritage on a par with, for example, 
“Image houses” (Table 2).
Field data is being gathered, though. By way of introduction, 
the project researching the Anuradhapura hinterland recognized 
the social bias of previous research which relied on the Buddhist 
chronicles (Coningham & Gunawardhana 2013: 10, see below). This 
awareness allowed analysis of new types of sites – for example dating 
the (end first millennium CE) non-Buddhist cult practices related 
to the terracotta objects of what has been termed the “Tabbova- 
Maradanmaduva-Culture” (Coningham & Gunawardhana 2013: 
144–149, 464).
Turning to entries where similar types of remains found in both 
the Swedish and Sri Lankan lists, we start with settlements. “The 
History of the Settlement of Sweden”, “Early Hunting Cultures” 
and “Stone Age Peasants” have their equivalent in “Prehistoric 
sites” on the Sri Lankan map. The low resolution of field data is 
shown in the number of sites compiled for the map in the atlas, but 
“Stone-Age archaeology” in South Asia already has a global focus. 
Remains of human activities technologically related to the “Stone 
Age” are acknowledged and researched in Sri Lanka and in the rest of 
South Asia in cooperation with natural and environmental scientists 
(Deraniyagala 1992). Since the 1980s, a number of archaeological 
field studies in South Asia have approached the question of the 
domestication of cultivars and the dating and spatial development 
of the introduction of agriculture by using methods developed by 
the natural sciences (Kajale 1988; Premathilake 2003; Saxena et 
al. 2006; Pokharia 2008; Fuller 2006). This links up with a grow-
ing interest in the environmental history of Asia (see e.g. Grove et 
al. 1998). To date, no remains of “Stone Age Peasants” have been 
identified in Sri Lanka. 
Turning to settlements dating from after the introduction of agri-
culture in Sri Lanka, a few words must be said on how to identify 
rural settlement sites in Sweden and Sri Lanka. In both countries, 
for most locations and periods, constructions such as houses on the 
settlement site itself will not be visible above ground. Thus other 
constructions which are visible above ground have been used to 
identify a settled area in both countries.
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Constructions for burials have been used in both countries to iden-
tify areas settled during the iron-using, prehistoric period. “Graves 
and Iron Age settlement” on the Swedish map has its counterpart in 
“Proto- and Early-Historic period” on the Sri Lankan map. Again 
it is evident that the Sri Lankan data has a low resolution, and field 
research related to the period has only just begun.
The suggested social bias is even more visible in Table 2 relating 
to the architectural and environmental cultural heritage. The map 
and text of “Archaeological sites and Monuments” in Sri Lanka refers 
exclusively to the environment of the lay and religious elite, and to 
material culture related to institutionalized religious practices.7 In 
the Swedish National Atlas, “Buildings and Farms in Rural Areas”, 
“Public buildings”, “Industrial Monuments” and “Place names” are 
acknowledged parts of the cultural heritage.8
In Sweden, the number and variety of sites documented during the 
antiquities survey helps in planning for land use studies. Regarding 
the equivalent of the Historic Period (Late Iron Age and Medieval 
times in Sweden), several large projects over recent decades have 
approached the history from the village and rural household point 
of view (Svensson 1998; Andersson & Svensson 2002; Emanuelsson 
et al. 2003; Lagerstedt 2007; Svensson et al. 2013). 
“Agriculture during the Iron Age and Middle Ages” in Sweden 
refers mainly to constructions on the ground related to the field 
systems or the movement of cattle from the village sites to pasture 
land, but also to the sites of the farmhouses. Most of the pre- medieval 
sites of buildings are not visible above ground, but are inferred 
from other contemporary remains or stray finds and documented 
through excavation. Though invisible above ground, they are pro-
tected monu ments under to the legislation. 
Palaeobotanical remains from excavations in the central settlement 
of the citadel of Anuradhapura indicate that agriculture in the form 
of rice cultivation was practiced in the ninth to sixth centuries BCE 
(Deraniyagala 1992). 
The entry “Settlements” in the Sri Lankan atlas is based on the 
location of irrigation works such as reservoirs and the c.25,000 minor 
village tanks, and not on registered settlements sites. The time frame 
for this map is the Early and Middle Historic Period (300 BCE to 
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1300 CE). The source-critical aspects of the distribution thus shown 
are discussed by the author Senake Bandaranayake (Bandaranayake 
1988: 58). They are: the lack of chronological control (1,000 years 
projected on one map); the “white spots” in the central mountains 
and in the southwest where rain-fed agriculture was undertaken; 
and in the north where well irrigation dominated. 
An entry specifically highlighting the exceptional remains, nowa-
days often restored, of the huge pre-thirteenth century irrigation 
constructions would have added to their visibility in a global com-
parative perspective, especially if their chronology could be demon-
strated. Included here are bunds of reservoirs with a storage capacity 
of up to 98.6 million m3 of water and transbasin canals up to 80 
km long traversing an almost level plain. An entry describing the 
known c.25,000 village tanks, chronologically ordered, would put 
the large structures into context. As has been observed above, field 
documentation of such remains has almost exclusively been the work 
of surveyors and irrigation engineers. Historians, not archaeologists, 
have tried to interpret the constructions from the perspectives of 
technological development and social context (Gunawardana 1971, 
1978, 1979, and 1982; Siriweera 1978, 1986, 1989). 
As shown in a few case-studies, mapping and sampling the tank 
and canal bunds and their bottom sediments gives opportunities 
for dating the construction and utilization phase (-es) of the irriga-
tion works (Abeyratne 1990: 19–29; Deraniyagala 1992: 732–733; 
Myrdal- Runebjer 1996: 128–133; Risberg, Myrdal-Runebjer & 
 Miller 2002: 41; Gilliand et al. 2013: 1024). It would thus be possible 
to develop a field practice for identifying, registering and gaining a 
spatial overview of irrigated agriculture through time.
Apart from the “low resolution of field data” there is also the 
problem of the “social bias”. Questions of different types of  agrarian 
land use have been raised in South Asia, also based on natural 
 scientific methods, but a close reading is lacking when it comes to 
the relations between the human beings who once created what is 
now the archaeologists’ material (Petralgia & Allchin 2007; King-
well-Banham & Fuller 2011). One of the few examples of palaeo- 
ecological research combined with the latter type of study in India, 
is the close reading of the agricultural landscape surrounding the city 
135
archaeological investigations,  interpretations,  and theories
of Vijayanagara in Karnataka, India, c.1330–1650 CE (Morrison 
2000; Morrison 2009). 
The author of the Ancient settlement map was one of the leading 
archaeologists in Sri Lanka in post-colonial times, Professor  Senake 
Bandaranayake. Regarding previous priorities in historical and 
archaeological research relating to the Early and Middle Historical 
Period (300 BCE to 1300 CE) he remarked in 1990 that it had 
been “largely confined to the study of structural remains, royal and 
official inscriptions and political and religious history – almost all 
of it relating to the apex or superstructure of the historical society.” 
(Bandaranayake 1990: 15).
On Bandaranayake’s initiative a multidisciplinary archaeological 
project (SARCP) was run from 1988 to 1994 “to investigate the 
 sett le ments and settlement network of a small but representative part 
of the archaeological landscape of the northern Dry Zone, the prin-
cipal area of settlement during the Anuradhapura and Polonnaruva 
periods”.9 He defined the project as an experiment of the archaeology 
of the village, focusing “the vast rural base”  (Bandaranayake 1990: 
15). A number of research projects with similar broader perspectives 
have been undertaken since then, not only in Sri Lanka but in other 
parts of South Asia.
The field results furthermore made it clear that the cultural land-
scape had been in a state of flux. Settlements moved, and tank bunds 
built by cultural layers from previous settlements were abandoned. 
There were also the remains of paddy-fields, some in the beds of dry 
village tanks now in scrub jungle, and some on land in other succes-
sion stages of the swidden cultivation landscape (Myrdal-Runebjer 
1996: 72). The presumed depopulation and/or migration during the 
thirteenth century, parallel to the abandonment of the large-scale 
irrigation structures, has been mentioned above. Together with these 
earlier indications of abandonment, there are some texts from later 
centuries that could help to formulate questions for field research 
pertaining to the abandonment of settlements.
The seventeenth-century remark by Robert Knox regarding the 
Kingdom of Kandy may be noted. He writes that “[t]owns … lie 
desolate, occasioned by their voluntary forsaken them.” Adding that 
“some will sometime come back and re-assume their Lands again” 
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(Knox 1981: 102). Here he mentions sickness and superstition as 
reasons for moving away, but further on in the text he states: “But 
if any find the Duty to be heavy, or too much for them, they may 
leaving their House and Land, be free from the King’s Service, as 
there is a Multitude do.” (Knox 1981: 167).
Alternative food procurement strategies as indicated in this and 
later texts from the nineteenth century, including the Sigirya settle-
ment study itself, have been swidden, hunting and trapping, and har-
vesting other forest produce such as honey (Myrdal-Runebjer 1994: 
246–260). The un-stratified village life as envisioned by twentieth 
century historians in the “tank-stupa-village synchronism” seems 
questionable, considering the seventeenth-century observation that 
people who did not have good paddy-land “are fain to sow on dry 
Land, and Till other mens Fields for a subsistence” (Knox 1981: 167).
John Davy described the methods used by the British army in 
the crushing of the rebellion of 1817–1818. These included the 
burning of houses, chopping down of fruit trees, and putting to 
death of “all who made opposition” (Davy 1983: 246f ). In 1819 
he travelled through the country noting deserted fields, houses in 
ruin, depopulated villages and famine (Davy 1983: 298–302, 319). 
We might further reflect over the remark made in 1833 by Thomas 
Skinner, the Commissioner of Public Works that the population of 
the Anuradhapura region (Nuwarakalawiya) was rapidly decreasing 
due to disease and drought (Farmer 1976: 11). Thus to obtain a 
chronology of settlements in this landscape in a state of flux would 
be one important step towards understanding its history from a 
village point of view.
The research developed in the Sigiriya hinterland from 1990 was fol-
lowed by hinterland studies around the ancient city of  Anuradhapura 
(Coningham et al. 2007; Coningham & Gunawardhana 2013). 
Beginning in 2005, hundreds of sites were documented and a selected 
number excavated and dated. An overall dating of the usage phase of 
irrigation facilities was obtained, approximately following the dating 
of the development of the central settlement, Anuradhapura (Gilliand 
et al. 2013). The approach further made it possible to introduce the 
concept of “change” in the analyses of the Anuradhapura hinterland 
(Coningham & Gunawardhana 2013: 464–468).
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So what is standing in the way of a mainstream reorientation in 
the field and, regarding societal interpretation, putting “the apex or 
superstructure of the historical society” into context?
Another senior Sri Lankan archaeologist, Professor Sudarshan 
Seneviratne, has commented on how available data has been inter-
preted. He identifies as a problem the fact that the narrative of the 
“peopling of the island” and “the emergence of civilization” relat-
ed in the Buddhist chronicles were accepted at face value “by the 
Orientalists, the Antiquarians, the colonial administrators, and the 
twentieth-century Nationalists.”. This he argues has resulted in “an 
ethno-religious history with a sectarian bias.” (Seneviratne 1996: 266). 
Without a critical reading of ground truth, settlement studies could 
fit well in to this view of the Sri Lankan past. Seneviratne notes that 
“the tank-stupa-village synchronism” has been identified as the roots 
of a “national culture” which requires preservation and perpetuation 
and is thus not to be questioned (Seneviratne 1996: 273).
One hypothesis might be that this perspective fits well into the 
view of the world inherited from the Orientalist tradition by many 
researchers in Europe and North America. Thus the emerging picture 
does not “ask for” further questions among the dominant researchers 
of either research community. 
Concluding discussion
It is not surprising that there will be different types of remains in 
Sweden and Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has been inhabited for almost three 
times as long as Sweden. Sweden has been thinly populated through 
time, rural, and, up until the nineteenth century, very poor, whereas 
Sri Lanka shows clear indications of early high population density 
areas, early central settlements and an affluent lay and religious 
elite, consuming monumental architecture, but not constructing 
it themselves. Sweden is located in the boreal forest, stretching up 
to and beyond the Polar circle, on the northwestern periphery of 
earlier major areas of high population density, far from the ancient 
trade-route highways. Sri Lanka, on the other hand, is located just 
north of the equator, directly on the early marine highway across 
the Indian Ocean. One may also note that in Sweden, Christian 
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churches belong to the architectural heritage, and in Sri Lanka, 
Buddhist stupas and Hindu temples. But this is not the focus of 
the comparative perspective discussed in this chapter.
What has been discussed above is how a historically determined 
difference in data capture creates a problem for research with a 
world-history-perspective. Examples were taken from Europe (Swe-
den) and South Asia (Sri Lanka).
Two problems were identified in this chapter: high and low resolu-
tion of field data and a social bias in selection of sites for documen-
tation. The expression high and low resolution of field data relates 
to a difference in degree of coverage in the respective areas of similar 
types of activities relevant for world history researchers. The “social 
bias” relates to a disregard of the primary producers in historical 
archaeological research in South Asia.
One disturbing result of this social bias is how the creative, reflec-
tive, active local population come forward in recent interpretations of 
the archaeological record in Europe, in contrast to the anonymous, 
silent contributors to the affluence and glory of kings and religious 
elites (and colonial powers) in South Asia.
Archaeological and palaeo-ecological field data has increased 
during the past four decades in Northern Europe. It includes data 
with a bearing on social organization and, hence, differential access 
to various resources, including the labour of others. It also includes 
a greater emphasis on research regarding rural settlements and pro-
duction sites. Thus the possibility has increased to also understand 
the social dynamics behind changing land use patterns.
When these types of field data have been collected in South Asia, 
the same questions are seldom asked. When scholars do ask such 
additional questions, and even succeed in showing a picture differ-
ing from the one inherited from the Orientalist research tradition, 
the work is not taken up as part of the grand narrative or the main-
stream, commonly agreed upon, story.
This being systematically so, what has been attempted here is 
not primarily to suggest types of fieldwork that could help fill the 
lacunae seen in comparisons to the rich archaeological database for 
settlement and land use history in Western Eurasia. It is not a lack of 
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awareness among the archaeological community in South Asia that 
constitutes the problem, as the Sri Lankan examples showed. The 
aim is instead to underline the necessity of being on source-critical 
red alert when attempting to write global history. This necessity 
exists irrespective of whether the focus is on the environmental 
impact of land use or on human society as such. The social context 
of data collection in colonized countries during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries constitutes a heavy legacy. The incorporation of 
preconceived colonial ideas of class and gender in national research 
agendas today does not make the task any easier.
If secondhand source consumers such as the writers of global 
history were to take into account the reports from the scattered but 
more holistic projects and the published suggestions of alternative 
research agendas, an account of the inequivalent sets of data could 
at least be presented openly and explicitly.
 
Notes
 1 Throughout the text “Sweden” signifies the area within this state’s present-day 
borders. Sri Lanka is now an island, and its area has been constant within the time 
limits and resolution of interest in the present discussion.
 2 Even if the interpretation that “Sweden” is marked in the VIIth climatic zone on 
Al-Idrisi’s map (which has not survived as an original) is accepted, the distorted 
geography represented on this part of the map and lack of place-names still makes 
the point valid. This part of the world was not a focus of the Mediterranean world 
in the twelfth century.
 3 Later maps produced during the Portuguese colonial rule such as those by Plan-
cius (1592) and General Constantine de Saa Noronha (early seventeenth century) 
also mentioned that the southern part of the country had been depopulated by 
“sickness” 300 years earlier. These maps have been cited to in the discussions of 
the causes of “the downfall of the Rajarata civilization”.
 4 See for example Baudou 2001; Bertilsson & Winberg 1978; Selinge 1989.
 5 And in the southwest of Sweden by archaeologists during the so-called “Göte-
borgsinventeringen” 1880–1923. The argument for the initial decision not to 
include them on the Economic map was the lack of visible boundaries for Stone 
Age settlement sites (Selinge 1989: 17).
 6 The survey ended in 1995.
 7 The entry “Hospitals” in Sri Lanka should be noted in a comparative perspective. 
It represents the much earlier development of institutions for medical treatment 
in Sri Lanka as compared to Sweden.
 8 A Swede with a critical mind might reflect over the entry “Our churches” in the 
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National atlas. Who are “we” and what sets the churches apart from rural farms 
in rural areas, public buildings and industrial monuments?
 9 c.500 BCE–1300 CE.
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chapter 5
 
Studying lawmaking in world history
Arne Jarrick & Maria Wallenberg Bondesson 
Why laws?
The comparative study of law and its history has been on the research 
agenda for quite some centuries, or even millennia. Confucius, 
 Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Montesquieu, Bentham, Maine, Marx, 
Spencer, Weber – all made important contributions to our under-
standing of law-making and the societal context in which it has 
always been immersed (Glenn 2010; Pospisil 1971; Maine 2012; 
Montesquieu 1989). Or consider the work of less well-known modern 
or contemporary scholars, such as Anners, Hart, Berman, Glenn, 
Pospisil, Luhman, Menski, Benton and many  others – and one 
cannot but be impressed (Anners 1975; Anners 1980; Hart 1997; 
Berman 1983; Berman 2003; Pospisil 1971; Benton 2002; Luhmann 
2004; Menski 2006).
However, bold as they were in generalizing and theorizing their 
findings, only rarely did scholars of the past take the pains to carry 
out the systematic empirical groundwork necessary to establish the 
validity of their ingenious thoughts. Some did, of course, but many 
did not (Maine 2012). 
Max Weber, who indeed made heroic comparative efforts to come 
to grips with the history of lawmaking around the world, did not do 
so with sufficient rigor to allow his successors to actually assess the 
credibility of his findings. In his studies of laws in ancient China, 
for example, he was so imprecise that it is all too often impossible 
What can be understood,  
compared, and counted as context?
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to really tell which of the codes he was referring to (Weber [Rhein-
stein] 1954: 54, 184–186, 236–237, 242, 264). Perhaps today’s 
legal scholars are more meticulous in carrying out their empirical 
work than Weber and others were. On the other hand, only a few 
seem to be engaging in the sort of large-scale global comparative 
work that some of their predecessors could not resist attempting. 
Consequently, to date, systematic, large-scale, empirically grounded, 
historical generalizations about lawmaking are still as needed as they 
are wanting (Duve 2013: 21).
Our ambition is to redress these shortcomings. To this end we are 
presently about to complete an empirically grounded, worldwide, 
long-term comparative history of lawmaking. By law we mean a set 
of officially authorized regulations of the social interaction among a 
certain agglomeration of humans who are subjected to the authorized 
rule of those in charge of setting the regulations up. Essentially, this 
empirical, long-term approach is nothing new to us. What is new 
is the global comparative approach.
On many occasions, when we have presented our ambition and 
our preliminary results, quite a few researchers have questioned 
whether it is really possible to trace trajectories of general changes in 
lawmaking – if not any aspect of long-term societal change  (Jarrick 
2003; Jarrick 2007). Methodologically, they base this criticism 
on questioning if we are in a position to properly understand the 
meaning and content, as well as the form, of laws from a distant 
past and from distant cultures. Accordingly, they have also expressed 
strong doubts as to whether such “entities” can be compared with 
one another in any meaningful way, a skepticism extended to our 
basic idea of how to carry out contextualizing work. Since doubts 
about intelligibility, comparability and contextualization are so 
often voiced among fellow scholars, such concerns have to be 
addressed, especially since we consider them highly unwarranted. 
This is precisely what we do in this chapter, which is a detailed 
advocacy of the possibility of understanding manifestations from 
seemingly alien cultures.
However, before presenting our argument in detail, we need to 
introduce the framework: our overarching aim, as well as the sources 
used and considered to be comprehensible. Having presented our 
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defense of the high potential of comparing laws from different cul-
tures, we proceed to a concise presentation of our methodological 
design and of some of our major substantial results.
Our overarching aim is to improve our understanding of the 
dynamic forces behind the uniquely human evolution of culture. 
Human culture is the incessantly ongoing interplay between crea-
tivity, innovation and transmission, constituting itself as a seemingly 
never-ending transformation of society, despite the relatively stable 
genetic set-up of its human agents. The general process of cultural 
evolution is nothing but a series of mutually intertwined concrete 
processes, of which different layers and types of lawmaking in dif-
ferent periods and corners of the world in particular constitute a 
profound aspect. This is precisely why lawmaking is our specific 
scientific target. We could have picked other processes for scrutiny, 
but for various reasons laws serve us incredibly well. Why?
In order to follow processes as prolonged as possible in human 
history, we need extended time series covering as many different 
and dissimilar parts of the world as possible. Therefore, written laws 
are especially useful: they have existed and been partly or entirely 
preserved for a period of more than 4,000 years. Furthermore, the 
way they are composed enables us to compare them reasonably 
well. Laws are optimal also because they signify an explicit regu-
lation of human interaction, and testify to a conscious attempt at 
a lasting regulation of this interaction. It is also of relevance that 
the legislators displayed an ability to handle the non-present, 
which is at the core of what makes humans unique in the world 
of living species. 
What we do
Thus, what is set out here is a comparative, essentially global and 
long-term study, still in progress. Also, differences in the amount 
of legal material preserved from different areas have made certain 
prioritizations necessary. We are also mostly confined to the use of 
translations of the original languages. Taking all this into account, 
we have selected certain geographical core areas, whose legal devel-
opment can be charted in detail and for long periods of time. Thus 
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far, these are West Asia, China, France and the Nordic countries of 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
Primarily we have sought to accomplish a global selection of legal 
cultures of different types, from societies with different political, 
social and religious features and organization. To achieve this, we 
have prioritized mutually independent legal cultures: that is, if a 
number of legal cultures were available for study in a specific geo-
graphic area, we have selected those which were most ancient or 
least dependent on previous neighboring legal cultures. 
From the first of these core areas, the earliest legal codes and 
collections were produced in Sumerian city-states in the period 
around the millennium 2000 BCE. These codes – which are quite 
poorly preserved – were followed by codes produced in the dawning 
empires of the Old Babylonian period (from the eighteenth centu-
ry BCE). Among these codes are the famous Laws of Hammurabi, 
the first code of this area to be preserved almost completely. Later, 
codes were also produced, for example, by the rulers of the Hittite 
Empire (1650–1180 BCE), and the Kingdom of Israel. To later 
periods in the history of this area belong the further development 
of Israelite law (in the form of, for example, the Mishnah, the Tal-
mud and the Mishneh Torah) and the advent and development of 
Islamic law (among others Roth 1997; Westbrook & Beckman 2003; 
Neusner 1988; Maimonides 1949; Glenn 2010: 99–132, 181–236 
and Twersky 1980). 
In China, legislative activity was continuous and extensive from 
at least the third century BCE, although the first Chinese law codes 
are known either only by name (e.g. Head & Wang 2005), or pre-
served only in part (the codes of the Qin and Han dynasties). The 
first Chinese code of law that has come down to us in full is the 
Tang Code (of either 653 or 737). Promulgation of codes was often 
associated with the assumption of power by new dynasties and 
the earlier stages of their rule, although many revisions sometimes 
followed before a final version was established. Thus codes of law 
were promulgated early in the Song (960–1279), Yüan/Mongol 
(1279–1368), Ming (1368–1644) and Qing dynasties, with the 
final version of the Qing Code (of 1740) remaining in force until 
the collapse of the Empire in 1912. However, there were also other 
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types of legislation in ancient China than the law represented by 
these “national”, general codes, such as administrative rules (e.g. Head 
& Wang 2005; Jones 1994; Jiang 2005). 
In the regions of present-day France, legal history can be said to 
begin with Roman law, which over time and in various ways, was 
built on the distinction between what was common and not common 
to people subjected to Roman rule. For the pre-imperial period this 
has been described either as a distinction between the principle of 
specific rights attributed to local peoples (jus civile), whether Roman 
or non-Roman, and different types of legal actions (jus honorarium), 
or as jus civile working alongside jus gentium, i.e. laws common to 
all – at least to all Italian communities, again, whether recognized 
as citizens of Rome or not (Ando 2011: 2–3). 
In the imperial period the actions system was pushed aside, and 
by the Dominate the Emperors had definitively taken over both 
legislation and the execution of justice. In the later Empire, Roman 
law consisted primarily of the legal codes of the Emperors Theodo-
sius (r. 379–395) and Justinian (r. 527–565), containing the laws 
of the Roman Emperors from the year 312 in revised form, and 
more informal Roman provincial law. Laws appointed for human-
kind as a whole were called jus naturale (Ankarloo 1994: 15–18, 
54–61; Maine 2012: 44–53; Watson 1985; Fisher Drew 1991; 
 Tellegen-Couperus 2012). 
The rulers of the Germanic confederations that assumed  power 
after the fall of Roman Gaul quickly took up the legislative activity 
of the Roman Emperors. Under the Merovingian and  Carolingian 
rulers a large number of nations and provinces in the former 
Roman West received their own legal codes. These codes were 
 supplemented by so-called capitularies, short collections of legal 
provisions divided into capitula: headings or chapters (Wormald 
1999: 1–43; Wormald 2003; Wood 1994: 102–119; Wood 1993; 
Fisher Drew 1991; Rivers 1986). However, with the decline of the 
Carolingian dynasty in the ninth century, the production of legis-
lation in the form of both codes and capitularies ceased. Under the 
Capetian dynasty (987–1328), France was ruled through unwritten 
provincial law, more or less influenced by “rediscovered” Roman 
law. The next spurt of written legislation in France came when these 
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legal traditions were given written form in the so-called  coutumiers 
(recordings of customary law) from the thirteenth century and 
into early modern times (Akehurst 1992: xiii–xxxii; Akehurst 
1996: xxi–xliv; Friedland 2012: 46–52; Cohen 1993; Berman 
1983). From early modern times, national legislation emerged 
and grew in scope, for example in the form of a substantial ordi-
nance governing civil and criminal procedure in 1670. Finally, in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, extensive legal 
codes were created, first by the revolutionary government and, 
only a little over a decade later, under Napoleon (Anners 1980; 
Friedland 2012: 47). 
In the Nordic countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, writ-
ten legislation first appears in the Middle Ages. The oldest texts of 
this kind are probably the remnants of the early twelfth century 
Norwegian laws of the Eidsivating and Borgarting  (Sigurdsson, 
Pedersen & Berge 2008; Tamm 2011: 15; Hoff 1997). In  Denmark 
and Sweden, codifications of the same kind are preserved from 
the decades following the year 1200 (Brink 1996; Hoff 1997; 
Ekholst 2009).
About twenty provincial codes were compiled in total in these three 
countries. However, from the latter part of the thirteenth century 
in Norway and the middle of the fourteenth century in Sweden, 
national codes were introduced. The four Danish provincial codes, 
however, continued to apply until the 1680s. In Sweden, the first 
national code was promulgated by King Magnus Eriksson, sometime 
in the period 1347–1352. About a hundred years later, the code of 
King Magnus was revised and reissued, although the earlier version 
continued to be used well into the sixteenth century. In Norway and 
Denmark, new national codes were issued during the 1680s, while 
it took until 1736 until the Medieval codes were finally replaced in 
Sweden by a new code in 1743: 1734 års lag (Tamm 2011: 15–18; 
Gelting 2011: 92–94; Andersen 2011: 121; Collin & Schlyter 1869: 
LXXXIV; Hoff 1997; Ekholst 2009). 
The study of the legal development of these “core areas” is supple-
mented with analyses of material from other areas, primarily the 
British Isles, from which there exists a comprehensive series of legal 
codes, from, about 600 (Attenborough 1922; Robertson 1925); 
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Russia (from Russkaia Pravda to the Ulozhenie of 1649, see Kaiser 
1992; Hellie 1988); and India, primarily the Dharmasutras and the 
Laws of Manu (Olivelle 2000; Olivelle 2004). 
Why some say that we cannot do it 
and we insist that we can
Below we will demonstrate that it is indeed practiable to make 
intelligible, and thereby to compare and contextualize, law codes 
from cultures separated from each other by huge temporal and 
geographical distances. For the sake of analytical clarity, we will 
address the intelligibility, comparability and contextualization as 
three separate problems, despite being fully aware of the fact that 
they are intimately intertwined.
Intelligibility
First, can we truly claim that we are in a position to discern what 
is really meant in thousands of different regulations from such dis-
similar laws as the ones that we have studied? 
Here the importance of the translations of critical editions of the 
codes, with their often very comprehensive commentaries, must be 
emphasized. In fact, it is the appearance of a great number of legal 
codes in modern translations during the last thirty years or so that 
has made truly global comparisons of this type possible at all. To 
return to the issue of comparability proper, a theoretical approach 
to the issue is not as helpful as a discussion of concrete cases. Below 
we will share our reflections on some illustrative cases – from the 
most easily decoded, through those that need some decoding, to 
the very few that really puzzle us. 
Almost all law codes, wherever and whenever they have been laid 
down, include regulations on non-lethal violence (as well as on lethal 
violence, of course). For example, in Pactus legis Salicae, a Frankish 
law from about 500 CE, it is stated that if
anyone mutilates another’s hand or foot, or knocks out an eye, or 
cuts off an ear or cuts off a nose … let him be held liable for 4,000 
denarii (Pactus Legis Salicae: 29.1, Rivers 1986).
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It is crystal clear that the above regulation deals with injuries caused 
by someone’s physical violence against someone else; that the body 
parts affected cannot be anything other than precisely foot, eye, 
ear and nose; and that these are body parts on human beings and 
no other species. The sanction is also explicitly described, so as to 
leave no doubt either about the type of punishment or the amount 
of money prescribed as compensation for the injury suffered. Fur-
thermore, the regulation also makes sense also from the vantage 
point of our contemporary world, where similar regulations are 
commonplace, except that in our time of volatile prices the amount 
of money would not be cast in stone.
One might consider it too easy to show that we are capable of 
decoding a law that is hardly in need of interpretation at all, a law, 
what is more, from our own cultural sphere, albeit at some temporal 
distance from the present. However, many regulations from cultures 
more distant in time and space are as easily understood as the above 
example. Let us illustrate this with the 2,000-year-old Code of Manu 
from India, laid down in a culture profoundly different from the 
Western World (Maisels 1999: ch. 4). This example is about stealing 
and other deeds, which the lawmaker in a typically casuistic way 
associates with other kinds of misbehavior: 
A man who steals a rope or a bucket from a well or tears down a 
place for distributing water should pay a fine of 1 Masa and restore 
that article (Law Code of Manu: 8.319, Olivelle 2004).
What might be concealed here we cannot tell. We cannot even see 
a cultural gap to bridge in this example, and, indeed, the Code of 
Manu abounds in such regulations, although quite a few are also far 
less intelligible than this (see below). Such cases are by far the most 
common ones. Our point is that in such cases we can dispense with 
knowledge about the local context and still reach an understanding 
of what was intended with a certain regulation.
Of course, this is not always the case. Frequently, we come across 
less easily decoded laws. A first illustration of this can be taken from 
Salian law. As with the previous quotation from the Pactus, the fol-
lowing rule is quite clear in regard to what is meant, i.e. the mean-
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ing of what is outlawed and the sanction that follows transgression, 
whereas the why of it is far from obvious without knowledge of the 
local cultural context:
if anyone shears the long hair of a free-born boy without his par-
ents’ consent … and it can be proven that he did this, let him be 
held liable for 1800 denarii (Pactus legis Salicae: 24.2, Rivers 1986).
Still, whatever might have been the normative rationale behind this 
restriction, there is no ambiguity in the message as such. The same 
applies to the following example, from Leviticus of the Biblical Law:
If any of the Israelites slaughters a bull, a lamb or a goat within or 
outside the camp, without in advance bringing the animal to the 
entrance of the tent of revelation, in order to give it as a sacrifice 
to the Lord at his abiding place, this he will be held accounted for 
as a blood sin. He has shed blood; that man shall be expelled from 
his people (Leviticus: 17.3–4, Bibeln 2000, our transl.).
However, being rather familiar with the local Biblical context, we 
find it even less strange than the previous example. On the other 
hand, since the sacralization of places is common in almost all con-
fessional systems, it is perhaps not that local after all, and therefore 
likely to be properly understood by almost anyone coming across it 
whether familiar with the Old Testament tradition or not.
The next extract from Leviticus may, however, seem somewhat 
more puzzling, although even here one would have no trouble 
understanding how properly to comply with the law, if one imagines 
being placed in a cultural setting where one is supposed to do so:
You must not let two animals of different species mate. You must 
not let two kinds of grain grow in your field. You must not wear 
clothes that are woven of two different kinds of yarn (Leviticus: 
19.19, Bibeln 2000, our transl.).
However, even though it might be beyond our reach to truly grasp the 
specific linkages between these three pairs, with mutually excluding 
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species (animals, grains) and artefacts (yarn), never to intermix, on 
the meta-level this way of thinking resembles mindsets that we are 
already familiar with. It is not too far from the exogamy law and 
the incest taboo in mating that we recognize in most cultures from 
different periods of history, although here it has been extended in 
a rather unintelligible way.
We close this series of cases along the gradient of intelligibility with 
one example that from our vantage point seems even more difficult 
to grasp than the cases above, from the Indian Code of Manu. It is 
about rules of conduct for what is here called the Bath-Graduate 
(religious graduate), and particularly about the relation between 
telling the truth and saying what is pleasant: 
He [the Bath-Graduate] should say what is true, and he should say 
what is pleasant; he should not say what is true but unpleasant, and 
he should not say what is pleasant but untrue—that is the eternal 
Law (Law Code of Manu: 4.138, Olivelle 2004).
The logical implication of this rule of conduct seems to be that the 
Bath-Graduate should only tell pleasant truths and otherwise stay 
silent. However, what mystifies us greatly in this message is what is 
said in the following sentence, namely that he “should call a lucky 
thing ‘Lucky’; or rather he should call everything ‘Lucky’” (Law 
Code of Manu: 4:139, Olivelle 2004). Everything – whether true 
or not? Pleasantness overriding the truth, being the basic norm? 
How should the poor individual sort this out: stay silent about 
unpleasant truths or convert them into something pleasant? Or 
should we rather interpret the request for silence as actually con-
veying a meaning: silence as a way to communicate disapproval? 
This we cannot tell.
The following passage from the same code – still concerning rules 
of conduct for the Bath-Graduate – is also obscure, but in another 
way: we have not managed to grasp what they have in common:
He must never blow on a fire with his mouth; look at a woman 
when she is naked; throw anything filthy into a fire; warm his feet 
over it; place it under his bed; step over it; place it by his feet; hurt 
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living creatures; eat, travel, or sleep during the time of twilight; 
scribble on the ground; take off his own garland; deposit urine, 
excrement, sputum, blood, poison, or anything smeared with filth 
in water; sleep alone in an abandoned house; awaken a sleeping 
superior; speak with a menstruating woman; or go to a sacrifice 
uninvited (Law Code of Manu: 4:53–57, Olivelle 2004).
Obviously, much in this passage shows an urge to avoid everything 
filthy, but not all of it. Why all these things have been linked is 
not apparent to us. Certainly, some of this law might make sense 
if we became familiar with the local context. In this case we do feel 
somewhat lost.
The last example is exceptional. It is unusually unintelligible – 
although not completely so. So in settling the issue of the intelligi-
bility of laws, aided by the translators’ commentaries, we maintain 
that we are able to understand the intended meaning of the bulk 
of the regulations in the laws at issue here.
Given that this conclusion drawn here could be generalized, why 
should this be the case? Why does it seem that the basic meaning of 
legal regulations can be properly communicated over huge cultural 
and temporal distances? In general, it is so because humankind is 
a communicative species whose members normally want to make 
themselves understood, and on the whole are not waging Machia-
vellian tug-of-wars of mystification against each other (Gärdenfors 
2000: 102 ff.; Laland & Brown 2002: 166). This is particularly the 
case with lawmakers, who have had very good reasons to make their 
laws as clearly understandable as possible in order to instill obedi-
ence among their subjects.
Comparability
Here, our intention is to argue that ours is a worthwhile undertak-
ing. Therefore, let us briefly discuss two pairs of examples where it 
is possible to interrelate otherwise unrelated laws.
The first example concerns a case where the same type of action 
is treated in radically different ways. It is about marriage between a 
male slave and a free woman. According to the 3,500-year-old Hittite 
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Laws, such a relationship was considered legal, although obviously 
in need of regulation: 
If a male slave [takes] a [free] woman in marriage, [and they make 
a home and children, when they divide their house], they shall 
divide their possessions [equally, and the free woman shall take] 
most of [the children,] with [the male slave taking] one child (The 
Hittite Laws: 32, Roth 1997).
In a Medieval Frankish capitulary, the case was quite the contrary, 
and a misalliance of this sort was harshly punished: 
If a woman unites in marriage with her slave, let the public treasury 
acquire all her property and let her be outlawed … Let that slave 
endure the worst death by torture, that is, let him be broken on the 
wheel (Merovingian capitulary, Capitulary III: 98, Rivers 1986).
In our view, the above example would demonstrate the comparability 
of the two cases, provided that slaves were socially distinguished in 
roughly the same way in the Hittite culture as in Frankish culture 
2,000 years later. If so, they would commonly have been treated as 
property, i.e. been subject to purchasing and selling. This was cer-
tainly the case in both these cultures, though in passing we would 
add that this far from exhausts their role. To the degree that they 
could be held responsible for their misdeeds, put to trial, convicted, 
and suffer punishment, they were also treated as humans, unlike 
other items sold at the market (Darnton 1984: ch. 1; Friedman 
1985: 218–229). 
As with the examples above, in terms of type of action and of 
sanction, the examples below concern two rather similar cases, also 
2,000 years apart. They concern theft, in Old Babylonia of a plough 
and in Medieval France of vegetables:
If a man steals a plow from the common irrigated area, he shall give 
5 shekels of silver to the owner of the plow (Laws of Hammurabi: 
259, Roth 1997).
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If anyone thievishly enters another’s garden, or turnip-, bean-, 
pea-, or lentil-patch, or steals [something there], and it can be 
proven that he did this, let him be held liable for 600 denarii … 
in addition to its value and a fine for the loss of its use (Pactus legis 
Salicae: 27.7, Rivers 1986).
These cases are not as perfectly analogous as the marriage cases dis-
cussed above. However, both can be considered economic crimes, 
both concern stealing, and in both cases the sanction stipulated is 
compensation to be paid to the owner. Thus, it is valid to subsume 
both of them under rather general categories without becoming 
conceptually distorted.
In conclusion, we would say that the comparative part of our 
work is as possible to carry out as the decoding part, although we 
know perfectly well that in some instances neither really works.
Contextualization
It might be claimed that the intertextual comparison of clauses, i.e. 
disconnecting them from the intratextual environment of other 
clauses, is an assault on their intended meaning. Is it not indispen-
sable to see them as integrative parts of a whole? Yes and no. As we 
will see, it is necessary to apply different arts of reading – both the 
holistic and the analytical. Among other things, a holistic approach 
requires validation of the intratextual representativity of a certain 
passage, meaning that one tries to make sure that the interpretation 
of this passage is not violated by the meanings of other parts – unless 
intended so by the (assumed) author. Once validated, it is equally 
legitimate to try to establish the meaning and significance of the 
passage in question by also applying intertextual contextualization 
(Jarrick 2002: 133–146). Moreover, having studied a series of law 
codes from the very first to the very last ordinance, we have found 
that it is not always true that a text is a genuinely integrative whole. 
Actually, the history of lawmaking may even be perceived as a secular 
striving towards textual coherence and integration.
Some scholars have been concerned about the absence of consid-
erations of the local cultural context in the societies where the laws 
methods in world history
160
under scrutiny were laid down. These are completely reasonable 
concerns. In addition, it should be pointed out that variation is a 
profound feature of all phenomena in the world. Without diversi-
ty, neither cultural nor natural evolution would take place. So this 
is simply something that has to be taken into account, in order to 
serve as a critical test of the explanatory power of causal reasoning.
The Tang Code could serve as case in point. In order to determine 
the degree of harshness in the many seemingly draconic sentences in 
this code, it is essential to know that if conviction was not obtained, 
false accusation rendered the complainant as harsh a punishment as 
was meant for the originally accused (Johnson 1997: 6). Thus draco-
nian sentences were not only intended to deter potential criminals 
from transgressing the law, but also to discourage accusation abuse 
among law-abiding people, thus implying a subtext of a lower degree 
of harshness than one might be inclined to conclude at first sight. It 
seems to have been only slightly less dangerous to frivolously voice 
suspicions of other people’s transgressions, than to be a perpetrator 
oneself. Applying our terminology, one could say that this is part 
of the intratextual context.
This should, however, not be interpreted as if the lawmaking 
authorities in ancient China did not consider certain transgressions 
serious misdeeds deserving tough sanctions. Taking the extratextual 
local (= Chinese) context into account, one would be inclined to 
explain this by pointing to the fact that “the Code was regarded as 
the last means by which to protect society when all other attempts 
… had failed” (Johnson 1997: 5). The basic philosophical pillar 
upon which laws were erected was the profound need to preserve 
the harmony between man and nature, which could be disrupted 
by overly heavy punishments or by sentencing people at the wrong 
season (Johnson 1979: 10, 15). Knowledge of such peculiarly  Chinese 
circumstances is crucial for understanding and explaining other, 
similarly unique features of Chinese law. And yet, the explanatory 
value of this rests with a comparative contextualization making it 
plausible that similar conditions in other societies did have similar 
effects (or that dissimilar conditions did not).
Yet, in this project, although they are analyzed, local cultures 
are not at the core of our contextualizing efforts. Rather, the major 
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context of each of the laws studied is the other laws studied. The justi-
fication for this is that our overarching aim has been to identify and 
explain general trajectories of lawmaking, making it indispensable to 
compare laws from clearly distinct cultural and historical contexts. 
This has enabled us to establish the overall presence or evolution 
of certain general processes or attitudes, but it has also forced us 
to rule out some hypothetical generalizations. And this is also con-
textualization! Again, by this measure we can test, modify, or even 
falsify, explanations built only on local context – explanations that 
too often have ignored the fact that the same phenomena emerged 
in very different cultural settings (for example Berman 1983).
Below, we will illustrate this point with two pairs of simple examp-
les. The first case concerns a husband’s responsibilities towards his 
wife and what she would be entitled to if he were away on business. 
Here the The Code of Manu states that a
man should provide for his wife before he goes away on business, 
for even a steadfast woman will go astray when starved for a live-
lihood. If he provides for her before going away, she should live 
a life of restraint; but if he leaves without providing for her, she 
may maintain herself by engaging in respectable crafts (Law Code 
of Manu: 9:74–75, Olivelle 2004). 
In the Laws of Hammurabi, compiled about 1,500 years before the 
Code of Manu appeared, in a culture quite distinct from it, the same 
topic is treated in the following way: 
If a man should be captured and there are sufficient provisions in 
his house, his wife [she will not] enter [another’s house] … If a 
man should be captured and there are not sufficient provisions in 
his house, his wife may enter another’s house (Laws of Hammurabi: 
133a, 134, Roth 1997).
In both these cultural settings, a man is above all supposed to provide 
for his wife. If he fails to do so while being away for some reason, 
his wife has to restrain herself from taking any steps towards inde-
pendence, but given that she is not provided for, as a last resort she 
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may maintain herself either by respectable work or by entering into 
another marriage. This applied equally in India and in Babylonia, 
and, we can tell, in many other cultures as well, although they may 
have been culturally alien to each other in many other respects.
The second case is about the illegal cutting down of trees in some-
one’s field or orchard. “If a man cuts down a tree in another man’s 
orchard, he shall weigh and deliver 20 shekels of silver”, states the 
4,000-year-old Sumerian Laws of Lipit Ishtar (§ 10, Roth 1997). 
2,500 years later, the Salian law almost identically stipulates that if 
“anyone cuts down a planted tree in another’s field … let him be held 
liable for 1,200 denarii” (Pactus legis Salicae: 27:15, Rivers 1986). 
This mirrors the fact that property and the violation of property 
rights are among the most frequently regulated aspects of human 
action in most legal systems.
Of course, no conclusions about the universal characteristics of 
laws can be drawn from the examples given here. They have been 
chosen simply to illustrate the potential of global intertextual con-
textualization.
This is how we do it
In order to address the issues raised above, we have developed a num-
ber of specific methods for long-term analysis of legal development, 
which are presented below. On an overall level, the study comprises 
two main subsurveys: first, analysis of the long-term development 
of the content of legal codes, and second, analysis of the long-term 
development of their form, although the latter is not treated in this 
article. The former subsurvey is comprised of two parts: quantita-
tive analyses of the entire contents of codes, and analyses of specific 
aspects of the codes.
The contents of the codes: 
quantitative analyses and selected themes1
Here, the aim is to provide an overall picture of the contents of the 
codes, so as to form a basis for comparisons over time and between 
cultures, and to analyze a number of aspects of the codes in depth. 
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The former is done above all through collection of two types of 
basic information: the types of human (inter)action regulated in the 
provisions of the various codes, and the consequences prescribed in 
those same provisions. 
A systematic comparison of this kind clearly requires quantifi-
cation and classification. How can we create categories that will 
work in all the historical contexts of the survey? How can we make 
sure that our analyses are intersubjectively verifiable? And how can 
we create a system that will work from the outset, but still can be 
revised as the work proceeds? In other words, how can a system be 
established, which is at the same time stable and flexible, and readily 
comprehensible and transparent?
To achieve this, we have developed a classification system with 
three main features: the use of explicit definitions of categories, a 
concentration on basic human interaction, and classification at 
different levels of abstraction. 
The insistence on an explicit definition of the categories used is 
intended to stabilize the system, and to cater to the need for trans-
parency and clarity. We want to avoid the pitfall of a too assumptive 
use of certain terms and categories – for example, by only defining 
key terms, and not creating a system of categories.
The second feature is based on the awareness that global compar-
isons of this kind call for the primary focus to be on a more general 
level (see also Reynolds 2013: 16). Understandably also, we cannot 
go into the smallest of details. However, this in no way precludes 
in-depth analyses or attention to detail per se. In fact, such analy-
ses are necessary in order not to risk only seeing what is similar in 
the societies and legal systems we are studying and thus lose out on 
variation. Indeed, in order not to lose sight of the comparative con-
text, it is essential for such analyses to always be connected to basic 
traits and processes found in most, or all, human cultures. In other 
words, there is a general level on which a connection can be made.
We have solved this problem of the need to be both general and 
attentive to variation by the creation of an analytical system where 
the legal material is classified at different levels of abstraction. In 
practical terms, this involves each rule in the codes in question 
being 1) summarized, 2) classified in a specific way, for example, 
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as concerning theft, and 3) classified in a more general mode, for 
example, as concerning property crime. The same principle is used 
to classify the consequences prescribed in the codes. This solution 
is also intended to ensure that the system is not too rigid and that 
it can be revised as and when new insights are gained. This is so 
because when changes are required it is always possible to go back 
to a more concrete level. It allows us to move a certain category at 
one level of abstraction without thereby (necessarily) ruining the 
classificatory order at another. For example, theft committed by 
a “slave” could be classified as a transgression either by a piece of 
“property” or by a human being, neither enforcing a change of the 
division between property and people at one level, nor the division 
between “theft” and other crimes at a more concrete level. 
This broad analysis of the content of the codes is connected to 
a number of in-depth analyses concerning matters closely related 
to our overall objectives: the issues of equality or inequality before 
the law, legitimization of law, obligations versus rights, and of penal 
principles. In a forthcoming study our analysis of content will be 
paralleled by a detailed analysis of the form of law codes and of the 
intricate interplay between form and content. 
These are our major results
We have spoken in defense of the possibility to understand, compare 
and contextualize laws from very different times and cultures, and 
we have also gone into some detail about the methods applied to 
make this possibility come true. Below, we will expand somewhat on 
the knowledge advanced by applying the methods presented above.
General themes and trends
Above, we claimed that one of the bases of intelligibility is that 
lawmakers to a substantial degree have tackled similar problems of 
human conduct and misconduct, despite huge cultural and temporal 
distances between them. The likelihood that this applies to the overall 
themes of laws in general is indicated in the figure below. Here we 
have collated evidence of the themes in four laws spanning more 
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than 1,500 years. They represent substantially different societal and 
cultural contexts, from Babylonia in the eighteenth century BCE, 
through the Middle East and Early Medieval Europe (Frankish law) 
to the Chinese Tang dynasty of the sixth century CE.
It is obvious that these very diverse laws are all extensively pre-
occupied with property crime and illegal violence, as are almost all 
other laws that we have examined. And it is highly probable that 
the presence of these themes in the laws reflects major concerns in 
all the sedentary societies or civilizations in which the legislators 
lived. This means that the similarities are not primarily due to some 
internal logic of legislation, even if this might play a role, since a 
simple statistical analysis reveals that the more comprehensive the 
law studied, the more even the distribution of subjects addressed 
in it, and vice versa.
It is equally clear that important resemblances between different 
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laws can be discerned also on lower levels of abstraction, although this 
is invisible in the figure above because of its low level of resolution. 
One such topic, recurrently targeted for regulation, is the matter of 
slaves, and another one prominent in its ubiquity is the handling of 
stolen property (e.g. Laws of Hammurabi: 9–13; Pactus legis Salicae: 
10.1–7, 37.1–3, 47.2, Rivers 1986; Tang Code: 296, Johnson 1997; 
Russkaia Pravda (Short Version): 11, 13, 16, Kaiser 1992).
All these similarities can serve as a case in point for the fruitful-
ness of using comparisons between laws from profoundly different 
societies as an essential basis of contextualization.
It is just as clear that the laws presented in the figure above dis-
play great variation in their main focus. In Biblical Law it is religion 
(of course); in the Laws of Hammurabi what might be called “pro-
to-civil” terms of transaction; in Frankish Salian law it is property 
crime; and, as expected, in the Tang Code it is civil administration. 
This variation reflects the profound cultural differences between the 
societies where the laws were promulgated. Variation is, of course, 
no less an intrinsic aspect of culture than of nature, and is as much 
a precondition for evolutionary change in the former as in the lat-
ter area of life, the one also often being indistinguishable from the 
other. And yet, through the course of time, certain general trends 
seem to evolve whatever the particular cultural point of departure, 
and wherever the multi-generational learning process of lawmaking 
took off. By taking a bird’s eye view on this process, we will here 
point to important long-term trends, while for the time being to a 
large extent disregarding variation.
Some of the trends have previously been identified by other 
legal historians. However, this has been done without being based 
on a broad and firm systematic analysis. Through our comparative 
enquiry, we are able to corroborate what others have suggested, quali-
fying and relating it to long-term structural or formal changes in 
lawmaking. Furthermore, our findings will serve as a basis for a set 
of hypotheses about how these trends might be causally connected 
to other major historical processes. This will be touched upon at 
the end of this section.
167
what can be understood, compared, and counted as context?
From inequality to equality before the law
One trend that we have identified is a general and gradual change 
from outright inequality to equality before the law. Some legal 
historians claim that laws generally originated in order to codify 
inequality and social differentiation, but eventually were recoded to 
emphasize equality (Glenn 2010). Be this as it may, and whatever 
the driving forces behind the process of codification might be, ine-
quality was undoubtedly the rule in the beginning, and most often 
deliberately and explicitly so. The example below, from the Laws of 
Hammurabi, may serve as a case in point. It is about physical vio-
lence within and across the social classes. In one clause, concerning 
socially horizontal violence between people of the highest class of 
Old Babylonia, it states the following:
If a member of the awilu-class should strike the cheek of another 
member of the awilu-class who is his equal, he shall weigh and 
deliver 60 shekels of silver (Laws of Hammurabi: 203, Roth 1997).
Quite the opposite applies if the same transgression is committed 
by a slave against a socially superior victim:
If an awilu’s slave should strike the cheek of a member of the 
awilu-class, they shall cut off his ear (Laws of Hammurabi: 205, 
Roth 1997).
The same ideology is repeated over and over again in most laws in 
most of the history of human legislation. One example of that is the 
provincial law of Gotland (Gutalagen), which was launched 3,000 
years later in a remote part of the gradually evolving Swedish state, 
in a cultural context very different from that of Old Babylonia. Since 
inequality is one of the constitutive principles of the Gutalagen, it 
is explicated in many of its regulations. For instance, concerning 
rape, it states that if a man commits rape,
then he shall pay twelve marker of silver to a Gotlandic woman, 
but to a non-Gotlandic woman five marker of silver and to an un-
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free woman six örar. If rape is committed together with a legally 
married woman, whether Gotlandic or not, then he has forfeited 
his life (Gutalagen: 224, Holmbäck & Wessén 1979, our transl.).
 
The principle of inequality applies fairly often to procedural law too, 
as is illustrated by two curious passages in the Code of Manu, con-
cerning the validity of testimonies in court. The first clause exhorts 
people to tell the truth, and for the individual witness to base his 
or her testimony on “what [he or she] has seen or heard” otherwise 
[he or she] will end up in hell in the afterlife (Law Code of Manu: 
8.74–75, Olivelle 2004).
Except for the consequence of trespassing not being a stipulated 
sentence but a predicted otherworldly fate, so far this makes sense 
also from the vantage point of modern legislation. But then follows 
a strange regulation that encourages false testimony, given that this 
might rescue criminals of certain classes from execution:
when a man, even though he knows the truth, gives evidence in 
lawsuits contrary to the facts for a reason relating to the Law, he does 
not fall from the heavenly world; that, they say, is divine speech. 
When telling the truth will result in the execution of a Śūdra, Vaiśya, 
Ksatriya, or a Brahmin, a man may tell a lie; for that is far better 
than the truth (Law Code of Manu: 8.103–104, Olivelle 2004).
Yet, even in the midst of an outright ideology of inequality, rudi-
ments of equality can be found. For example, in early times it was 
already often stipulated that the sovereign was supposed to obey 
the law in the same way as his subjects (e.g. Canning 1996: 23. See 
also Hart 1997: 58). This even applies to the Code of Manu, despite 
its incessantly repeated emphasis on the legal significance of differ-
ences in social status. For example, it states concerning theft that 
the “king must restore to individuals of all classes any property of 
theirs stolen by thieves; if the king retains it for himself, he incurs 
the sin of its thief ” (Law Code of Manu: 8.40, Olivelle 2004); and 
in “a case where an ordinary person is fined 1 Kārsāpana, the king 
should be fined 1,000” (Law Code of Manu: 8.336, Olivelle 2004). 
Correspondingly, even in old codes such as that from legalist China, 
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there are traces of the principle of equal treatment regarding certain 
crimes, although for a long time this occurs simultaneously with the 
principle of unequal treatment of people of different status.
In the very long run, however, the idea gained ground that all 
humans should be treated as equals before the law, by which they 
also were transformed into citizens instead of mere subjects of the 
sovereign. In many codes, age-old specific references to the differing 
status of people were now replaced with references to “any person” (or 
just “the person”), as in the Ottoman civil law of the 1870s (Mejelle: 
f.i. 8. 902, or almost anywhere in the law); or “every individual” as 
for instance in the French criminal code of 1810, Code Pénal: 
Every individual, who shall have given any wounds or blows, shall 
be punished with solitary imprisonment, if there shall have resulted 
from such acts of violence, a sickness or inability to work, for more 
than twenty days (Penal Code: 309).
In modern law this is not just visible in the specific regulations, but 
also anchored in statements of principle, such as in the following 
passage in the Swedish Constitution of 1809:
Public power shall be exercised with respect for the equal worth of 
all and the liberty and dignity of the private person (The Constitution 
of Sweden: The Fundamental Laws and the Riksdag Act 2003: 63). 
Once formulated however, there were no guarantees that this cele-
brated idea would really become the guiding principle of the entire 
legal system. It took time before it genuinely permeated the minds 
of the lawmakers. This is obvious in many instances. For example, 
it is clearly stated in the introduction to the famous Napoleonic 
Code Civil that “[e]very Frenchman shall enjoy civil rights” (Code 
Napoleon: 8). However, this does not prevent it from containing 
gender-biased regulations, among other things stipulating that the 
“husband owes protection to his wife, the wife obedience to her hus-
band” (Code Napoleon: 213); that the “wife cannot plead in her own 
name” (Code Napoleon: 215); and that the “husband may demand 
a divorce on the ground of his wife’s adultery,” whereas the “wife 
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may demand divorce on the ground of adultery in her husband”, 
only “when he shall have brought his concubine into their common 
residence” (Code Napoleon: 229–230).
So, after all, everyone was still not as equal as everyone else. But 
in due course everyone was declared to be equal, whatever the degree 
to which it was implemented in judicial practice. Yet, alongside this 
development a kind of re-differentiation has evolved where the social 
conditions of suspected criminals have gained increasing significance 
in law as well as in court practice. Certainly, rudiments of such con-
siderations can be seen very early on in the history of lawmaking, 
but they did not proliferate until the equality  principle began to 
become established, rather as its corollary than as its precondition, 
and rather as an integrative part of its spirit than its negation. This 
is so since such considerations serve as an equalizing corrective to 
inequalities between the suspects in terms of social and psycholog-
ical conditions.
Towards secularized legitimization of law
Intrinsically linked to this development, the legitimization of law 
has been subject to substantial change over the millennia. It is not 
that legitimization as such emerged at some point in the history of 
lawmaking: as far as we have been able to survey the trajectories of 
written legislation, it is an ever-present ingredient in law.
It is of course possible to think of power simply as brute force, 
implemented by power-holders having no incentive to justify them-
selves, and thus in no need of making laws. However, in practice 
this is almost never the case. Quite the contrary, history abounds 
in rulers, brutal or not, who have attempted to make their rule 
reasonably agreeable to their subjects through various legitimizing 
measures. Although this does not necessarily mean law initially, it 
does in due course (f.i. Glenn 2010; Newman 1983). And simply 
by its existence, law signifies a quest for legitimization, regardless of 
whether this aim is explicitly stated or not. Yet, in most cases laws 
do include metastatements of this kind. 
In most of these cases, reference is made either to impersonal 
forces, such as magic, tradition and heaven, if not nature itself; or 
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to heavenly personae (Friedman 1985: 236; Weber [Rheinstein] 
1954: 8 ff., 106); or to “innerworldly” agents, such as the rulers 
and legal scholars responsible for putting the rules together; or to 
the consent of larger groups, most commonly elite collectivities 
such as councils of elders or nobles (e.g. Bjarne Larsson 1994: 18, 
37, 216–218; Canning 1996: 59–64; Laws of Wihtred: Prologue, 
Attenborough 1922); but in more recent times also to the people 
as a whole. References of the former types are inserted in order to 
anchor what may seem like regulations too contingently human or 
temporal in something more solidly extra-human or eternal. 
Simplifying somewhat, we would say that the legitimization of 
law started as a mixture of references to magic, tradition and the 
worldly authorities themselves (Newman 1983: 10).2 Subsequent-
ly, it turned to heavenly powers (Glenn 2010: 93; Newman 1983: 
10), although some of the earlier figures of legitimization lingered 
on. Eventually, it gravitated all the way back to the mortal beings 
generally referred to as “the people”, let alone that the people in 
their turn have often been resacralized into the common will and 
human law has been elevated to natural law (Friedman 1985: 204; 
Weber [Rheinstein] 1954; Newman 1983: 28; Guchet 1993: 48). 
How this is reflected in early law in different cultural areas 
depends very much on the particular context or stage of socio- 
political development where written law was first introduced. More 
specifically, there seems to be a connection between state building 
or state expansion and increasing resort to “otherworldly” legiti-
mization, such as reference to personal gods. Thus, in the earliest 
laws preserved, the codes of the early state societies of Sumer and 
Babylonia, religious references loom large. In order to appease his 
subjects and potential challengers to his position, King Hammurabi 
of Babylon opened his code by asserting that he was “selected by 
the god Enlil”, that the god Marduk had “commanded [him] to 
provide just ways for the people of the land (in order to attain) 
appropriate behaviour”, and that the god Shamash had “granted 
[him] (insight into) the truth” (Laws of Hammurabi: Prologue, 
Epilogue, Roth 1997). By this Hammurabi copied and elaborated 
the legitimizing rhetoric already present in older Mesopotamian 
codes, such as the Laws of Ur-Namma and the Laws of Lipit-Ishtar 
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(from the twenty-second and twentieth centuries BCE respective-
ly) (Roth 1997).
As important as religious reference was to these rulers in their 
efforts to legitimize their laws, it should also be noted that this was 
supplemented with more “innerworldly” references to their own 
suitability for the task: their might, wisdom and benevolence towards 
the people (Jarrick 2008: 205–207; Laws of Ur-Namma: Prologue; 
Laws of Hammurabi: Prologue, Roth 1997). 
Also in the laws of the European Middle Ages and the early 
modern period, we find a mixture of frequent references to God 
and innerworldly concerns (Burgundian Code: Preface, Fisher Drew 
1976; Pactus legis Salicae: 1–2: Rivers 1986; Bjarne Larsson 1994). 
However, God is mostly no longer presented as the one who had 
explicitly appointed the king to his task as a legitimate lawmaker. 
No doubt, the Medieval “code wrights” spoke “in the name of God” 
(Burgundian Code: Preface: Fisher Drew 1991; Pactus pro tenore 
pacis: 92, Rivers 1986; I Aethelstan: Prologue), and pretended to 
act in “accordance with God’s intent” (Pactus pro tenore pacis: 92: 
Rivers 1986). One may also speak of a certain distance between the 
kings and God here, since Medieval kings sometimes refer to the 
representatives of God rather than to God himself. Thus, several of 
the English kings who from the seventh to the eleventh centuries 
promulgated laws carefully noted that they had done so with the 
counsel and consent of their bishops and ecclesiastical advisors (e.g. 
Laws of Ine: Prologue; I Aethelstan: Prologue, Attenborough 1922; I 
Edmund: Prologue; V Aethelred: Prologue, Robertson 1925). In this 
sense, the grand He was out of fashion as the ultimate taskmaster 
as early as the European Middle Ages, at least when it came to law-
making. Whether this change of ways of referring to God could be 
seen as a rudimentary step towards the secularization of lawmaking 
cannot be settled, although this is exactly what happened in the 
very long run. It might also be added that Ashutosh Dayal Mathur 
has claimed a similar development for Medieval Indian law. He 
refers to a “secularization of dharma sastra” in Medieval Hindu law 
(Mathur 2007: 5).
However, occasionally references to God are more direct, which 
to a large part seems to coincide with state expansion and the cen-
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tralizing ambitions of rulers (Bjarne Larsson 1994: 7–8; Canning 
1996: 47–64). Thus Charlemagne describes many of his specific 
legal rules as being in accordance with the “Lord’s law”, situating 
his own judicial duties in a truly otherworldly context (e.g. Gene-
ral admonition, 789 (Boretius 22); Programmatic capitulary, 802 
(Boretius 33), King 1987), and the English King Alfred the Great 
included Biblical provisions more or less unchanged in state law 
(Laws of Alfred: 1–48, Griffiths 1995). 
The emphasis on otherworldly legitimization of law and the judi-
cial activities of rulers, and the inclusion of religious law in secular 
codes, appear also in early modern times (Konung Karl IX: s stad-
fästelsebrev till KrLL, Collin & Schlyter 1869: 4–6; The Muscovite 
Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649: Prologue, 1–9, Hellie 1988). How-
ever, a profoundly new element did appear in this field in the late 
eighteenth century. In the preamble of the American Constitution 
from 1789, it was declared that “[w]e the People of the United States 
… do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States 
of America” (American Constitution, preamble). As is well known, 
what happened in America was synchronous with the great turmoil 
in France, which lead to a secularization of lawmaking there too. 
As already stated, in 1788 a “nation means the community formed 
by the association of individuals who decide to live freely under 
a common law, forged by their representatives” (Furet 1992: 50). 
Within this mental framework, reaching its apex after the downfall of 
the monarchy, the only authority or “sovereign” recognized was the 
people. This was repeated in the many constitutions that appeared 
during the different phases of the French Revolution (Furet 1992: 
87; Guchet 1993: 54, 61–62, 86).
Above, we claimed that the long-term trend towards equality 
before the law was intrinsically linked to the secularization of law-
making. This is probable in the sense that the waning of legitimizing 
references to powers beyond emerged alongside the evolving general 
idea that no one should be considered above anyone else anyway. 
Thus the dismantling of extraterrestrial powers was just one aspect 
of the disapproval of inequality altogether.
However, beautiful as it might seem, reference to the people as 
the sole legitimizing basis of law was sometimes little more than lip 
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service paid by an elite that more and more often tended to speak in 
the name of the people and less and less through the people. This is 
at least what some scholars have claimed was the fate of the French 
Revolution, where gradually ordinary women and men were being 
marginalized by the very process that also “sacralized” them as the 
“the People” or even “the General Will” (Furet 1992; Guchet 1993).
From emphasis on obligations 
and particularistic rights to general individual rights
However, in due course the two long-term processes discussed here 
were accompanied by a third process: the change from a general 
emphasis on obligations and group privileges to general individual 
rights, eventually dissolving the lofty references to the General Will.
All the way up to the eighteenth century CE, there was a general 
emphasis on obligations, whether we look at laws from Mesopotamia, 
Europe or China. Obligations are ubiquitous, like the collectivistic 
distinguishing and lumping together of people of differing social 
status, as illustrated by the following example from the Tang Code:
All cases in which officials of the seventh rank and above, [and 
relatives] of those officials and nobles permitted petition, commit 
a crime punishable by life exile or less shall follow this principle 
allowing reduction of punishment by one degree (The Tang Code: 
10; Johnson 1979).
This legal culture lasted for a very long time, and we will not go 
into any detail here about the process that eventually caused it to 
fade away. Suffice it to say that this fading away finally occurred in 
the eighteenth century. Implied in the secularized and democratic 
perspective on the legitimization of law was the notion of general 
individual rights, which now for the first time accompanied obli-
gations as an essential ingredient of law codes (Guchet 1993: 59). 
Thus, in Article 4–5 of the famous French Declaration of Rights from 
1789 the following is stated:
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Article 4. Liberty consists in being able to do anything that does not 
harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of every man 
has no bounds other than those that ensure to the other members 
of society the enjoyment of these same rights. These bounds may 
be determined only by Law.
Article 5. The Law has the right to forbid only those actions that 
are injurious to society. Nothing that is not forbidden by Law may 
be hindered, and no one may be compelled to do what the Law 
does not ordain. 
Although Napoleon’s civil code was far more despotic than the proud 
declaration of rights cited above, civil rights also appear here, in fact 
already on the first page of Book One, where it is stated that every 
Frenchman “shall enjoy civil rights” (Code Napoleon: I.1.1.7–8). 
Certainly, to the degree that older laws contain such obligations 
where people’s responsibilities towards each other were stipulated 
(and not only towards the authorities), what one person owed 
another could namely be understood as what the other had the 
right to claim from that individual. One may also be inclined to 
label as rights certain privileges frequently given by the sovereigns 
of premodern societies. In that sense rights were not altogether 
absent in ancient law. 
However, when present, as, for example, was frequently the case 
in the Institutes of the Justinian Code, rights were most often stat-
ed in positive terms for certain activities, such as the wife’s rights 
in marriage (Institutes of the Justinian Code, 535 CE), or as group 
privileges, instead of being indiscriminately offered the “generic” 
citizen at her or his discretion (e.g. Berman 1983: 395–396; Lev: 
2–5, Bibeln 2000; The Etablissements de St Louis: 76, 113, Ake-
hurst 1996; Guchet 1993: 113; Friedman 1985: 195). And it never 
happened that people were offered freedom of expression, although, 
admittedly, the Justinian recognition of everyone’s right to use pub-
lic resources belonging to no one (such as rivers and ports) borders 
on a modern perspective on rights (Institutes of the Justinian Code: 
Book II.I.2), while outright repression of heresy certainly does not 
(Annotated Justinian Code: Book 1:1, 5–11). Furthermore, “rights” 
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implied through someone’s obligations towards someone else are 
not the same as the explicit recognition of the individual rights 
offered each and every individual considered a citizen. Whereas 
obligations are specific, normally individual rights are deliberately 
unspecific. And where collective privileges are granted to one group 
at the expense of all the unprivileged, the opposite is the case with 
individual civil rights, being collective utilities in the sense that their 
use by one citizen does not to any degree reduce their accessibility 
to any other. Thus, not only did secularized law originate with the 
people, from now on it also guaranteed certain rights to the people, 
who by this reform were differentiated into individuals (Guchet 
1993: 47; Glenn 2010: 142).
However, it must be added that the idea of rights has rather often 
been violated in modern law despite being formulated as a basic 
principle there. For example, not all adult inhabitants were included 
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century French legislation on civil 
rights. Women were not considered citizens in the full sense of the 
word (Code Napoleon: 7, 19, 214–226).
Summary and discussion 
Focusing on methodological issues, we have tried to demonstrate 
the scientific fruitfulness of a global and systematic comparative 
approach to historical studies of law. The motivation is that we want 
to improve our understanding of the cultural dynamics of human 
society, an objective compelling us to also improve our methods of 
enquiry. For such an objective, laws and lawmaking suit us extra-
ordinarily well, partly because they testify to profound aspects of 
human interaction, and partly because they can be followed over a 
considerable time span of at least 4,000 years. Although most parts 
of the world will soon be covered by our study, only a few out of 
all the innumerable laws will be analyzed. They have however not 
been chosen at random. Rather, certain core areas have been picked, 
particularly those where the content and form of lawmaking can be 
followed over long periods of time.
As a response to concerns as to whether it is at all possible to 
make large-scale comparisons, we started out by showing that laws 
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even from distant and dissimilar times and cultures are more easily 
decoded and compared than many researchers believe. Furthermore, 
we also showed that the corpus of laws studied can serve as a means 
by which each of them could be contextualized. What is present or 
absent in a law code from a certain culture throws light on corre-
sponding absences and presences in law codes from other cultures 
and thereby on the significance of local conditions for recurring 
or unique traits in laws. However, to truly make the possibility 
of comparisons of legal regulations come true, we have equipped 
ourselves with clear and stable definitions, and we have applied a 
three-level system of categorization in order to bring flexibility as 
well as stability to our analyses.
 Thematically common to most laws is their preoccupation with 
property crime and illegal violence, and this applies to laws as 
dissimilar as the Tang Code and the Laws of Hammurabi, despite 
huge cultural differences between the societies in which they were 
promulgated. While laws in their earlier phases were biased as to 
their thematic orientation, later on the themes became more evenly 
distributed, the more so the more extensive and the more encom-
passing the laws became.
Reducing the development of the substance/content of lawmak-
ing to the major long-term trends, we have identified the following 
changes:
• From deliberate inequality to equality before the law
• Towards secularized legitimization of the law
• From an emphasis on obligations, particularistic rights and 
group privileges to general individual rights
Another trend that we have identified concerns the long-term course 
of development of the death penalty. Over a very long timespan we 
have identified a curvilinear track from leniency, through harshness 
and back to leniency. Since we will deal with this subject elsewhere, 
here we will make do with just pointing it out.
We are fully aware of the fact that these changes have evolved 
neither in a unidirectional nor in a uniform way, and we cannot 
claim that the tide can never turn and undo what has happened to 
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date. In some respects it is even now about to happen. Nevertheless, 
a certain direction in the gradual development of lawmaking can 
be still be discerned.
We assume that the dynamics of a cultural system have a certain 
direction, simply meaning that a system never really returns to its 
“point of departure”, despite all kinds of feedback mechanisms at 
work in the course of history. Yet this should neither be understood 
as if the system has to be unilinear, nor that if it in itself shows any-
thing like an intention, although it is peculiar to such a system that 
its basic components, the human agents, do have intentions. Implied 
in our assumption is that culture is a process, where societal change 
unfolds according to specific causes. In other words, the history of 
culture is deterministic in the sense that certain processes seem to 
be the necessary precondition for other processes to occur.
The general cumulative directionality of history, be it unilinear or 
not, can be established as nothing but the unfolding of a number of 
specific processes. Without the concrete flesh of history, there can 
be no history at all – naturally. However, history luckily abounds in 
examples of this simple but surprisingly oft challenged fact (Jarrick 
2013). For example, once in the distant past sedentary life grew out 
of nomadic life, in its turn being the precondition for the emergence 
of urban clusters. Furthermore, it is unlikely that regular wars could 
be fought unless people had settled down, let alone that homicide has 
been immanent in human culture throughout history. The opposite 
trajectory is hardly thinkable: a history departing from sedentary 
societies in a sparsely populated prehistoric world gradually giving 
way to an overcrowded world of wandering people. Moreover, the 
exchange of utilities necessarily developed before money was intro-
duced in order to facilitate exchange, little by little being transformed 
into commodity trade. A parallel development is how religious ideas 
had to appear before religious associations did, before churches and 
other devotional buildings were erected, a long time before some 
people in the modern age began to distance themselves from the 
whole otherworldly package altogether.
Being a crucial example in our specific context, the history of 
laws also testifies to the directionality of human affairs as much as 
other fields of human interaction do. This has been shown above. 
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In addition, two other aspects of the directionality of the history of 
lawmaking processes are worth mentioning. 
First, as has frequently been shown, in most if not all societies, 
unwritten behavioral rules anteceded written law. Since human 
interaction sooner or later becomes regulated in one way or another, 
and humans have lived together long before they acquired literacy, 
this is almost self-evident. Furthermore, this order of institutional 
change should be understood not only in the chronological, but 
also in the causal-intentional sense, meaning that once they learned 
the art of reading and writing, people could intentionally draw on 
experiences from the former when developing written law. It has 
been claimed that this development could be linked to the emergence 
of the concept of transcendent powers, and gods, stipulating laws 
for humankind (Elkana 1986: 47). Traces of unwritten regulations 
everywhere in the oldest written law codes clearly testify to this.
Secondly, not only rules of behavior but also how to handle the 
violation of the rules – the administration of justice – was developed 
long before official courts or the use of written records and other 
such instruments were introduced. Correspondingly, it took some 
time until conflict settlement with the aid of third parties emerged, 
and still more time before this procedural component was made 
mandatory (Newman 1983: 51–52). As expressed by Catherine 
Newman: “self-redress systems relying upon retaliation [which] entail 
clearly defined notions of right and wrong”, were developed “despite 
the absence of third-party authority figures” (Newman 1983: 61).
More could be added, but the above examples suffice to make 
it obvious that the history of legislation and jurisdiction fits well 
into the picture of history as a cumulative process with a certain 
discernible direction. Furthermore, an inverted process could hardly 
be imagined, dawning with written law that over centuries gradually 
dissolves into the oral regulation of human behavior. 
We have demonstrated that the cultural dynamics of the human 
society, as studied through the history of lawmaking, have a cer-
tain direction, and that they constitute a process of cumulative 
change. We are inclined to add that our “story” also indicates that 
the  significance of culture increases with the development of culture, 
in the sense that laws neutralize or diminish the effects of natural 
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selection, among other things through the protection of the weak. 
In the long run this is amplified to the principle of equality before 
the law (supplemented, among other factors, by consideration of 
social background).
It is likely that the long-term evolutionary implications unearthed 
through our law study apply to other processes of cultural change 
too, though this is still to be demonstrated. Also, we believe that 
the methods used here could open up for studies of other aspects 
of the cultural dynamics of the human society. They could for 
example, serve as a model for quantification of other material so 
far not considered in such a context. We will ourselves actually be 
using this study as a point of departure for further studies of the 
connection between law and other profound aspects of long-term 
cultural change.
Notes
 1 We have described this method in close detail in a previous article (see Jarrick & 
Wallenberg Bondesson 2011).
 2 According to Yehuda Elkana 1986: 47, in the very beginning the authority of laws 
rested with worldly authorities before they were made transcendental through the 
emergence of the old, axial world religions. This may be partly true, but in the Laws 
of Hammurabi, written before the breakthrough of axial religions, Hammurabi 
referred to God as the ultimate authority.
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chapter 6
Core and periphery in the  
early modern world system
A time-space appropriation assessment
Rikard Warlenius
In this chapter, methods usually associated with ecological economics 
are applied to world history studies, in an example of what Martínez- 
Alier and Schandl (2002) have called “ecological-economic history”. 
It is understood as going beyond a general ecological concern in 
environmental history to the application of measures and methods 
originating from ecological economics. Ecological economics is a 
heterodox school of economic thought which acknowledges the 
planetary limits of (a sustainable) society and in which biophysical 
measures such as ecological footprints and material flow analysis are 
frequently applied to economic analysis.
This chapter uses a biophysical method grounded in world system 
analysis and ecological economics – Alf Hornborg’s (2007) time-space 
appropriation – to investigate one of the main questions posed on the 
“battlefields” of global history: was the early modern world  economy 
centered on Europe or China? As a case study, it focuses on the 
exchange of Swedish bar iron and Chinese Bohea tea in the eighteenth 
century via the Swedish East India Company. In time-space approp-
riation, the amount of productive land and human labor embodied 
in the commodities exchanged is assessed, as well as the quantities 
exchanged at the prevailing price relation, in order to establish a net 
flow of biophysical quantities – time and space – between the parties 
of exchange. The underlying assumption is that monetary prices are 
masking uneven relations of power, and that an equal exchange of 
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money often hides an unequal exchange of biophysical resources. 
In this particular case, the method is used to discuss the structural 
position of Western Europe and China respectively within the early 
modern world system, assuming that the net-receiver of resources 
in the exchange is the more central area. The empirical findings and 
assessments are collected in a separate section (p. 206).
The “ReOrientation” of world history 
With its strong focus on methodology, the rich theoretical and histor-
ical debate about Eurocentrism in (world) historiography is largely left 
aside in this chapter. I only wish to note that a strong movement for 
dismantling Eurocentric historiography has existed for some decades, 
which is most closely associated with the “California school”, a fairly 
heterogeneous historical school that borrows ideas and methods from 
neoclassical economics and institutionalism, as well as structuralism. 
Its most prominent work is arguably Kenneth Pomeranz’ The Great 
Divergence (2000). It was, however, to an even greater extent struc-
turalist scholars, including Janet Abu-Lughod (1989), Samir Amin 
(1989), James Blaut (1993, 2000), and Andre Gunder Frank (1993, 
1998), who pioneered this “ReOrientation” of world history. 
Frank offered the most radical revision and the importance of his 
ReOrient (1998) is equal to the work of Pomeranz (2000). Although 
the theoretical perspectives differ, their conclusions on Eurocentric 
historiography are quite similar. Frank’s main aim, stated in the first 
sentence of his book, is to “turn received Eurocentric and social theory 
upside down” (Frank 1998: xv). He asserts that more recent historical 
research, mainly from the peripheries, synthesized holistically into 
a new world history, shows that other parts of Afro-Eurasia were at 
the same economic level as Europe, or were even more advanced, 
up until circa 1800. In a posthumous book (Frank 2014) he argues 
that for China, this was the case even up to the last three decades 
of the nineteenth century. 
According to Frank (1998: 111), in the early modern world sys-
tem, China was the core for two main reasons: its “preeminence in 
production and export” and its “function as the final ‘sink’ for the 
world’s production of silver”. The two factors were connected, since 
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China’s exports of silk, porcelain and tea were unrivaled, based on 
its superior productivity, and led to a trade surplus “with everybody 
else” – other parts of Asia, Europe, Africa, and America (Frank 1998: 
116) – which was balanced through silver payments. The silver ena-
bled the Chinese market economy to expand on a silver basis. In fact, 
the whole world economy was on a silver standard, and China was 
the center of this silver-based world economy.1 However, silver also 
played the role of a “Trojan horse” that would eventually create a shift 
in global dominance. The extremely rich silver discoveries in Mexico 
and Bolivia not only fueled China’s further economic expansion, but 
became Europe’s ticket to the much greater Asian economic train 
(Frank 1998: 277). Still, it was not until after the Western Industrial 
Revolution that Westerners were able to “displace the Asians from the 
locomotive” of the world economy (Frank 1998: 37). 
 Flynn and Giráldez, the most prominent historians on the early 
modern silver trade, also share Frank’s Sinocentric view and the 
importance of China’s silver imports. They disagree with Frank’s con-
tention that China was enriched by its silver imports and emphasize 
the high social costs of substituting a practically free paper money 
system with silver paid for with exports. However, China’s capacity 
to do so for centuries only “underscores the centrality of the Chinese 
economy as global juggernaut” (Flynn & Giráldez 2002, cf. Flynn 
& Giráldez 2000).
Ecological-economic history 
Environmental history has now become an established subdivision 
of history, and while for a long time it was mainly national in scope, 
environmental explanations for world historical events are now both 
advanced and acknowledged. However, Jason W. Moore (2003) notes 
that environmental history is surprisingly void of social theory, and 
mentions James O’Connor’s “second contradiction”, John Bellamy 
Foster’s theory of the metabolic rift, Wallerstein’s world system analy-
sis, actor-network theory, and political ecology, as potential inspi-
rations for a more theoretically-concerned environmental history. 
From a methodological perspective I would like to add ecological 
economics as another potential inspiration.
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Ecological economics is a growing academic field that started as 
a “break-away” from neoclassical economics, merging economics 
with natural science to investigate the biophysical foundation of 
economic activities.2 Several such biophysical measures have been 
developed in ecological economics. These include Odum’s emergy 
concept (see Brolin 2006; Foster & Holleman 2014); Material Flow 
Analysis elaborated by the Vienna Social Metabolism school (e.g. 
Fischer-Kowalski & Hüttler 1999); Borgström’s (1965) concept of 
ghost acreages; and the more elaborated concept of ecological foot-
prints (Wackernagel & Rees 1996; WWF 2010). 
Ecological economics shares with world system analysis a critique 
of neoclassical theories of trade and prices. At the base lies a convic-
tion that prices on the world market do not neutrally reflect value 
solely as a response to supply and demand, but in some way reflect 
power, social relations and cultural constructions. As the human 
ecologist Alf Hornborg puts it: 
[T]he cultural bubble of neo-liberal economics excludes all those 
other possible measures of exchange [besides money] – such as 
energy, materials, hectares, labor time – with which it is fairly easy 
to show that world trade is indeed highly unequal (Hornborg 2009: 
262; cf. Hornborg 2001: 39).
Hornborg is critical of any value theories, including those of Marx, 
Odum (1983) and Bunker (1985), since he argues that any “objective” 
valuation of a commodity denies that valuation is highly cultural. 
Prices are not a neutral reflection of supply and demand, as econo-
mists would have it, but related to power relations, social relations 
and cultural valuations. Even if prices mask power relations, and 
there is no “objective” value theory with which prices can be com-
pared and unmasked, they can be measured against real, physical 
inputs such as labor time – what the structuralist economist Arghiri 
Emmanuel (1972) called unequal exchange. 
The theory of unequal exchange is rooted in Ricardo’s (1953, orig. 
in 1817) classical trade theory of comparative advantages, according 
to which a country gains by specializing in the production of com-
modities in which it has a relative advantage, and by trading with 
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other countries for the commodities in which they have a relative 
advantage. Given immobility of labor and capital, both countries 
will gain from the exchange – although Ricardo fully understood 
that this would lead to an unequal exchange of labor time. Marx 
picked up on Ricardo’s theory and observed in Capital that “the 
privileged country receives more labor in exchange for less” (Marx 
1981: 345). However, this agreement, in substance, leads to very 
different conclusions. Ricardo’s theory laid the foundation for the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model of factor endowments and all current main-
stream trade theory in which low wages are regarded as a comparative 
advantage or the result of an abundant factor of production to be 
used in international trade. In Marxist and structuralist theory the 
concept of unequal exchange – in essence “more labor in exchange 
for less” (Marx 1981: 345) – has been regarded as a core explana-
tion of uneven development and the maintenence of core-periphery 
relations in an unjust world system.
Later on, this concept was situated at the centre of attempts 
to ‘green’ world system analysis by analyzing uneven or unequal 
exchange, not only of labor but also flows of material and/or energy. 
An ecological version of unequal exchange was first developed by the 
sociologist Stephen Bunker (1985). To be able to actually test the 
hypothesis that the world system is characterized by uneven flows 
of energy and matter, the biophysical measures developed within 
ecological economics have proven useful. For instance, ecological 
footprints have been used to measure uneven flows of trade in  several 
studies (for recent overviews, see Hornborg 2009: 249; Foster & 
Holleman 2014: 11).
Ecological economists have also occasionally applied their meth-
ods to historical cases3 – what Martinez-Alier and Schandl (2002) 
call “an ecological-economic history concerned with the physical 
assessment of the impacts of the human economy … a history of 
‘social metabolism’”4 – but historians are still mostly uninterested 
in quantifying the entropic flows, ecological footprints, energetics 
regimes and so on of past societies and economies. One exception 
is Andre Gunder Frank, who late in life began to see entropic flows 
as an important analytical tool for global history (Frank 2006, 
2014; Bergesen 2011; Denemark 2011). The English ascendance 
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of the nineteenth century, he argued, was characterized by the dis-
placement of ecological and social entropy from the center to the 
periphery, permitting greater order and democracy in core regions 
while simultaneously imposing disorder, ecological devastation and 
conflict/violence onto the periphery forced to absorb the entropy. 
This displacement of entropy, as well as the converse transfer of 
exergy to the core, is distributed through the world market where 
price differences favoring the core serve as the engine (Frank 2006: 
304–307). In his posthumous book ReOrienting the 19th century 
(2014), Frank set the task of explaining the “the great divergence” 
partly through entropic flows, but unfortunately he was not able 
to finish those sections before he was lost to cancer in 2005 (Dene-
mark 2011).
One obvious problem in measuring asymmetric entropic flows 
in general, but especially in history, has been the difficulties in put-
ting it into operation in empirical research based on existing data. 
Hornborg suggests one feasible way:
[D]etect such structural asymmetries in trade by converting statis-
tics on commodity flows into quantities of “embodied land” and 
“embodied labor”. Both these factors of production can be sources 
of exergy for the accumulation of capital, but have the advantage 
of being quantifiable, for example in annual hectare yields and in 
hours of human labor (Hornborg 2007: 261).
Thus, the method Hornborg labels time-space appropriation is an 
attempt to measure ecologically unequal exchange. He uses the 
trade between England and its former American colonies in the 
mid-nineteenth century as a case study. To actually assess the land 
and labor embodied in the traded commodities turned out to be 
much harder than anticipated, however.5 However, by studying a 
broad spectrum of literature and estimated figures often used for 
other purposes, an assessment was possible. Accordingly, in 1850, 
1,000 sterling pounds worth of raw cotton from the former colonies 
embodied circa 21,000 hours of mostly slave labor and 59 hectares 
of land, whereas 1,000 sterling pounds worth of cotton textiles from 
England embodied circa 14,000 hours of labor and less than one 
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hectare of land (Hornborg 2013: 91). This unequal exchange was 
made possible through technological superiority emanating from 
capital accumulation that, over time, became self-enforcing when the 
profits derived from the unequal exchange were  invested in  further 
technology (Hornborg 2007: 267). In conclusion, Hornborg’s calcu-
lations are used to reinforce an analysis of British industrialization, 
not so much as the rise of growth and productivity, as of successful 
appropriation of other people’s land and labor in what is essential-
ly a zero-sum game: “to save time and space by the application of 
increasingly ‘efficient’ technologies may often tend to imply that 
someone else in the world system is losing time or space in the pro-
cess” (Hornborg 2007: 270).6
By including both land and labor, Hornborg bridges the Marxist- 
oriented world system analysis, within which the concept of unequal 
exchange focusing on labor emerged, and ecological economics and 
global history, which focus on flows of embodied land. 
A time-space appropriation assessment of 
an early modern Swedish–Chinese trade exchange
Time-space appropriation
To summarize the introductory part of this chapter, a non-reduc-
tionist, structuralist, non-Eurocentric, ecologically concerned global 
history is favored, and special attention is paid to biophysical meth-
odologies associated with ecological economics. One such method, 
time-space appropriation (TSA), is used to build a case that aims to 
test, or at least shedding some light on, a world history controversy, 
namely Andre Gunder Frank’s hypothesis that the early modern 
world system was essentially Sinocentric and not Europe-dominat-
ed. This approach is novel in at least one sense. It seems self-evident 
which parts of today’s world system are cores and which parts are 
peripheries, but going back in history, this is not as obvious – hence 
the controversy. While the methodologies related to (ecologically) 
unequal exchange have been developed to explain how existing 
cores exploit peripheries, and how an unjust world system is thereby 
maintained, here the aim is to determine which part of a historical 
world system was core, and which periphery. Presupposing that the 
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same tendencies that apply now were also in function some hundred 
years ago – basically, that the peripheries exchange more labor and 
more nature for less – measuring energetic net flows in world trade 
might indicate which parts of the world system were more central, 
and which parts were more peripheral. 
TSA has been chosen for a number of reasons. It has a solid and 
straightforward theoretical underpinning that is not based on con-
troversial and, arguably, metaphysical value theories. While most 
biophysical measures, such as ghost acreages, or ecological footprints, 
only take ecological resources such as land into account, and while 
Emmanuel’s unequal exchange only focuses on labor and wages, TSA 
defines energetic flows more broadly by including both land and 
labor. Like unequal exchange, it is reciprocal, i.e. it compares both 
import and export to assess net flows, which gives a fuller picture 
than a one-way assessment. Finally, its variables rely on data that 
should be assessable for many historical cases. There are, of course, 
also some disadvantages and complications with the method that 
will be dealt with as they arise and summarized towards the end.
First though, it is not self-evident that TSA should be used as 
a general measurement of unequal exchange – of core/periphery 
status – within any world system. Even though Wallerstein is not 
ignorant about ecological factors (cf. Moore 2003), he nonetheless 
defines economic status in the world in exclusively economic and 
political terms; in The Modern World System I (Wallerstein 1974), 
variables such as “the complexity of economic activities, strength of 
the state machinery, cultural integrity, etc” (Wallerstein 1974: 349) 
are described as the differences between cores and peripheries. The 
world economy is distinguished by its axial or geographical division 
of labor, and the core countries dominate through tasks “requiring 
higher levels of skill and greater capitalization” (Wallerstein 1974: 
350). These are factors that are not easily operationalized. In 1974, 
Wallerstein made no reference to Arghiri Emmanuel or unequal 
exchange. Over time however, Emmanuel’s analysis was incorporated 
into world system analysis (see Wallerstein 1980: 50; 2004: 28, 98), 
and was even proposed as a measure of core/periphery status.7 In his 
theoretical introduction, World System Analysis (2004), Wallerstein 
states that cores and peripheries are defined by their production 
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processes, and that their status can be decided by examining the 
degree to which they are monopolized, or submitted to the rules of 
the free market (core production processes are more monopolized 
and peripheral ones are more exposed to competition, Wallerstein 
2004: 28). Core/periphery status is here defined by the rate of profit 
of the production processes, but profitability is seen as directly related 
to the degree of monopolization. In an exchange, the competitive 
commodities are in a weaker position than the (quasi-) monopolized 
ones, which results in a permanent flow of surplus value from the 
peripheral producers to the core producers. “This has been called 
unequal exchange” (Wallerstein 2004: 28).8 
Following Wallerstein, either unequal exchange or factors relat-
ing to the level of profitability or market dominance should be 
operationalized in order to measure core/periphery status within 
a world system. But if we agree with Bunker, Hornborg and other 
proponents of a “green” structuralism – that the world system is 
not only characterized by an unequal exchange of labor time, but 
also of natural resources, which is also in line with the above excur-
sion on the relevance of ecology in historical explanations – then it 
becomes logical, and true to the original world system analysis, to 
use ecologically unequal exchange as an indicator of core/periphery 
status. As has already been shown, time-space appropriation is one 
usable method for measuring ecologically unequal exchange.9
Constructing a case of time-space appropriation
To use measurement of time-space appropriation to shed light 
on”divergence” before the Industrial Revolution, we need, first and 
foremost, to single out one, or a few, representative cases. Hornborg’s 
example, the exchange of American raw cotton and finished British 
textiles in the mid-nineteenth century, is key to understanding the 
Industrial Revolution. Does such an emblematic case of exchange 
between Europe and Asia in the early modern period exist? Having 
identified such a case, we shall need to create a theoretical model, 
and find dependent variables and relate them to each other, before 
getting into the empirical details and calculating the results. 
Europe’s main export commodity to Asia in early modern times 
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was silver, and the main import product was tea (silk in the earlier 
period), so it would be natural to use silver and tea (or silk) in our 
case study. There are, however, four problems with using silver, of 
which one seems insurmountable. First, silver is mysterious because 
of its use partly as money, partly as a commodity. The non-economic 
use value of silver is limited and it is hardly an important part of any 
economy’s direct social metabolism. If we were to treat silver merely 
as money – as a means of payment and a residual store of exchange 
value – then it might be unsuitable for a time-space assessment, since 
its value might be largely symbolic and backed by states and might 
therefore say very little about its biophysical content. The relation 
between its embodied exergy and its price would then be distorted 
and hard to compare with other commodities. There are, however, 
good reasons to treat silver as a commodity in the early modern world 
market (cf. Flynn & Giráldez 1995 and 2002; Pomeranz 2000: 160). 
Even if it was mainly used to mint coin, its advantage as money, com-
pared with, e.g., paper money (which in China had failed bitterly 
during the Ming era), was that it also had a market value as a metal 
commodity, which made it less risky to accept as money. Thus, even 
when used as money it seems that its value was market-based rather 
than state-backed. Therefore, silver may be compared to other com-
modities and could be suitable for a time-space assessment. 
Second, we might still suspect that silver’s market value was a 
result not only of the land and labor it embodied, but also of its 
scarcity. This could also distort the correlation between exergy and 
price. The counterargument would be that scarce metals are also 
related to exergy input, since much labor time is usually spent on 
finding the ore and refining the metal. Third, that silver is an abiotic 
– nonliving – resource is not ideal for a time-space assessment. No 
attention is given to the fact that it is harvested only once, from a 
natural process that is extended in geological time rather than in 
space (as opposed to biotic, i.e. living resources), which might dis-
tort the land factor used in TSA. On the other hand, this concern 
is probably of little economic importance since what nature “gives” 
– either photosynthetically or geologically – is usually considered in 
economics as gratis. In any case, as we will see below, the extraction 
of minerals often had a large land component anyway because of the 
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wood or charcoal needed for refining, or at least this was the case in 
the “old” organic regime when energy was mostly dependent on land. 
There is, however, a fourth problem with using silver, which has 
nothing to do with its particular material characteristics, but is rooted 
in the unique role this money-commodity played in the early mod-
ern world economy. One important assumption in how time-space 
appropriation is used here is that the net receiver of land and labor 
in a particular exchange – such as England in Hornborg’s example 
– is more central in the world system, higher up in the hierarchy, 
with the power to influence pricing. In this case, a confirmation of 
a Frankian, Sinocentric hypothesis would mean that the land and 
labor embodied in the silver exported to China is higher than in the 
commodities for which it was exchanged (e.g. tea), making China 
more central. But even if this were the general pattern, there might 
be exceptions to the rule. Not every single commodity exported by 
China would have to be less land- and labor-intensive than silver for 
the general pattern to be true. Perhaps, not even some very important 
commodities have to follow the general pattern for the pattern to be 
true. The problem here is that several informed observers claim that 
Europe’s silver export to Asia was this exception to the rule. According 
to Pomeranz (2000: 160), silver was one of very few commodities 
with which Europe could beat its global competitors, and for Frank 
it was precisely the profits from silver that in the long run made 
Europe strong enough to overthrow the Asian economic hegemony, 
even though it took several centuries (Frank 1998: 37, 277).
Because of silver’s supposed deviation from the general rule, a 
result pointing to a net transfer of land and labor to Europe would 
not be easily translatable into a more general claim of European 
world dominance. At the same time, it would not be reasonable 
to make the opposite claim: to regard a net flow of land and labor 
towards Europe as a vindication of Frank’s and Pomeranz’ claims, 
because what would a result supporting a Eurocentric world econ-
omy then look like? Since both results could be interpreted in favor 
of the hypothesis, constructing a falsifiable theory on silver’s role 
in the time-space appropriation of the early modern world system 
seems impossible. Another possibility is to look for other European 
export commodities to compare with those imported from China. 
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A major problem is that there were hardly any: silver was essentially 
the only thing the Chinese wanted from the Europeans, until the 
British success in balancing its China trade with Indian opium, but 
by then we are already on the verge of the industrial era.
If silver was almost the only thing the Chinese wanted in exchange 
for their tea and other commodities, and this exchange is likely to 
have been characterized by a net time-space flow to Europe, do we 
have to give up on using TSA as a measure of structural position 
within the world system? I think it is a better idea to circumvent the 
particularities of silver by constructing another case study where sil-
ver is included but treated as money instead of as a commodity, and 
see if such a case study implies a net transfer to China or to Europe. 
Several such case studies can be constructed. For the trade carried out 
by the Swedish East India Company that I have studied, the most 
relevant case, for reasons explained below, is the exchange of Swedish 
iron for silver, which in turn was exchanged for Chinese tea. A focus 
on other commodities traded by the British, Dutch or French East 
India Companies might have been as relevant, or even more relevant, 
for understanding whether Europe or China was more central in the 
early modern era, but they have not been investigated so far. Hope-
fully, this particular example can still provide some methodological 
insights for anyone tempted to construct further case studies.
Iron for tea
Founded in 1731, the Swedish East India Company (“Swenska 
Ostindiska Compagniet”, SOIC) conducted 132 expeditions to Asia. 
These expeditions were almost exclusively to Guangzhou (Canton) 
in China, although a few voyages were also made to India before the 
SOIC was dissolved in 1813. Tea was the most important Chinese 
import to Europe in the eighteenth century, for the SOIC as well as 
for the other East India Companies, and black Bohea tea was the most 
preferred sort. According to Robert Constant, a French merchant in 
Guangzhou in the mid-eighteenth century, “it is tea which draws 
European vessels to China; the other articles that comprise their  cargoes 
are only taken for the sake of variety” (quoted in  Gardella 1994: 33). 
Between 1739 and 1767, a total of 16,533 tons were imported by 
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the SOIC (Koninckx 1980: 211). Bohea tea constituted 13,851 tons 
or 84 per cent of the total known imports of tea (Koninckx 1980: 
207). According to the statistical compilation of the value of imported 
goods by the SOIC in Nyström (1883), tea comprised 71.4 per cent 
of total value of imports between 1769 and 1777.10
If we assume some stability over time, it seems that Bohea tea 
alone made up more than half of the cargo arriving at Gothenburg 
on the Swedish East Indiamen. This makes Bohea tea the most 
 relevant Chinese commodity for further research in this study. I 
have not investigated whether the ratio between land and labor in 
tea is representative for the other important commodities imported 
to Sweden, such as raw silk, cotton clothing or porcelain. Obviously, 
the data for Bohea tea cannot automatically be applied to Chinese 
export commodities in general since it might theoretically be anoth-
er exception, just as with silver, discussed above. However, it has 
been chosen because it was by far the most important commodity. 
What then did the SOIC export? Mainly metals and timber. 
According to Koninckx (1980: 184), whose study on the SOIC 
covers the years between 1731 and 1766, “[m]etals in the form 
of semi-finished or finished products constituted the bulk of the 
Swedish Company’s exports. The most interesting items relate to 
iron”; “[i]n general, bar iron always dominated Swedish exports, at 
least at the beginning of the eighteenth century” (Koninckx 1980: 
185). Thus, bar iron seems to be the most important export com-
modity and is chosen for the same reasons as Bohea tea. However, 
the problem of the dominance of silver in the Sino-European trade 
returns. It turns out that most, if not all, of the bar iron and the other 
Swedish export commodities were not carried to China, but only 
to Cádiz in Spain, where they were sold to pay for chests of silver 
(Koninckx 1980: 193). Up to 1766, there is data on silver cargoes 
from a dozen of the SOIC’s expeditions and Koninckx confirms 
that silver was practically the only thing the Swedes could sell in 
China: “the cargo of Spanish piasters was the sine qua non of the 
Company’s trade” (Koninckx 1980: 190). By treating the silver as 
money, as a residual store of the value of the bar iron for which it 
was exchanged, a comparison between the iron and the tea bought 
with the silver coins is still possible.
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Relations of the variables, and hypothesis 
TSA is the difference in land and labor input into commodities 
from two areas exchanged at a certain price rate. If commodities 
from the areas are called I and II, TSA exists if there is an exchange 
of I and II and if I ≠ II. TSA is the difference II–I. It is assumed 
that the part with the highest value is peripheral to the part with 
the lowest value. If I > II, Area A is periphery and Area B is core. 
It is crucial to establish the price relation of the exchange: other- 
wise it will be impossible to assess how much of I was exchanged 
for II.
The ratio II/I expresses the magnitude of the inequality in the 
exchange. In order to assess the magnitude of the TSA, we also 
need data on what quantities of the commodities were exchanged. 
By multiplying the sum with the quantities of the exchange, the 
total TSA is assessed. In this case, however, the total quantities of 
the exchange are not the focal point. Both Pomeranz’ use of ghost 
acreages and Hornborg’s use of TSA aim to measure European eco-
logical relief by former colonies, and therefore emphasize the total 
sums of the land and labor saved, but I am interested in using TSA 
here as a measure of the relative exchange of land and labor in the 
trade between Sweden and China, in order to settle their positions 
in the hierarchy of the world system.11
Each factor (I and II) has two dependent variables: annual hectare 
yields (i) and the human labor (ii) embodied in production (cf. Horn-
borg 2007: 261). That there are two variables measured in different 
units is a complicating factor since no clear independent variable 
can be established in the equation. If the measure is formalized as
TSA = (I ≠ II)
and the dependent variables of I and II are I.i, I.ii, II.i and II.ii but 
no common unit exists for the categories i and ii, the equation is 
unsolvable unless divided into two equations:
space appropriation (SA) = (I.i ≠ II.i) 
time appropriation (TA) = (I.ii ≠ II.ii)
where, of course,
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TSA = TA + SA 
If there is a net transfer of land and labor in the same direction, such as 
(I.i < II.i) ^ (I.ii < II.ii)
it is possible to qualitatively conclude that there is time-space approp-
riation to either Area A or Area B, and it is also possible to calculate 
quantitatively the SA and the TA of the commodities separately, 
but it is not possible to quantify the extent of total TSA. If there is 
a mixed result, such as 
(I.i < II.i) ^ (I.ii > II.ii)
it is not possible to conclude whether there is any time-space approp-
riation at all; even if, for instance, the net TA appears to be much 
larger in one direction than the net SA in the other direction, trying 
to forge them together without a common unit is like comparing 
apples with pears.
For this case we have four dependent variables:
I. i:  Annual hectare yields embodied in the cultivation and 
  production of Chinese Bohea tea per price unit.
 ii:  Days of human labor embodied in the cultivation, 
  production and transportation of Chinese Bohea tea 
  per price unit.
II. i:  Annual hectare yields embodied in the extraction and 
  production of Swedish bar iron per price unit.
 ii: Days of human labor embodied in the extraction, 
  production and transportation of Swedish bar iron per 
  price unit.
A clear-cut Sinocentric relation of these variables must state that 
China was the net receiver of both embodied land and labor. The 
quantitative part of this essay’s hypothesis can thus be stated as:
(I.i < II.i) ^ (I.ii < II.ii)
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Frank and Pomeranz had divergent views on the importance of land 
and labor in determining “the Great Divergence”, and the basis for 
this was their differing views on the relative wages and land pres-
sure in China and Europe. Pomeranz asserts that both wages and 
pressure on land were roughly equal, while Frank claims that wages 
were lower in China, mainly as a consequence of higher land pres-
sure. Straining these assertions somewhat, it could be claimed that 
Pomeranz would expect that the labor and land input per price unit 
in the Sino-European exchange would be roughly the same, while 
Frank would expect that the Chinese input of labor per price unit 
would exceed the European input, but the opposite would be true 
for inputs of land, which would be higher in Europe than in China. 
The logic behind these assertions would be that the relative costs 
for land use12 and labor would decide how much of these factors 
could be put in commodities that are equally exchanged price-wise.
If the logic is accepted, three scenarios could be set up, correspond-
ing to the hypothesis of this essay (RW) and to my interpretations of 
the implications of Pomeranz’ (KP) and Frank’s (AGF) hypotheses:
RW: (I.i < II.i) ^ ( I.ii < II.ii) Embodied land and labor of 
Swedish export commodities
 exceed those of the Chinese 
KP: (I.i ≈ II.i) ^ (I.ii ≈ II.ii) Embodied land and labor of 
Swedish export commodities
 roughly equal those of the 
 Chinese 
AGF: (I.i < II.i) ^ (I.ii > II.ii) Embodied land of Swedish 
export commodities exceeds 
those of the Chinese, while 
the opposite is true for em- 
bodied labor
Approximate values 
To give approximate values to the dependent variables and relate 
them quantitatively through prices and currency exchange rates, 
all data collected would ideally be from a limited time period. To 
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obtain that requires hard empirical work, in my experience, since 
the labor time and land requirements for commodity production 
are usually not readily available in the standard works of economic 
history. Through reading of a lot of sources, and with some puzzling, 
estimating and adding, I think it has been possible to get  reasonable 
estimates for the data needed. Of course, the values could have been 
based on even more detailed and comprehensive studies, but one 
has to draw the line somewhere. I decided to include the direct 
labor used in the production of the commodities as well as in the 
most important inputs – raw material and fuel, and the labor used 
to transport the commodity to the domestic staple port. For land, it 
is also essentially the land required for raw materials and fuels that 
is included in the assessment. Thus, the land and labor needed to 
feed workers and animals are not included, neither is an assessment 
of the land and labor invested in capital (industrial or landesque), 
or the labor put into, for example, the trans-oceanic voyages and 
their ships.13 
One interesting methodological question concerns how to account 
for the additional labor and increased price due to long-distance 
transport. What I call the staple port method may be able to give an 
accurate answer. In this method, the prices of bar iron and Bohea 
tea are compared in the staple ports of Gothenburg and Guangzhou 
with respect to the currency rate between Swedish silver daler and 
Chinese taels. The method implies that the role of the SOIC was 
limited to transporting the items involved, adding transport labor 
costs and profits to the selling prices, but not really altering the 
price relation between the commodities. Instead of dividing the 
extra labor of the journey and the resulting price increase equally 
between the two commodities, transport and higher prices are cut 
out of the operation. Hence, the currency rate is very important in 
determining the price relation between the commodities. Besides 
data on the embodied land and labor of the commodities involved, 
the staple port method requires data on the prices of the commodi-
ties in the staple ports – bar iron in Gothenburg and Bohea tea in 
Guangzhou – as well as the currency rate between Swedish silver 
dalers and Chinese taels.
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Results: exchange of time and space
A compilation of all the data is reported in the last section (p. 206), and 
the results of the quantitative estimations are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Embodied land and labor in eighteenth century Chinese Bohea tea 
and Swedish bar iron.
I.i: Embodied land in tea: 3.1 (2.9–3.3) hectares/ton.
I.ii:  Embodied labor in the production and transportation to Guangzhou of 
tea: 1,432 (1,377–1,487) working days per ton.
II.i:  Embodied land in bar iron: 41 (37.4–46.9) hectares (mid-century), 38 
(34.3–42.7) hectares (late century) per ton.
II.ii: Embodied labor in the production and transportation to Gothenburg of 
bar iron: 163 (141–184) working days per ton.
Time-space appropriation, as defined previously, requires a compar-
ison of land and labor content per price unit. The annual hectare 
yield and days of labor embodied in 1,000 silver dalers’ worth of 
Swedish bar iron are calculated in Table 2, and for Chinese Bohea 
tea in Table 3. They indicate that there was an extraordinary net 
transfer of land from Sweden to China, while the net transfer of 
labor went in the same direction, but not at all to the same extent. 
According to Table 4, the ratio for land exchange is between 130:1 
and 161:1, i.e. the land transfer per price unit was more than 100 
times greater from Sweden to China than in the opposite direction. 
The ratio for labor exchange is between 1.23:1 and 1.40:1. Thus, 
the transfer of labor per price unit is measured to be circa 23–40 
per cent greater eastwards than westwards.
Table 2. Embodied land and labor of Swedish bar iron. 
Year Price per ton Amount for Embodied land Embodied labor
 (silver daler:öre) 1,000 silver daler  of 1,000 silver daler of 1,000 silver daler
  (ton) (hectares) (working days)
1743 100:13 9.96 408 (373–467)  1,623 (1,404–1,833)
1748 113:25 8.79 360 (329–412) 1,433 (1,239–1,617)
1770 158:9 6.31  240 (216–269)  1,030 (890–1,161)
1772 185:– 5.41 206 (186–231)     881 (763–995)
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Table 3. Embodied land and labor of Chinese Bohea tea. 
Table 4. Exchange ratio of land and labor per price unit for Swedish bar iron 
and Chinese tea.
Year Embodied land Embodied labor
 bar iron:tea  bar iron:tea
1743 148:1 1.28:1
1748 161:1 1.38:1
1770 151:1 1.40:1
1772 130:1 1.23:1
According to Table 4, the amount of both time and space appropria-
tion is greatest in 1748 and 1770. In the first case, this is because 
of high Chinese prices and a currency exchange rate that favored 
China. In the 1770s, it is the combined effect of inflation in  Sweden 
and deflation in China that causes the considerable differences 
between 1770 and 1772. In 1772, tea prices were among the lowest 
in  Glamann’s (1960) table covering 1732 to 1772.
These results clearly suggest that the eighteenth-century trade 
between Sweden and China was characterized by ecologically un equal 
exchange, as measured by TSA. The quantitative part of the hypo-
thesis, defined as 
RW = (I.i < I.ii) ^ ( I.ii < II.ii)
with a price unit equal to 1,000 silver dalers, can be expressed as 
RW = (2.75 < 408) ^ (1,271 < 1,623)
for the year 1743 and is thus verified with an immense margin for 
land and a slight margin for labor. The results for 1748, 1770 and 
Year Price per ton  Amount for Amount for Embodied land Embodied labor
 (taels) 1,000 taels  1,000 silver daler  of 1,000 silver daler of 1,000 silver daler
  (ton) (ton) (hectares) (working days)   
1743 234.6 4.26  0.8875  2.75 (2.57–2.93) 1,271 (1,222–1,320)
1748 247.2 4.05 0.723 2.24 (2.10–2.39) 1,036 (996–1,075)
1770 234.6 4.26  0.513 1.59 (1.49–1.69)     735 (707–763) 
1772 226.2 4.42 0.502 1.58 (1.46–1.66)    719 (692–747)
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1772 reveal a congruent pattern. The measures for labor in Sweden 
and China could be defined as roughly the same, thus confirming 
the Pomeranz-inspired KP scenario for labor but not for land, where 
the difference is vast and robust. The RW hypothesis can be regarded 
as further strengthened by the reasonable assumption that Swedish 
bar iron embodied more “dead” labor in the form of greater capital 
stocks than Chinese tea. Had the resulting higher labor productivity 
been included in the calculation, the calculated net transfer of labor 
from Sweden to China would have been greater.
These results do not fit the Frankian AGF hypothesis for labor, 
since it predicted higher input per price unit for the Chinese export 
commodities than for the Swedish. For land, it predicted higher 
input in European export commodities, similar to the RW-thesis. 
This was also very much the case. If the assumed higher Chinese 
land productivity had been quantified and included in the study, 
the difference in land input would, however, have been less striking.
Even though no far-reaching inferences can be drawn from 
this study on the divergent opinions of Pomeranz and Frank 
regarding wages and land pressure in Europe and China, I can 
at least conclude that the results do not support Frank’s claim 
that wages were lower in China, and they do fit into Pomeranz’ 
view of roughly similar wages. On the other hand, the results do 
not support Pomeranz’ assertion that land pressure was roughly 
equal in Europe and China. They indicate greater land pressure 
in China since vastly more land could be invested in the export 
commodities from Europe.
Regarding the qualitative part of the hypothesis of this essay – 
“In the early modern world system, China was in a more central 
structural position than western Europe” – the results point to a 
confirmation since the quantitative part – “and thus net receiver of 
embodied land and labor in the SOIC’s eighteenth century trade 
between Sweden and China” – is verified. However, whether or 
not the net transfer of land and labor is indeed an expression of 
structural position within the world system cannot be settled by 
quantitative methods: it remains a point of analytical persuasion. 
The arguments for such an understanding were thoroughly dis-
cussed above.
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Taking into account the (semi-)peripherality of both Sweden 
and tea-producing Fujian to the interregional cores, plus Sweden’s 
access to subsidized Spanish-American silver and the clear results 
in this case study; taken all together it at least suggests that the 
early modern Western European nations were peripheral to the 
world system core of China. The results thus support Frank’s view 
of a Sinocentric world system rather than Pomeranz’ view of a 
polycentric one.
Developing time-space appropriation
Time-space appropriation is quite a novel and undeveloped meth-
od, but with the potential to be a sophisticated indicator of eco-
logically unequal exchange in the past. I have briefly discussed 
some methodological concerns, such as how to account for the 
past (“dead”) labor put into the capital used in the production 
of the selected commodities; where to draw the line for which 
land- and labor-requiring activities to include in the production 
of the selected commodities, including the reproduction of the 
labor force; how to value abiotic resources harvested only once; 
and the lack of a common unit for land and labor which is poten-
tially obstructive to unequivocal results.14 The discussions of TSA 
as a relevant measure of core/periphery status in the world system 
and the methodological choice of the staple port method were 
more detailed. Without any doubt, all these concerns or problems 
could be developed further, as could the theoretical foundations 
discussed in the first part of the chapter. My conclusion is that it 
would be worthwhile to do so, since the advantages of the method, 
on balance, seem greater than the drawbacks.
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Empirical accounting in detail: 
Approximate values and their relation 
Points in time 
The initial ambition was to be able to calculate the time-space approp-
riation for this case of Swedish–Chinese exchange as early as possible 
after the foundation of the SOIC in 1732. The reason is that the 
early modern period is the focus of this chapter; it ended about 1800 
but many Asian economies started to show signs of decline as early 
as in the mid-eighteenth century (Frank 1998: 264). However the 
determining factor, it turned out, was access to the necessary data. 
To calculate the time-space appropriation in this case, we need data 
about the embodied land and labor of Swedish bar iron and Bohea 
tea, their prices in Gothenburg and Guangzhou, and the exchange 
rate between the Swedish silver daler and the Chinese tael. Access 
to this data is patchy and insecure, as will be shown below. The final 
approximations are rough, but I still deem them solid enough to 
provide an interesting result. 
The point in time when the most data are simultaneously avail-
able is the early 1770s. We have access to market price scales in 
Sweden for all of the 1770s, and Guangzhou tea prices for 1770 
and 1772. I was also able to conduct calculations for two years in 
the 1740s. There was a fast depreciation of the Swedish currency 
during this decade. In 1743, the silver daler was at a peak in rela-
tion to the tael, with a ratio of 4.8:1. Five years later the tael was 
almost one silver daler more expensive. We have access to Guang-
zhou tea prices for the 1740s as well as market price scales for bar 
iron in Värmland. However, there are no observations permitting 
an adjusted estimation of the transportation costs of bar iron from 
Värmland to Gothenburg. I will therefore also use an estimation 
of transportation cost from the 1770s for the 1740s. It biases the 
study only marginally since the transportation cost is only a small 
part of the total cost. 
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Swedish bar iron: embodied land
The land embodied in iron is not derived from the area used for the 
mine, which would be minimal, but from the forest area needed 
to grow the timber used for the charcoal and the “mine timber” 
necessary for production. The only estimate obtained of mine tim-
ber consumption – 15 cubic meters per ton of iron – concerns the 
mid-seventeenth century (Sundberg et al. 1995), but I assume it 
also to be valid also for the eighteenth century. Estimates of the 
charcoal needed in the foundry and at the trip hammer for the 
production of one ton of bar iron vary between 50 and 52.5 cubic 
meters early in the eighteenth century, and 40 to 44.5 at the end of 
the century (Arpi 1951: 92–93; Hildebrand 1987: 77).15 Accord-
ing to Arpi (1951: 110), to produce one volume unit of charcoal 
required 1.2 units of fresh wood, while Nordström (1952: 33), uses 
a ratio of 1.57 cubic meters of wood per cubic meter of charcoal, to 
“maximize the safety margin”, and Sundberg et al. use a 1:1 volume 
ratio. I will stick to Arpi’s better-founded ratio, which is close to the 
mean value of the other two estimates and implies that the amount 
of fresh wood needed to produce the required amount of charcoal 
is between 60 and 63 cubic meters early in the century, and 48 to 
53.4 at the end of the century. 
The sustainable yield of Swedish forests in the eighteenth century 
varied with climate and forestry practices, and approximations in 
the literature are few. After comparing sources, Arpi (1951: 214) 
arrives at the estimation that the average forest growth in the iron- 
producing area of Sweden in 1830 was between 1.5 and 2.0 cubic 
meters per hectare of forest land. He uses the median figure, 1.75, 
for his calculations. Since productivity was probably somewhat lower 
in the eighteenth century, a marginal 5 per cent reduction of Arpi’s 
figures leads to a productivity between 1.42 and 1.9 cubic meters. 
This is also close to Nordström’s (1952: 33) assumption of a growth 
rate of 1.5 cubic meters per hectare in the eighteenth century.16 This 
uncertainty, however, widens the span of probabilities. 
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Table 5. Estimates of fresh wood and land requirements for production of 
Swedish bar iron.
Thus, all in all, some 44 hectares of forest land were needed to pro-
duce one ton of bar iron in the mid-eighteenth century, decreasing 
to 41 hectares at the end of the century. 
Swedish bar iron: embodied labor 
To produce iron, labor was put into logging, charcoal-making, and 
the transport of wood and coal to the trip hammer; into the often 
long transport of iron from the trip hammer to the staple port; into 
manual work at the production sites (smiths, melters, fire- watchers 
etc.), as well as into administration (scribes, clerks etc.). None of 
the three studies referred to below reports all of these kinds of labor 
input, and therefore I will have to use different sections from dif-
ferent studies to complete the puzzle.
In 1762, 332 persons were on the payroll for the iron works Horn-
dals bruk in Dalarna, but this figure corresponded to only about 
100 full-time employees (Hildebrand 1987: 89). The consensual 
opinion (Boëthius 1951: 414; Essemyr 1989: 73, Montelius 1962: 
245) is that a year in Sweden at the time consisted of 300 working 
days, which for Horndal gives us 30,000 working days to produce 
between 200 and 250 tons of bar iron per year in the second half of 
the eighteenth century (Hildebrand 1987: 89). Using the mean figure, 
225 tons, every ton of bar iron from Horndal in 1762 would thus 
have embodied 133 working days. However, parts of the production 
process are missing, such as administration and management, as well 
as the mining of the ore. In a similar study on the Säfsnäs agglom-
erate of iron works in Dalarna, mining is included and assessed at 
5–6 per cent of the total labor input in bar iron (Montelius 1962: 
 Mine timber  For charcoal  Total  Forest land
 (m3/ton) (m3/ton) (m3/ton) (hectares/ton)
Early 18th (≈1700–1732) 15 60–63 75–78 47.2 (39.5–54.9)
Mid 18th  (≈1733–1765)    43.9 (36.3–51.5)a
Late 18th  (≈1766–1799) 15 48–53.4 63–68.4  40.6 (33.1–48.2)
Sources: Arpi 1951; Hildebrand 1987; Sundberg et al. 1995.
a Mean values of Early and Late eighteenth century estimates.
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288). If we suppose that the same relation was true in Horndals 
bruk in 1762, the total number of working days embodied in one 
ton of bar iron rises to 140 (126–159) days.17 
Mats Essemyr (1989) lists the people working at the iron works 
at Forsmark in northern Uppland in the year 1765. His thorough 
presentation also includes administration and management – even 
the priest and the parish clerk. If we exclude them,18 114 persons 
were employed in the industry (Essemyr 1989: 46), which, if they 
worked 300 days a year, corresponds to 34,200 working days. The 
production of this industry in 1765 was 3,042 ship pounds “mine 
weight”, or 455 tons (Essemyr 1989: 73, 195). This would mean that 
the embodied labor of each ton of bar iron at Forsmark amounted to 
75.2 working days. This excludes the labor required for the mining 
of the ore and only includes a minor part of the production of the 
charcoal needed. It probably also excludes a large part of the trans-
port work needed. Adding the estimated 6–9 working days needed 
for mining the ore used produce one ton of bar iron in Säfsnäs, the 
number rises to 82.5 (81.2–84.2) working days per ton. Most of the 
charcoal needed was produced by the surrounding farmers (Essemyr 
1989: 45). By estimating the total input of labor needed to produce 
the charcoal and fresh wood, and subtracting the working days put 
in by Forsmark employees, the labor input of farmers, including 
transportation to the mine and iron works, adds over 30,000 working 
days a year or 67.3 working days per ton of bar iron.
Commonly, peasants from the surrounding area also carried 
out most of the transportation work. According to Essemyr’s list, 
nine drivers and three boatswains were employed by the industry, 
 capable of 3,600 working days or about 5.3 per cent of the labor 
time calculated so far. In the other studies, transport (excluding 
transport of charcoal) amounted to 19 per cent in Horndal 1762, 
and 32 per cent in the more remotely situated Säfsnäs in 1768 
(Montelius 1962: 288). Even though the location of Forsmark, 
about 30 kilometers from the Dannemora mine and close to the 
Baltic sea, certainly lowered the need of transport work compared 
to the inland iron works, it seems very doubtful that only 5.3 per 
cent of the total labor input would have been used for transport. A 
conservative guess is to at least triple the amount of total transport 
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work to 10,800  working days. This adds another 15.8 working days 
per ton of bar iron bought from farmers and puts transport at about 
14 per cent of the total labor input at Forsmark. All in all, one ton 
of its bar iron thus embodied 166 working days. 
From Forsmark we can now derive the factors missing for Horndal; 
i.e. administration and mine timber. In Forsmark, the administra-
tion consisted of 6 employees, equalling 4.0 working days per ton 
of bar iron, and labor input in mine timber was 6.8 working days 
per ton. When added to the earlier calculation based on Horndal’s 
iron works in 1762, the total number of working days embodied in 
one ton of its bar iron rises to 151 days. We now have at least two 
fairly detailed estimations of embodied labor in Swedish eighteenth 
century iron: 151 (137–170) working days per ton of bar iron in 
Horndal in 1762, and 166 in Forsmark in 1765. As a conservative 
estimate, in further calculations I will use the mean of the two earlier 
estimates, which is 158.5 (137–18019).
For this study, it is, however, justifiable to further increase the input 
of transport labor. The reason is that the Swedish East India Company 
sailed from Gothenburg, which is further away from the iron-producing 
sites than, for example, Stockholm. The iron traded in Gothenburg 
regularly came from industries in Värmland, and was first transported 
to Karlstad or Kristinehamn on Lake Vänern, and thereafter shipped 
to Vänersborg on the southern shore of the lake. Until the Trollhättan 
Canal was opened in 1800, further land transport was necessary from 
Korseberg near Vänersborg to Åkerström south of Trollhättan, from 
whence the river Göta älv was navigable to Gothenburg. The cost of 
getting the bar iron from Kristinehamn to Gothenburg “was widely 
greater than a simple trip on Mälaren” to Stockholm, according to 
Hildebrand. One calculation from the 1770s reports that it cost almost 
3 copper dalers to freight one ship pound of iron from Korseberg to 
Åkerström, but only 21 öre (about one fifth of the cost) to send it by 
boat from Åkerström to  Gothenburg (Hildebrand 1957: 334–337). 
Additionally, the iron works in Värmland had a longer than average 
journey to the staple ports. The bar iron from the large-scale industry 
in Uddeholm, for example, had to be trans-shipped from rowing boats 
to horsedrawn carts and back to rowing boats eight times before even 
reaching Karlstad (Hildebrand 1957: 339).
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When adding an estimate of the transport labor input for bar 
iron in Gothenburg, it therefore seems most reasonable to use the 
estimation of transport used for the remote Säfsnäs (which also de 
facto delivered iron bars to Gothenburg). At Säfsnäs, the transport of 
bar iron constituted 9 per cent of the labor input of the iron ore in 
1768, according to Montelius (1962: 288), while mining  constituted 
6 per cent. Above, we estimated mining to  contribute 7.3 working 
days per ton of bar iron, which would mean that transport of bar 
iron amounted to 11.0 working days per ton. From Horndal’s iron 
works in the middle of the iron-producing region of Sweden, still 
inland but not as remote as Säfsnäs, the transport of bar iron in 
1762 required 6.8 working days per ton of bar iron20 (Montelius, 
Utterström & Söderlund 1959: 218), i.e. 4.2 working days fewer 
than for Säfsnäs. An additional 4.2 working days per ton of bar 
iron therefore seems reasonable, if conservative, in this particular 
case. To sum up, one ton of eighteenth-century Swedish bar iron 
transported to Gothenburg would have  embodied about 41 hectares 
of land and 163 (141–184) working days. This labor assessment is 
based on studies of the 1760s, and I will assume that the figure is 
valid both for the middle and the late eighteenth century.
Chinese Bohea tea: embodied land 
The most preferred tea from the Swedish East India Company – as 
well as from the other European Companies – was Bohea black 
tea, originating from the Bohea, or Wuyi, mountains in the north-
west of the province of Fujian. This tea undergoes several stages 
of production. After being picked, the leaves are spread in thin 
layers that allow a current of warm air to circulate around them 
for roughly twenty-four hours. The withered leaves are rolled in 
order to break down the cell walls and release their oils, and are 
then sorted according to size and condition into various classes 
of tea. Next comes fermentation, in which the leaves are spread 
out and exposed to very humid and temperate air for one to three 
hours. The leaves are finally dried in hot air (Stella 1992: 39–40). 
The assessment of the embodied land of eighteenth-century Bohea 
tea will be divided into three parts; first, the actual land needed for 
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cultivation of the tea bushes; second, the land needed to provide 
the firewood used for processing the leaves into dried tea; and third, 
the land needed to provide the manure or other types of fertilizers 
used in cultivation. 
I have not been able to find any literature referring to original 
sources on the hectare yield of Bohea tea in the eighteenth centu-
ry. There are, however, sources on and estimates of the yield in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.21 Robert Gardella, 
in Harvesting Mountains, refers to conservative estimates, based on 
both English and Chinese sources, of an average tea yield per acre 
in Fujian in 1887 and 1941 of around 400 pounds in both cases 
(Gardella 1994: 118). Even though not explicitly stated by Gardella, 
the land productivity of Fujian tea-farming does not seem to differ 
substantially between the eighteenth and the late nineteenth or early 
twentieth centuries. I will therefore assume that an average yield of 
400 pounds, or 181.4 kilograms, of dried tea per acre is also valid 
for the eighteenth century. One ton of tea thus required 5.5 acres 
– 2.24 hectares – of tea plantation. 
The production of tea also required fuel for heating, for which 
mainly firewood was used. I have come across no historical data or 
assessment on the amount of fuel needed to produce any specific 
amount of tea. The closest I came is an article reviewing the energy 
consumption of Chinese tea production in the 1980s, which also 
gives a figure for 1949 (Ni & Zhou 1992). Accordingly, the 1949 
Chinese output of 46,000 tons of tea required 93,700 tons of CE 
(Coal Equivalent: 2.93 GJ/ton), or 2.04 tons of CE per ton of tea. 
According to Ni and Zhou, the processing of black tea of the Bohea 
type requires less energy then green teas. While the processing of one 
kilogram of green tea consumes on average 2.04 kg of CE, black tea 
only requires, on average, 1.27 kg. If we assume that energy efficien-
cy improvements between 1949 and 1980 were the same for black 
tea as for the total tea production, then the energy consumption for 
one ton of black tea in 1949 was 1.40 tons of CE. That corresponds 
to circa 2.45 tons of firewood. This can be compared to the claim 
that “in some mountain areas in Zhejian Province, the villagers 
still cut 4 tons of firewood for making one ton of tea” (Ni & Zhou 
1992). In the same paragraph, it is stated that “in Yingshan County, 
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Hubei Province, 9,000 tons of firewood are needed every year for 
tea  baking, equalling an annual productivity of 36,000 mu (5,929 
acres) of  forest”, which implies that one acre of Hubei forest annually 
produces 1.52 tons of firewood. That would imply that the 2.45 to 4 
tons of firewood estimated for the production of one ton of black tea 
required the annual firewood yield from 1.61 to 2.63 acres of forest.
Turning to fertilizers, Rawski (1972) covers, among other things, 
the peasant economy during late Ming and early Qing China in 
the Chien-ning prefecture in northwest Fujian, of which the Wuyi 
mountains form a part. In the early seventeenth century, gazetteers 
in Chien-ning recommended the use of ash from firewood and 
other plants to enrich the soil (Rawski 1972: 82). There were no 
significant changes in the use of fertilizers for a very long time; even 
in the twentieth century, one third of the fields in northwest Fujian 
were not fertilized at all. Rawski’s conclusion is that Chien-ning’s 
agriculture remained backward (Rawski 1972: 96). In the light of 
this general description, it seems that the manure from humans and 
animals at the farm and the ash from the quite large amounts of fire-
wood used in tea baking would have been the bulk of the fertilizers 
used in eighteenth-century Wuyi tea production. If so, no further 
embodied land needs to be added to the production of Bohea tea. 
To summarize, I have estimated that in order to produce one ton 
of black tea in eighteenth-century Fujian, 5.5 acres of tea planta-
tion were needed. In order to process the tea leaves into dried tea, 
the firewood yielded by 1.61–2.63 acres of forest land was needed. 
Using the mean figure, the embodied land of one ton of tea was 
7.62 (7.11–8.13) acres, equal to 3.08 (2.88–3.29) hectares.
Chinese Bohea tea: embodied labor
The most precise and solid figure that I have come across for labor 
in Chinese tea production is mentioned in the classic work of J.E. 
Buck, Land Utilization in China, and refers to a massive study of 
thousands of Chinese farms between 1929 and 1932. In his Table 
14. “Man labor requirements (number of days per crop acre) for 
growing various crops” the figure mentioned for tea is 126 (Buck 
1964: 302). I consider this data to be applicable also to eighteenth 
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century conditions, since no major changes in productivity are 
reported to have occurred in tea farming between the eighteenth and 
the early twentieth centuries. However, it is not clear exactly what 
“tea” means in Buck’s table. My assumption is that he is referring to 
crude tea output including all manual work at the farm – planting, 
fertilizing, picking, baking etc. – while it seems reasonable to exclude 
the logging of the firewood needed. Since this is quite a marginal 
part of the embodied labor of tea, I have allowed myself to use a 
figure from Sweden. Previously, it was concluded that the logging 
and transportation of wood in seventeenth-century Sweden required 
circa 0.5 working days per cubic meter of wood, and I will apply 
the same figure for China.22 Above, I have claimed that 4 tons of 
firewood were consumed per ton of tea, which adds 2 working days 
per ton of tea. For the 400 pounds of tea produced on each acre, 
the addition of embodied labor for the logging and transportation 
of firewood amounts to only 0.36 working days.
Additional labor was of course required to produce dried tea from 
crude tea. I have seen no data, but some valuable clues about labor 
requirements for the processing of tea do exist. In Gardella (1994: 
154), the total employment in China’s tea industry in 1935 is esti-
mated. Tea farmers and tea pickers/crude processors out numbered 
fine processors, tea manufactories’ employees and merchants by 
9 to 1. This implies that the bulk of the labor embodied in tea is 
put in on the farms. However, these figures can hardly be seen as 
an exact proportion of labor input, since many of the farmers and 
farm workers were not occupied full-time with tea, while processors 
and merchants probably were to a higher degree. Another indica-
tion is found in Table 21 in Gardella (1994), which deconstructs 
production costs of Qinmen black tea in 1935. Here, crude tea 
represents almost two-thirds of the production cost of tea, while 
processing and packing represent a little more than 20 per cent of 
the cost. Transportation is 5 per cent and tax, profit and interest on 
capital constitutes 9 per cent (Gardella 1994: 159). The distribu-
tion of costs between crude tea and packed, dried tea is thus 75 to 
25 per cent. If we assume that the figures for Qinmen black tea in 
1935 are valid for eighteenth-century Fujian tea, and if we assume 
that the salaries of farm workers and processing workers were the 
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same, we have to add 44.4 working days to the 126 working days, 
to reach a total of 168.4 working days for the yield of one acre, i.e. 
400 pounds of tea. Measured per ton of tea, processing and packing 
took 245 working days.
The British botanist and East India Company advisor on tea Robert 
Fortune travelled through the tea districts of China in the 1840s, 
and tried to estimate the cost of transporting the tea from the Wuyi 
mountains to Guangzhou and Shanghai.23 According to his report, 
crude tea was bought by merchants at the mountain farms and most 
of it was brought to the city of Tsong-gan-hien for final processing. 
There, finished tea was bought from the merchants of Guangzhou 
and Shanghai connected to the interregional and international trade. 
The tea route from Tsong-gan-hien started with coolies carrying two 
chests of tea on their shoulders for five to six days northwards to 
a riverside at Hokow. There, the tea chests were loaded into boats. 
If intended for the Guangzhou market, they proceeded down the 
river westwards to the lake Poyang. When describing the rest of the 
route, Fortune refers to another nineteenth-century representative 
of the British East India Company, Samuel Ball. According to Ball, 
the tea chests were
conducted to the towns of Nan-chang-foo and Kanchew-foo, 
and they suffer many transshipments on their way to the pass of 
 Ta-moey-ling. … At this pass the teas are again carried by porters; 
the journey occupies one day, when they are re-shipped in large 
vessels, which convey them to Canton. The time occupied in the 
entire transport from the Bohea country to Canton is about six 
weeks or two months (quoted in Fortune 1853: 224).
Ball stated that the overland route “accounted for more than one 
third of the total transport cost, which was itself equal to one third 
of the initial cost of the tea at the point of origin” (quoted in Rawski 
1972: 60). Ball’s figure of six weeks to two months is a vague estimate 
but the only one I have come across. I will proceed by assuming that 
seven weeks was the normal time for the journey. 
The labor input in the distance travelled on land – six to seven 
days according to Fortune and Ball – is the easiest part to calculate. 
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According to Gardella (1994: 158), one chest of tea contained 0.54–
0.62 piculs.24 One picul equals circa 133 pounds (Gardella 1994, 
6) which means that the contents of one chest are 72–82 pounds 
of tea. Two chests carried by one coolie implies that it would have 
taken about five (4.9–5.6) coolies to carry the annual crop of one 
acre (400 pounds). If this was done in six to seven days, the labor 
input amounts to 29–39 working days per 400 pounds.
After being carried for 6–7 days, and assuming a total transport 
time of seven weeks, 42–43 days of water transport remained until 
the tea reached Guangzhou. How much work did this add? In 
 Fortune’s study of the cost of taking the tea from Tsong-gan-hien 
to Shanghai, a journey he estimates at 28 days (of which 4 are spent 
waiting without any cost attributed), he reported that the cost per 
chest for one day of land transport is 133 cash, while transport 
on water cost 33–38 cash (“cash” here is a monetary unit, and the 
cost varied slightly on the different parts of the route). This cost 
difference hardly mirrors the difference of labor input exactly, since 
shipping is more capital intensive and perhaps was also better paid 
than carrying and therefore might have cost more per hour of labor. 
However, I will use the cost difference as a rough estimate of the 
difference in the labor input of land and water transport. I assume 
that the labor input on water is one fourth of the labor input on 
land (133/4=33.25), and that the transportation of 400 pounds of 
tea on water requires 1.2–1.4 working days per day (4.9–5.6/4). For 
the normal 42–43 days on water, the sum would be 50–60 work-
ing days. Adding the land transport, the total labor input for the 
transport of 400 pounds of tea from Tsong-gan-hien to Guangzhou 
would be between 79 and 99 working days. 
To conclude this section, the production of 400 pounds of crude 
tea – the average yield of one acre of tea plantation – required 126 
days of labor. The processing and packing required an extra 44.4 
working days. The embodied labor of the firewood needed was 
 marginal, assessed at 0.36 working days. The transport of the tea from 
Tsong-gan-hien to Guangzhou adds up to between 79–99 working 
days. Converted, the estimated labor input per ton of Bohea black 
tea transported to Guangzhou is shown in Table 6.
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Table 6. Embodied labor in Bohea tea in Guangzhou.
Activity Working days/ton
Crude tea  695
Firewood 2
Processing and packing 245
Transport to Guangzhou  435–545
Total 1,377–1,487 (mean: 1,432)
Prices of bar iron in Gothenburg
There are several sources for the prices of Swedish bar iron during the 
eighteenth century, but no continuous source on prices specifically 
in Gothenburg (cf. Boëthius & Kromnow 1947: 37). Therefore, I 
use the market scale prices collected for bar iron from Värmland, 
the major iron-producing region closest to Gothenburg, and add 
a reasonable transport cost. According to Jörberg (1972: 572), the 
bar iron prices per ship pound (149.6 kg) in Värmland were 13 sil-
ver dalers in 1743 and 15 silver dalers in 1748. In 1770, the price 
had risen to 21:21 in 1770, in 1772 to 25:21,25 a more inflationary 
trend than expected.26
A calculation from the Björneborg iron works in the 1780s stated 
the freight cost of one ship pound over lake Vänern from Kristinehamn 
in Värmland to Vänersborg at 31/3 or 6 2/3 shillings depending on sea-
son.27 In the early 1770s, another calculation stated that the total cost 
of freighting one ship pound from Vänersborg to Gothenburg was 
4 copper dalers and 26 öre (Hildebrand 1957: 336). Since the prices 
were quite stable in the 1770s and 1780s, without major inflationary 
tendencies, I will add both these costs in order to get a rough total for 
the transportation costs from Värmland to Gothenburg. 
The 31/3 shillings for the trip over Lake Vänern amounts to 13 
öre according to the pre-1777 monetary system. Adding the cost 
from Vänersborg to Gothenburg means that the total freight from 
Värmland to Gothenburg adds up to 2 silver dalers 2/3 öre per ship 
pound. This figure should be reasonably valid at least for the time 
between the instabilities of the 1760s and the inflation in the late 
1790s. Adding the transport cost gives us the estimated Gothenburg 
prices of bar iron as stated in Table 7 below:
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Table 7. Estimated prices of bar iron in Gothenburg (silver daler:öre).
Year  Per ship pounda  Per ton 
1743  15:2/3   100:13
1748  17:2/3   113:25
1770  23:212/3   158:9
1772  27:212/3   185:–
a of 149.6 kg.
Sources: Jörberg 1972: 571–572; calculations by Warlenius.
Prices of Bohea tea in Guangzhou
No exact information has been found on how much the Swedish 
East India Company paid for Bohea tea in Guangzhou. There is, 
however, some sparse data. Colin Campbell, the supercargo of the 
first Swedish vessel sailing to China, writes in his diary that he 
bought Bohea tea for 13 taels per picul and green tea for 10 taels 
(Johansson 1992: 59). Kjellberg (1974: 217) has found one contract 
drawn up between the supercargo Jean Abraham Grill and Cantonese 
merchants in 1767. The price was set at 15.5 taels per picul. There 
are, however, better sources for the prices paid by the contemporary 
Danish Asiatic Company, and there is no reason to assume that 
the Swedes would not have paid about the same. Glamann (1960: 
131–133) has compiled a table of median prices of Chinese Bohea 
tea in Guangzhou for the years 1734–72. It reveals that after fluctu-
ating prices during the first years of trade, there was a continuous 
increase in tea prices until 1754, when a sharp fall occurred and low 
prices prevailed until an increase in 1759, followed by high prices 
in the first part of the 1760s. The last years of the period show a 
fall in prices. Glamann’s table has one column for median prices 
(taels per picul) for each ship loaded, which could be more than 
one per year, and another for the range of prices (taels per picul) 
paid for the loadings – one shipload could consist of tea delivered 
under slightly different business conditions. I use only the median 
price in Glamann’s Table 6.2, and only data for the years where iron 
prices in Gothenburg could be assessed. For 1743 there is no data, 
but the median price in 1742 was 15 taels per picul, and in 1744, 
13 taels per picul, so I use the mean value of 14 taels per picul. For 
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1748, there are figures for two shiploads at 14.7 and 14.8 taels per 
picul. Again, I use the mean value.
Table 8. Median prices of Chinese Bohea tea in Guangzhou (taels).
Year  Per picula  Per ton 
1743  14.0  234.6
1748  14.75  247.2
1770  14.0  234.6
1772  13.5  226.2
a of 59.68 kg. 
Source: Glamann 1960: 132–133.
Currency exchange rates 
The eighteenth-century exchange rates between Swedish silver dalers 
and Chinese taels was assessed by Edvinsson (2010) through the 
silver content of the respective coins. The exchange rate is listed in 
Table 9 for the years we are concerned with here: 
Table 9. Silver dalers per tael.
Year  Silver dalers
1743  4.8
1748  5.6
1770  8.3
1772  8.8
Source: Edvinsson 2010.
Edvinsson’s calculations are congruent with other historians’ obser-
vations, although these are patchy. According to Kjellberg, the  value 
of the tael was 4.5 silver dalers in 1743. Four years later it had risen 
to 5.4 silver dalers, and in 1777 to 8.8 silver dalers (Kjellberg 1974: 
296). According to Nyström (1883: 151), one tael was worth 1½ 
riksdalers specie equal to 9 silver dalers, which is close to Kjellberg’s 
data from 1777. In Koninckx (1980: 442), the exchange rate is 
set at “1 tael = minimum 4½ daler smt. [silver dalers]”. No date 
is mentioned, but the period analyzed in the book is 1732–1766. 
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Notes
 1 Pomeranz (2000: 4, 107) and Parthasarathi (2011: 22) reject both the received 
Eurocentric and Frank’s Sinocentric views of the early modern period, regarding 
it as a polycentric world with several cores that besides China and Western Europe 
also included Japan, India, Persia, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire.
 2 For introductions to ecological economics, see Martinez-Alier 1987 or Daly & 
Farley 2004.
 3 See the special section in Ecological Economics 41(2) (Martínez-Alier & Schandl 2002) 
as well as later, occasional articles (see Barca 2011 for a fairly recent overview), and 
the chapters in the second part of Hornborg, McNeill and Martínez-Alier 2007.
 4 My emphasis.
 5 Hornborg’s comment that “my impression is that the conventional economic dis-
course on industrialization conspires to keep such questions – and their answers – 
out of view” (Hornborg 2007: 362) is something that I can also endorse regarding 
early modern history.
 6 Similar conclusions have been made earlier, by e.g. Borgström (1965) and Pomer-
anz (2000).
 7 Another reason for redefining core/periphery status after incorporating Emmanuel 
might be his pertinent critique of the common view of peripheral production as 
“primary” and core production as more complex, requiring more skill or technol-
ogy: “[S]ugar is about as much ‘manufactured’ as soap or margarine and certainly 
more ‘manufactured’ than Scotch whisky or the great wines of France” … “Are 
there really certain products that are under a curse, so to speak; or is there, for 
certain reasons that the dogma of immobility of factors prevents us from seeing, 
a certain category of countries that, whatever they undertake and whatever they 
produce, always exchange a larger amount of their national labor for a smaller 
amount of foreign labor?” (Emmanuel 1972: xxx–xxxi).
 8 He continues by stating that unequal exchange is not the only way to transfer 
accumulated capital from peripheries to cores; plundering, in the form of under-
priced “privatizations” of state properties etc., was and still is another important 
method (Wallerstein 2004: 28), but accumulation by plunder is not considered 
in what follows.
 9 Though we should keep in mind that when we include an ecological variable in 
the measurement of core/periphery status, it is not under the assumption that 
peripheral production is necessarily more “primary”, but that the resources of the 
peripheries, like their labor, is underpriced for structural reasons and therefore 
constitutes an important loss that should be included in the equation.
 10 Nyström does not state more closely what “value” refers to. It could, for instance, 
be the purchase price in Guangzhou or the sales price in Gothenburg, but it could 
also be the customs value set by Swedish customs for the purpose of taxation.
 11 To a certain extent, this research design is a consequence of patchy access to data, 
making total figures of the exchange impossible to obtain. But the most important 
reason is that China’s early modern exchange with Europe was not about ecological 
relief. It bought almost exclusively silver from the Europeans, and even though 
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silver production actually did require vast amounts of land (Moore 2007: 125–128, 
133), land pressure was not the reason for China to import silver. There simply 
did not exist enough silver ore in China to satisfy the market, so imports were 
the only alternative. Another indication that the import of silver was not about 
ecological relief is that another precious metal could have been used as a monetary 
base for the re-monetization, if deemed necessary. China’s silver imports were not 
a necessity, but a possibility.
 12 It is presupposed that higher land pressure increases the cost of land use.
 13 Arguments for these methodological choices are given in Warlenius 2011.
 14 The possibility of converting land and labor into a common unit to get a clearer 
result in TSA analyses is discussed in Warlenius 2011. See also Hornborg 2009: 
250–251.
 15 Sundberg et al. 1995 arrive at 60 m³ of charcoal per ton of iron for the mid-eigh-
teenth century, which, assuming the same efficiency rate as Arpi and Hildebrand 
for the nineteenth century, would be within the limits mentioned.
 16 Sundberg et al assume a yearly “growth potential” of 4 cubic meters per hectare 
for the seventeenth century, but this figure does not seem to be reached through 
research in historical sources and is left unconsidered.
 17 There is no presentation of total labor time at Säfsnäs in Montelius 1962.
 18 Since no personnel conducting religious services are included in the assessment 
of Chinese tea in the next section.
 19 The upward end of the span is assumed to be as far from the mean value used as 
the lower end, although I have not found any indications of such a high figure.
 20 Transport of bar iron is said to be 9 per cent of the working days of the production 
of bar iron, and the total number of working days is 133.
 21 It is of course a problem that this and also other data from China is from the nine-
teenth or twentieth century, and it is only partly comforting that several authors 
claim that no major changes in tea production occurred until the second half of 
the twentieth century. I am aware that referring this data back to the eighteenth 
century is congruent with the Eurocentric view of a “stagnant Asia”, but when 
earlier data is lacking, I do not see any alternative.
 22 Transportation must be much longer in the more sparsely populated Sweden 
than in China, where trees were generally cultivated near the farms. According 
to Pomeranz (2000: 231) “transport costs [for fuel-wood] were minimal”. How-
ever, transport in Sweden was also fuel efficient since it was mainly carried out in 
winter time when snow reduced friction.
 23 His reason for this was to calculate the profit made by the Chinese merchants 
who arranged this transport, and to figure out whether cost cuts could be made if 
this trade was overtaken by the EIC. His conclusion, however, was that “it would 
appear that the profit upon common teas is very small, so small indeed as to make 
it a matter of doubt whether they will ever be produced at a reduced rate” (Fortune 
1853: 228).
 24 He equates 130,000 chests to 70,000–80,000 piculs.
 25 Even though not clearly stated by Jörberg, the pre-1776 prices seem to be expressed 
in the tables as silver dalers and öre with the ratio 1:32.
methods in world history
222
 26 The trend continued the following years, rising to 30 silver dalers per ship pound 
in 1775.
 27 It is not stated which season cost more, but I assume it to be the winter season.
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chapter 7
National accounts  
in world history
Methodological problems and possible solutions
Rodney Edvinsson
Did the European economy overtake that of China as early as the 
fifteenth century, or was China more advanced economically than 
most of Europe up until the early nineteenth century? To answer these 
questions, historical national accounts of all the countries and regions 
in the world must be constructed leading back to the Middle Ages. 
In the last ten years, major progress in this direction has been made 
(Broadberry & Gupta 2009; Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton & 
van Leeuwen 2010; Bassino, Broadberry, Fukao, Gupta & Takashima 
2011; Broadberry, Guan & Li 2012). The main pioneering work in 
this field was carried out by Angus Maddison (2010). In his database 
he has extended the GDP series for all countries back to the year 1 CE.
Despite the progress made, there are a number of problems 
with various estimates concerning several countries. Co-ordination 
among researchers and comparisons between countries are still not 
fully developed, and there is a lack of international standards for 
historical national accounts. Gregory Clark (2009) remarks that:
All the numbers Maddison estimates for the years before 1820 are 
fictions, as real as the relics peddled around Europe in the Middle 
Ages. Many of the numbers for the years 1820, 1870, and 1913 
are equally fictive.
Despite this, Maddison’s database has gained wide currency among 
economists analyzing economic growth. His books are among the 
most quoted among social scientists, historians and economists in 
Google Scholar. Clark continues:
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Just as in the Middle Ages, there was a ready market for holy relics 
to lend prestige to the cathedrals and shrines of Europe – Charle-
magne secured for the cathedral in Aachen, his capital, the cloak of 
the Blessed Virgin, and the swaddling cloths of the infant Jesus – so 
among modern economists there is a hunger by the credulous for 
numbers, any numbers however dubious their provenance, to lend 
support to the model of the moment. Maddison supplies that market.
Since Maddison’s death in 2010, a project has come into existence to 
update his database, but it also reproduces the problematic methods 
applied by Maddison, for example, his method to use the purchasing 
power parities of 1990 as a benchmark for all other periods. 
The main concern of national accounts is how to measure different 
aspects of the production and distribution process. In the general 
debate, the impression is often given that the value of aggregate 
production, often taken as synonymous with GDP, is unequivocal 
once you have reliable sources. Sometimes the data is taken for 
granted even if it is not based on reliable sources at all. Aggregate 
production can, however, be calculated using different methods 
and definitions, which can lead to quite divergent interpretations 
of economic development. GDP is a controversial measure from 
many points of view. There are also different methods to calculate 
GDP that can give quite different results (Inter-Secretariat Working 
Group on National Accounts 1993: 14).
The constant price fallacy
Volume or real value is a kind of constant price estimate. The effect 
of different price levels must be eliminated when volume growth or 
volume values are measured. In national accounts, this is achieved 
by making a comparison in constant prices of the production at two 
different points in time or in two countries. The nominal series is 
deflated by a price index to arrive at volume values. The difficul-
ty does not end there, since the question still remaining is which 
constant prices and index formulas to use. Various techniques to 
eliminate the inflation component result in different conclusions 
concerning economic growth and the relative standing of various 
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countries. This drawback is often glossed over by economists. Part 
of the problem is theoretical in origin. Many theories of economic 
growth, mostly of neoclassical origin, use a one-commodity model. 
In international comparisons the focus is on aggregate GDP, often 
disregarding comparison of the various components of GDP. Real 
economies, however, consist of many goods and services.
A simple example can illustrate the deflation procedure. Take 
an economy that in year 1 produces one billion tons of apples and 
in year 2 one billion barrels of oil. Has the economy experienced 
a positive, negative or zero growth rate in constant prices? This 
depends on how a barrel of oil is valued in comparison to a ton of 
apples, i.e. on the relative prices of oil versus apples. If a barrel of 
oil is valued at more than a ton of apples, the economy has experi-
enced positive growth. If a barrel of oil is valued at less than a ton 
of apples, the economy has experienced negative growth. Finally, if 
a barrel of oil and a ton of apples are valued equally, the economy 
has experienced zero growth.
A further issue is which year’s relative prices should be used. In 
the above example, assume that in year 1 a barrel of oil is worth 
more than a ton of apples, and in year 2 a barrel of oil is worth less 
than a ton of apples. In the prices of year 1 there has then been 
positive economic growth, while in the prices of year 2 there has 
been negative economic growth. The first is called a Laspeyres vol-
ume index, while the second is called a Paasche volume index (for 
both indices, the first year is here considered the base year, and the 
second the compared year). The difference between the two indices 
is often small, but can accumulate to large differences over time. 
Over longer periods, a Laspeyres volume index tends to display a 
higher growth rate than a Paasche volume index if the base year is 
earlier in time than the compared year, the so-called Gerschenkron 
effect (Jonas & Sardy 1970: 83). The Gerschenkron effect arises 
when activities whose relative prices are falling tend to increase their 
volume shares of total production and vice versa. This is what hap-
pened during the industrial revolution. Manufacturing expanded 
its volume share of GDP at the same time as the relative prices of 
manufactured goods decreased. This was due to faster increases in 
productivity than for other sectors.
methods in world history
230
If the Laspeyres volume index displays just a 0.3 per cent higher 
growth per year than the Paasche volume index, over 200 years this 
amounts to 82 per cent. Comparing the relative development of 
two countries that use different index formulas over a longer period 
of time can have huge consequences. Maddison’s database consists 
of such series, and the difficulty has been ignored or glossed over 
by many economists and social scientists who use his data. Some 
researchers have argued for the use of the geometric average of the 
two indices – a so-called Fisher price index – or equivalent formulas, 
but this has seldom been adopted in historical national accounts.
In poor countries, the prices of goods and services for domestic 
consumption are, in general, lower than in rich countries. In addition, 
exchange rates tend to fluctuate considerably. Therefore, when the 
GDP or GDP per capita of various countries are compared, Purchas-
ing Power Parities are constructed to eliminate differences in price 
levels, which is equivalent to the comparison of a country over two 
time periods. These parities are expressed in national currency units 
per United States dollar (similar to the exchange rate). The relative 
price level in one country is the ratio of the purchasing power par-
ity to the exchange rate. Even if the prices of many goods did not 
converge internationally until the nineteenth century  (O’Rourke & 
Williamson 2002), the price differences between countries today for 
many services may be as large or even larger. The problem of different 
prices is as much a problem today as it is for the reconstruction of 
historical national accounts of the preindustrial period.
A difficulty with purchasing power-adjusted GDP is that it can be 
computed in different ways. PPP-adjustment removes the difference 
in the absolute price level, but not the relative price differences. In 
addition, there are two ways to compare countries’ GDP per capita 
over time: the use of current and constant PPPs.
Current purchasing power parity entails two countries’ GDP for 
one year being compared in that year’s PPPs. This means that the 
new PPPs have to be calculated each year, and this method is very 
time-consuming.
The other method entails PPPs only being calculated for one 
year, the benchmark year. When comparisons are made for earlier 
or later years, they are based on the estimated economic growth 
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rates of the various countries. For example, assume that the GDP 
per capita of country A grows by 100 per cent between 1950 and 
1990 and of country B by 200 per cent during the same period. 
If the two countries’ GDP per capita is valued at 20,000 dollars 
in 1990’s prices and PPPs (the benchmark year), country A had a 
GDP per capita of 10,000 dollars in 1950 and country B a GDP per 
capita of 5,000 dollars in 1990’s constant PPPs. No current PPPs 
are needed for 1950 to make this calculation. This is basically the 
method applied by Angus Maddison in his comprehensive database. 
All the data back to the year 1 CE is expressed in 1990 so-called 
Geary-Khamis dollars.
There are drawbacks with both methods. Let us continue our 
example with oil and apples. Suppose that Norway’s GDP consists of 
only one billion barrels of oil, and Sweden’s of only one billion tons 
of apples. Which country has the highest purchasing power-adjusted 
GDP? It depends on the relative price of oil and apples. If a barrel 
of oil is valued at half as much as one ton of apples, Norway’s real 
GDP is half that of Sweden. However, if world oil prices increase 
significantly in relation to apples, so that a barrel of oil is valued at 
twice as much as one ton of apples, Norway has twice the real GDP 
of Sweden (here we assume one world price, but if the relative prices 
are different in Sweden and Norway, using Sweden’s or Norway’s 
prices results in different PPPs as well, as in the example of growth 
from one year to the next). This would illustrate why, for example, 
Norway’s purchasing power-adjusted GDP per capita fluctuates 
sharply from one year to another, despite the fact that Norway’s real 
GDP per capita does not display any equivalent fluctuation. The 
explanation is the high share of oil production in Norway’s GDP and 
the high volatility of the relative price of oil on the world markets. 
Using constant PPPs has the advantage that annual fluctuations 
are reduced. However, we then have another dilemma pertaining to 
long-term growth and terms of trade. Assume that between 2010 
and 2020 Norway increases its oil production by 100 per cent, 
from one billion to two billion barrels of oil, while Sweden’s pro-
duction remains stagnant at one billion tons of apples. In constant 
PPPs, Norway’s GDP has doubled compared to Sweden’s. However, 
assume that the price of apples remains the same, while the price 
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of oil declines by 75 per cent. The growth in Norway would then 
be counteracted by a decline in its terms of trade. In fact, while 
in constant PPPs Norway’s GDP would double in comparison to 
Sweden, in current PPPs it would be halved compared to Sweden’s, 
between 2010 and 2020. In the example, Norway became relative-
ly poorer since it could buy fewer apples and less oil on the world 
market than Sweden, despite experiencing faster economic growth. 
Again, the differences are usually quite small for shorter periods. For 
longer periods, which are what matters for economic historians, the 
accumulated effects could be huge.
The method of constant PPPs is primarily used in international 
economic-historical research, such as in Maddison’s database. Most 
historical reconstructions of GDP transform their figures into 1990 
Geary-Khamis dollars, to make the new series comparable with 
Maddison’s database. This entails comparisons of countries’ volume 
GDP for earlier centuries being distorted and not being the same as 
if current PPPs had been used. If a country produces a large share 
of goods and services whose relative prices fall faster than for other 
goods and services, this country shows a higher per capita growth 
than other countries if the position compared to other countries 
does not change in current purchasing power parities. In this case, 
current PPPs provide a more accurate picture of a country’s long-term 
economic development in relation to other countries, although the 
constant PPPs provide a more accurate picture of annual changes. 
The only way that Maddison’s method could work is if the terms of 
trade of all countries were unchanged for longer periods of time, an 
assumption that cannot be supported theoretically or empirically.
Against this background, Prados de la Escosura (2000) argues 
that current purchasing power parities are preferable when exam-
ining how countries’ relative positions change over time. Ward and 
Devereux (2003) show that estimates of current purchasing pow-
er parity entails the United States having had a per capita GDP 
that was well above that of the UK as early as the 1870s, while 
Maddison’s method of constant purchasing power parity implies 
that the United States did not overtake Britain until around 1900. 
Broadberry (2003) argues that there are problems with Ward’s and 
Devereux’s calculations, and maintains that both methods should 
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be used. Recently, Broadberry and Klein (2012) presented the PPPs 
for the years 1905 and 1927. Their result is that Sweden’s purchasing 
power-adjusted GDP per capita for the year 1905 is 10 per cent 
higher if 1905 year’s purchasing power parity is used instead of 1990 
international Geary-Khamis dollars.
The definitional dilemma
A great difficulty for international comparisons is that the historical 
national accounts of different countries are not based on the same 
methods and definitions. Alternative measures of production and 
volume growth are mostly ignored. Generally, historical national 
accounts attempt to follow modern national accounts. However, 
due to the constant revisions implemented by modern statistical 
offices, historical national accounts tend to use older methods and 
definitions. Some definitions of the production boundary are also 
specific to individual studies.
Certain assumptions and definitions are necessary for the recon-
struction of historical national accounts and trends for economic 
growth. One problem is taking for granted that assumptions and 
definitions are based on a fully developed market economy. For 
 example, assumptions that various assets, such as land and equipment, 
were used competitively even during the Middle Ages, can lead us 
to the wrong conclusion concerning the level of income these assets 
generate. Even today, much of production is not profit-maximizing.
One issue concerns which activities to include in aggregate pro-
duction – i.e. where to put the “production boundaries”. According 
to modern international guidelines for national accounts, a distinc-
tion is made between activities that are “productive in an economic 
sense” and those that are not. There are many inconsistencies in this 
respect when it comes to official national accounts. Many economic 
activities, mostly outside the market economy, are not included in 
the GDP – most importantly, unpaid domestic or voluntary work 
– while all goods produced for own use are to be included since a 
revision of international guidelines implemented in 1993, which is 
of particular importance for developing countries (United Nations 
et al. 2009: 99).
methods in world history
234
One issue in historical national accounts is whether manufactur-
ing in homes is to be included in the measured GDP or not. For 
some countries this has significant repercussions on the estimate of 
industrial production. Modern guidelines today entail the inclusion 
of manufacturing in homes. Internationally, historical national 
accounts often calculate the approximate scope of manufacturing 
in the 19th century by following the intermediate consumption of 
raw materials. Indirectly, that entails the inclusion of manufactur-
ing other than factory production and handicrafts (Bourguignon 
& Lévy-Leboyer 1990: 266; Grytten 2004: 249; Horlings et al. 
2000: 37–45). However, the production boundary of SNA 2008 is 
not used consistently for all countries. For example, the historical 
national accounts of Finland include manufacturing in homes for 
sale on the market, but not for own use (Hjerppe 1996: 33). In 
Swedish national accounts two different definitions have been used, 
one including manufacturing in homes (Edvinsson 2013) and one 
excluding it (Edvinsson 2005; Schön & Krantz 2012). A problem 
with Maddison’s database is that he mixes GDP data in which dif-
ferent definitions of the production boundary are applied.
One of the largest drawbacks in constructing national accounts 
is the reliance on price. This is especially problematic when valuing 
non-market production. In the agrarian societies production was 
mostly for self-use. At least during the early modern period a large 
part of it was traded. Prices exist for most goods and services. One 
important aspect with indices is that even if they have low validity, if 
they are measured consistently they may still be quite good indicators 
of economic growth and fluctuations. That is the main, although 
quite shaky, argument for using modern definitions of GDP for 
the preindustrial period as well. It is also reasonable to argue that 
it should be possible to compare production in one period to the 
level in a later period.
A major weakness is how to deal with products and services that 
are not priced, or where the pricing mechanism is distorted. These 
products and services can either be excluded or assigned a fictitious 
price tag. Historical national accounts deal with economies where 
market relations only affected a small part of production; but modern 
economies also consist of large sectors that are not priced. Although 
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the international guidelines recognize that unpaid household services 
are “productive in an economic sense”, it is argued that the “inclusion 
of large non-monetary flows of this kind in the accounts together 
with monetary flows can obscure what is happening on markets 
and reduce the analytic usefulness of the data” (Inter- Secretariat 
Working Group on National Accounts 1993: 5), and that “there are 
typically no suitable market prices that can be used to value such 
services” (Inter-Secretariat Working Group on National Accounts 
1993: 124). For historical national accounts this statement is par-
ticularly awkward, since the purpose of reconstructing a GDP series 
is to measure production rather than to provide data suitable for 
economic policy. Some researchers therefore argue that there are 
good reasons for historical national accounts to include unpaid 
household services (Jonsson 1997: 49). Especially for  earlier times 
it is difficult to apply the distinction between “paid” and “unpaid” 
labor, since most of the production was for final self-use.
Different methodologies have been developed to measure the value 
of unpaid household work by putting a price tag on it (Edvinsson 
2009). One method is to equal the value of these services to the 
labor input, utilizing the wage of paid domestic labor as an indicator. 
This method has been put into operation in The National Income of 
Sweden (Lindahl, Dahlgren & Kock 1937: 213–215) and later in 
Swedish historical national accounts (Krantz 1987: 17). However, 
doing this runs the risk of putting the wrong value on the actual 
work performed. A more appropriate method is to estimate the mar-
ket output of these services (Nyberg 1995: 22–28). This also gives 
differ ent results, depending on the indicators used. One solution may 
be to equal the value added per unpaid household working hour to 
the average value added per working hour within the market sector 
(Folbre & Wagman 1993: 285). Nevertheless, such a measure has 
little to do with how such services would actually be valued on the 
market, and it does not add any new information apart from that 
already provided by the estimates of unpaid household work in terms 
of actual working hours. The question of the labor productivity of 
unpaid household work in relation to market activities needs to be 
empirically investigated and not taken as given.
According to Anita Nyberg (1995: 25–27), the monetary  estimates 
methods in world history
236
of the value of unpaid household work in different industrialized 
countries vary between 30 and 60 per cent of GDP, which is quite 
sizable. It is likely that the proportion is even greater for earlier 
periods.
How do we measure changes in the level of production if we are 
dealing with an economy that does not know of any prices, such as 
a self-subsistence economy? Surely, it should be possible to construct 
volume indices for economic growth for such an economy as well. 
One solution is to use the relative prices of a modern economy, but 
such relative prices might be completely different from the relative 
valuations of the economy under study. Not all economies or activi-
ties are priced, but labor is the foundation of all human production.
An alternative to relative price may be to compare how much labor 
time it takes to produce two goods, i.e. to use relative labor times 
instead of relative prices to construct a volume index, accounting 
for the labor time embodied in intermediate consumption as well. 
Rickard Warlenius discusses in this book how embodied labor can 
be used to analyze flows at the international level. In studies of 
hunter-gatherer societies, where there are neither money nor prices, 
anthropologists often use the number of hours spent on different 
activities of the total worked per week to describe the economic 
structure of these societies (Cashdan 1989: 23). The labor time is 
a cost, in terms of foregone free time. Such a volume index is, in 
contrast to the usual one applied in national accounts, completely 
independent of price relations. If prices are proportional to labor 
values, then this type of volume index gives exactly the same result 
as the volume index based on relative prices. But when prices and 
labor values diverge, the labor value volume index favors activities 
that have a low value, reckoned per working hour, if it is assumed 
that labor productivity is the same as in other types of activities 
such as, for example, government and household services. It is of 
course desirable that the productivity differences between laborers 
should be considered. However, without information on price, such 
comparisons can only be made if similar types of product are consid-
ered. Table 1 presents an example of using labor productivities as an 
alternative to prices when weighting quantities produced. Imagine 
an economy A, consisting of one household (one woman and one 
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man), with a strict, gendered division of labor. The woman and 
the man each work 8 hours a day. In total there would, therefore, 
be 16 working hours per day. The woman produces 8 kilograms of 
grain, while the man produces 8 kilograms of meat. This means that 
the productivity of economy A is 1 kilogram of grain per working 
hour and 1 kilogram of meat per working hour. However, because 
of gender discrimination and due to the strict, gendered division 
of labor, women’s work is valued less than men’s. In our example, 
the price of grain is set to 1 dollar per kilogram and for meat to 2 
dollars per kilogram. This means that the total daily work of the 
woman is valued at 8 dollars, while that of the man is valued at as 
much as 16 dollars, in total 24 dollars. It is also possible to make 
this calculation if no prices are known for economy A (i.e. if there 
is complete self-sufficiency), if we apply the prices of a market econ-
omy at about the same level of development.
Imagine now that we observe another economy, B, which pro-
duces 16 kilograms of grain and 4 kilograms of meat. We may not 
know the productivity or the prices of this economy. Economy B 
may, for example, be an adjacent household or the same household 
at another period in time. To estimate the volume of production of 
economy B compared to economy A we can use the usual method 
based on constant prices. In the prices of economy A, economy B 
is valued at 20 dollars, i.e. one sixth less than the value of econo-
my A. However, calculating how many hours it would take for the 
economy A to achieve the production of economy B, we arrive at 
the figure 20 hours, which is 25 per cent longer labor time than in 
economy A. The difference arises because in the prices of economy 
A men’s work is valued more than women’s. Both indices of produc-
tion are Laspeyres volume indices, if the economy A is considered 
the base period. The Paasche volume indices, which use the prices 
and labor productivities of economy B, produce other results that 
are, however, not presented in the table.
Under perfect market conditions, if men and women were to 
produce the same amount of grain and meat per hour, then there 
would be no price difference between grain and meat. In reality, 
gender discrimination would probably come into play, preventing 
women from doing men’s work and vice versa. Furthermore, we may 
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not know the prices of economy A and B, if both were self-sufficient. 
In that case only a volume index based on labor productivity should 
be calculated, since using the prices of a third economy could be 
misleading (the possible discrimination of the third economy may 
not apply to economies A and B).
Table 1. Illustration of how to compute a volume index to compare two 
economies using prices and labor productivity respectively.
Production Productivity Price Volume 
index,  
prices of  
economy A
Volume 
index, pro-
ductivity of 
economy A
Economy A 8 kg grain 
   (women) 
8 kg meat  
   (men)
1 kg grain  
   per hour  
1 kg meat  
   per hour
1 dollar  
   per kg  
   grain 
2 dollars  
   per kg  
   meat
24 dollars 16 hours
Economy B 16 kg grain 
  4 kg meat
20 dollars 20 hours
Errors and lack of transparence
The empirical material of historical national accounts consists of both 
primary and secondary sources. These sources do not use the same 
classifications and definitions. Breaks often occur when different 
time series for the same variable but different periods are compared 
with each other. Modern standards for national accounts change 
constantly, which requires retrospective revisions (“Utredningen om 
översyn av den ekonomiska statistiken” 2002: 18–23). Such revi-
sions are made regularly by the statistical offices, but unfortunately, 
often only for an insufficient number of years, which creates new 
breaks in the series. When time series are linked with each other, 
the figures of the original time series are changed, and there is a risk 
that the linked time series will provide an inadequate picture of the 
actual values or levels.
Some of the difficulties when constructing historical national 
accounts stem from the status of doing this type of research. Often it 
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does not fit the format of journal articles, which means that writing 
extensive documentation of how data has been constructed is not 
very rewarding for individual researchers. This dilemma is shared 
with other fields of historical statistical reconstruction. Even so, 
historical national accounts often have better documentation than 
that of official statistics. One solution would be to redefine historical 
statistics as a separate academic field, and to create new academic 
journals specializing in this field. These could then also publish 
detailed documentations. 
Since historical national accounts deal with quite extensive 
quantities of material, it is almost inevitable (according to the 
laws of probability) that they should contain errors, even if much 
time has been spent on double-checking and calculating series in 
different ways. Such errors can be found in most studies dealing 
with a large amount of quantitative material, and this is further 
aggravated by the lack of documentation and transparency. For 
countries where different researchers have constructed different 
historical GDP series, these often deviate substantially from each 
other. In spite of this, the impression is often given that the esti-
mates are very accurate.
Feinstein and Thomas (2002) argue that the publication of new 
historical data should present the margin of errors in a transparent 
way. This is seldom done however, and the reader cannot gain any 
idea of how reliable various estimates are.
The users of historical national accounts must be much more 
conscious of the weaknesses and assumptions underpinning various 
series. What historical national accounts usually provide is in statis-
tical terms the expected value of various aggregates. For example, if 
there is a 40 per cent probability that the GDP per capita of Sweden 
in the year 1000 was 600 dollars and 60 per cent probability that 
it was 800 dollars, the expected value of the two numbers is 720 
dollars (0.4×600+0.6×800=720). Even if we knew that only a GDP 
per capita of 600 or 800 dollars is possible, and never a GDP per 
capita of 720 dollars, presenting the number 720 dollars minimizes 
the squared error in the estimate. The most important thing is, how-
ever, that the expected value presented is not biased. For example, if 
we know that the calculated estimate probably underestimates the 
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actual value, it is better to increase the estimate, even if it is based 
on very rough judgments.
Deciding the actual margin of error is very difficult. Instead, Fein-
stein and Thomas (2002) propose that researchers should present 
subjective margins of error for various series based on their calcula-
tion methods and assessments of the material. If the margin of error 
of an aggregate series is to be calculated we also need to estimate 
a correlation matrix of the different errors, which might also be 
based on the subjective judgments of the researcher. For example, 
the root mean square error (RMSE) of the sum of the estimates of 
A and B is calculated as:
Corr (EA , EB) is the correlation between the two errors EA  and EB 
which can range from -1 (perfect negative correlation) to +1 (perfect 
positive correlation). If there is no correlation this term is set to zero. 
The above formula shows that a correlation closer to +1 increases the 
margin of error of the sum of the two estimates. If there is no corre-
lation between the errors of the individual series, this in turn means 
that the margin of error of the sum is reduced. We can also calculate 
a coefficient of variation of the error, as the RMSE divided by the 
estimate, which can be presented as a percentage.
Assume, for example, that the estimate of the GDP of Norway 
is 100 billion dollars and of Sweden 100 billion dollars. Assume, 
furthermore, that the RMSE in both instances is 10 billion dol-
lars, which means that the coefficient of variation of the error for 
each country is 10 per cent. The estimated GDP for Norway and 
Sweden together is then 200 billion dollars. The estimated margin 
of error of this sum depends on the correlation between the two 
errors. Using the formula above, if the correlation is zero, then the 
estimated RMSE of the sum is 14 billion dollars and the coefficient 
of variation 7 per cent. If the correlation is +0.5 then the RMSE 
is 17 billion dollars and the coefficient of variation 8 per cent. If 
the correlation is +1, then the RMSE is 20 billion dollars and the 
coefficient of variation 10 per cent. Under the very unlikely cir-
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴+𝐵𝐵 = √(𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 )2 + (𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵 )2 + 2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶(𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 , 𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵 )𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵   
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cumstances that there is a perfect negative correlation, the RMSE 
of the sum would be zero.
This reasoning can be extended to the sum of many estimates. 
For example, assume that we estimate the GDP of 100 countries, 
encompassing the whole world, at 100 billion dollars each. The 
estimate of global GDP will then be 10,000 billion dollars. Assume 
that the RMSE of each individual country’s estimate is 10 billion 
dollars and the coefficient of variation 10 per cent. If the errors of 
the individual countries are perfectly correlated then the coefficient 
of variation of the error for global GDP is also 10 per cent. How-
ever, if the errors of the individual countries are not correlated with 
each other, then the coefficient of variation for the error of global 
GDP is just 1 per cent.
The point is that given that there is no perfect correlation, the 
sum is relatively more accurate than its individual components. The 
various errors partly even each other out. That is one of statistical 
theory’s important insights. Despite the problems of reconstructing 
historical national accounts for individual countries, estimates of 
global GDP might actually be more accurate than most or even all 
of the estimates individual countries. A major problem, however, 
is whether or not there is a systematic bias across countries, which 
renders the correlation of their errors close to unity. One such bias 
complicating our analysis of global GDP in the preindustrial period 
is Maddison’s assumption of a 400-dollar subsistence level.
The 400-dollar subsistence level versus a real wage
There are divergent interpretations of per capita economic growth 
in the Middle Ages and the early modern period in Western Europe, 
one, Malthusian, assuming stagnation or even decline and one, 
Smithian, assuming steady growth. While Maddison advocates 
the Smithian view, Clark (2009) criticizes Maddison’s assumptions 
of continual economic growth in the Middle Ages and the early 
modern period in Western Europe. Different indicators point in 
different directions. The real wage series supports the Malthusian 
view, while this indicator is heavily criticized by Maddison (2007). 
Historical national accounts have been used to support either one 
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or the other of the views. The quandary is that these series display 
quite different developments, despite the fact that they claim to 
measure the same variable (GDP per capita).
To reconstruct global GDP back to the Middle Ages or even earlier, 
we need data on population, the agrarian sector and the non-agrarian 
sector. All three are problematic to estimate. Maddison and others 
use outdated population data, which is further discussed by Janken 
Myrdal in this book. An important check for the agrarian sector is 
whether or not it yields reasonable estimates of the implied calorie 
consumption, but that is sometimes forgotten, and many estimates 
are too low. The non-agrarian sector is probably the most difficult 
component to calculate. An indicator that has been used, the rate 
of urbanization (Persson 2008: 170), might be inappropriate given 
that in some countries most of the non-agrarian sector was located 
in the countryside.
The Smithian viewpoint mainly rests on Maddison’s assumption 
of a 400-dollar subsistence level in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. 
This is based on the data showing that the poorest countries only 
had a GDP per capita at this level, or slightly above, in that year. In 
fact, Maddison uses that to estimate the GDP per capita for most 
countries in the year 1000 CE. As Gregory Clark (2009) puts it:
One crucial element is his assumption that the basic subsistence 
GDP per capita of all societies is $400 (1990 international prices). 
This is the fundamental constant in Maddison’s world, the basic 
unit of human existence. Any society without a sophisticated pro-
duction technology, without significant urbanization, and without 
a substantial rich class, or just where nothing is known, is assigned 
this minimum. Thus around 1000 AD the various parts of the 
world are mostly assumed to have incomes either of $400 (uncivi-
lized) or $450 (civilized)… What is that subsistence income in real 
terms? In 1990 US $ prices, a pound of white bread cost $0.70. So 
Maddison’s $400 is the equivalent of 1.6 lbs of wheaten bread per 
person per day, or 1,500 kcal. That is an extraordinarily low income, 
rarely observed in practice. Since most societies have inequality, the 
poorest in such a subsistence economy would have lived on the 
equivalent of much less than that daily 1.6 lbs of bread. So if the 
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poorest people spent nothing on clothing, heat, shelter, light, and 
consumed only the cheapest form of calories such as bread, they 
would still be engaging in hard physical labor on a diet well below 
1,500 kcal in the Maddison vision of subsistence.
Since many Western European countries had a GDP per capita of 
over 1,000 dollars in 1820, Maddison draws the conclusion that 
there was substantial growth in Western Europe during the  Middle 
Ages and the early modern period. The assumption that the subsist-
ence level was 400 dollars in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars distorts 
the comparison of Western European countries with the rest of the 
world in the early modern period and before (Jerven, 2012 and 
2013). It seems unlikely that a country like Sweden on the peri-
phery of Western Europe had a GDP per capita around 1800 that 
was twice the level of poor African countries in 1990. It is likely 
that the estimates for 1990 undervalue the actual GDP level for the 
poorest countries. For example, it should be considered that the 
new revisions of international guidelines in 1993 recommended 
the inclusion of all goods production in GDP, also the proportion 
that is only consumed by the producers themselves. Poor countries 
implementing this have revised their data upwards.
An alternative to calculating GDP is to use the income approach. 
This is applied by Gregory Clark (2010) for the English economy for 
example, by calculating the incomes derived from wages, capital and 
land retrospectively as far back as the Middle Ages. His estimate of 
English GDP per capita in the Middle Ages is set much higher than 
Maddison’s, but is also higher than the corresponding estimate for 
England based on the production approach presented by Broadberry 
et al. (2010). Clark’s series displays stagnating GDP per capita in 
England between the Middle Ages and the early nineteenth century, 
which runs counter to the views of most other economic historians. 
The main predicament when applying the income approach 
to the preindustrial period is that most of the incomes have to be 
estimated theoretically, since only a small part of the economy was 
monetized. Clark makes the assumption that the ratio of capital 
income essentially followed wages and rent values, with a correction 
for long-term changes in the profit rate; and because of the risks 
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he adds 3 per cent. It is also possible that his rent values are over-
estimated. According to him, his series “measures rental values when 
land was rented in a competitive market, not the average rents paid 
by land occupiers which would often be lower because of customary 
leases” and that the estimated rent values “are much higher before 
1820 than in the recent series of Michael Turner, John Beckett and 
Bethany Afton” (Clark 2002: 201). Altogether, this implies that his 
estimated property incomes may be overestimated. Clark (2010) 
estimates the wage share in 1200 at 47.8 per cent, which was even 
lower than its share in 1860 at 65.1 per cent.
There is a difference in estimating theoretical production values and 
incomes. For example, while estimates concerning theoretical values 
for building houses for own-use may be questionable, they are still 
based on actual production activity. However, when the contribution 
of capital or labor is included in the estimation, the researcher may 
be led astray since their contribution must first of all be measured 
in terms of how much they contribute to physical output. Estimat-
ing physical output is necessary before anything can be said about 
incomes. Even in developed countries today some of the incomes 
must be imputed as well. The category of mixed income concerns 
production units where the laborer also owns the capital. It is a sum 
of labor and property income. In a previous study, I have tried to 
estimate property income in agriculture in late twentieth-century 
Sweden (Edvinsson 2005). Since the self-employed constituted a 
large proportion of the labor force, most of the labor income must 
be calculated by using the wage rate of agricultural wage earners. 
Property income cannot be estimated directly, but only indirectly, 
as the value added less the estimated labor income. The net property 
income thus estimated was negative for the late twentieth century. 
The only conclusion that could be drawn was that both capital and 
labor in modern Swedish agriculture are paid significantly below 
their market values. In other words, not knowing physical output 
and using the income approach for Swedish agriculture in the late 
twentieth century would significantly overestimate value added if 
it was assumed that capital and labor were paid their full market 
values. Assuming market rates for the Middle Ages must be even 
more questionable.
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A variant of the income approach is the estimation of agricul-
tural production according to the so-called demand approach. For 
example, Malanima (2010) presents annual estimates for Italy back 
to 1300 and Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2011) for 
Spain back to 1270, using the approach for agricultural output, 
while other activities are approximated from the rate of urbanization. 
The demand approach was advocated by Allen, based on positing a 
demand curve for agricultural products (Allen 2001: 13). Consumer 
theory requires that own price, income, and cross-price elasticities 
of demand add up to zero. Agricultural production is accordingly 
calculated from the development of real wages and the real prices of 
agricultural and non-agricultural products. The change in income is 
set equal to the change in the wage rate, and rests on the assumption 
of no change in the wage share or labor input per worker. The prob-
lem is, of course, that the assumption of a constant wage share has 
no empirical backing, even for the modern period. Theoretically it 
is motivated by the Cobb-Douglas function in neoclassical growth 
theories, but there are also other functional specifications that do 
not rest on constant shares in the incomes of labor and capital. It is 
also quite likely that the share of labor income was much higher in 
the Middle Ages than it is in a fully developed capitalist economy.
Both the 400-dollar approach and the identification of income 
with wages rest on shaky assumptions. To overcome the gap between 
Smithians and Malthiusians, new measures involving more direct 
indicators of production are necessary. One path forward would be 
to apply a kind of expenditure approach, where reasonable estimates 
are made of consumption and investment patterns to assess the level 
of GDP per capita. The expenditure approach can also be used to 
cross-check whether various estimates are reasonable, such as in the 
quote by Clark that even the assumption that people only live on 
bread must entail a GDP per capita above 400 dollars.
One example can illustrate the expenditure approach. Most studies 
show that food consumption in Sweden, as well as in other Euro-
pean countries, was better in the late Middle Ages than in the early 
nineteenth century. An indicator of the food nutrition standard is 
average heights. For Sweden, archeological findings record that the 
average height among men was 170–174 centimeters in the  Middle 
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Ages, and 170–176 centimeters in the Viking Age (Gustafsson et 
al., 2007). An average height of 172 centimeters is recorded for 
conscripted men born in the 1890s, and a height of 173 centime-
ters for conscripted men born around 1910 (Öberg, 2014: 17). In 
1900, food consumption made up around one third of GDP. In 
that year GDP per capita was 2,202 (1990 Geary-Khamis) dollars 
(Edvinsson 2013). Food consumption alone therefore contributed 
around 700 dollars of the GDP per capita. A similar calculation 
for the early nineteenth century shows that food consumption 
contributed around 600 dollars, consumption of clothes 100–150 
dollars, housing around 50 dollars, wood products (mostly firewood) 
around 50 dollars, and building and construction around 50 dollars 
of the GDP per capita. Given the climatic conditions in Sweden it 
is unlikely that people could survive having much worse clothing, 
housing and warming in the Viking Age or the Middle Ages than 
in the early nineteenth century. Assuming that other parts of GDP 
contributed to less than 50 dollars per capita, GDP per capita in 
Viking age and medieval Sweden should have been around 1,000 
dollars, which is at the same level as in the early nineteenth century.
This very simple application of the expenditure approach shows 
that the GDP per capita in Sweden probably did not change much 
before the nineteenth century. Any growth in some parts of GDP, 
such as trade and the public sector, was mostly offset by a decline 
in food standards. More importantly, the estimate proposed here is 
much above Maddison’s assumption for Sweden of 400 dollars for 
the Viking Age and 650 dollars for the year 1500. This gives further 
support to Clark’s view that no society could have survived on a 
400-dollar subsistence level in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, even if 
we allow that different climatic conditions can be accompanied by 
different subsistence levels (Jerven, 2012: 119).
Summary and conclusions
This paper focuses on the methodological questions and dilemmas 
of reconstructing historical series of global GDP. Various problems 
stem in part from the endeavor to make international comparisons. 
If we want to compare countries and world regions we need common 
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definitions and methods. Sometimes differences must be assumed 
to be of minor importance, otherwise comparisons cannot be made. 
Data collection is extremely time-consuming even for a single country 
or a single branch for a short period. Estimating world GDP in the 
last centuries or millennia necessitates certain shortcuts. 
It must be emphasized that constructing historical national 
accounts is not an exact science. It is inevitable that certain assump-
tions must be made and accepted. Even modern national accounts 
are not very exact, and are based on much guesswork, such as, for 
example, estimating the extent of illegal activities to be included in 
GDP, or other activities prone to a high degree of tax evasion. The 
solution may lie in publishing all the documentation and calcula-
tions that underpin the historical national accounts.
Interpreting history is never a neutral act and neither is the cri-
tique of such interpretation. Which methods and definitions to use 
is not just a purely objective question, but is also dependent on the 
purpose to which each series is to be used. Official national accounts 
are not socially neutral, as they may appear, and are adapted to 
the needs of the social community of the present day, not least its 
 economic policy. Using the same definitions and methods to con-
struct macroeconomic series back to the Middle Ages, or even the 
dawn of mankind, unavoidably introduces anachronistic elements. 
Writing history on the basis of the definitions of official national 
accounting is in a sense partly writing history from the perspective 
of the social system that has conquered the whole world in the last 
two centuries, namely the capitalist system. Putting a price tag on 
all the goods and services produced in societies mainly based on 
self-sufficiency could still be done, however, if there were at least some 
market activities. However, economies with no market  activity, such 
as hunters- gatherers, cannot be valued in current prices.  Similarly, 
some productive activities, such as unpaid domestic services, currently 
excluded from official estimates of GDP, are not priced. There is, 
therefore, a need to develop new alternative measures that are not 
necessarily based on valuations using market prices.
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